Partnership:
Developing Self-Sustaining Security Force Capabilities

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
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Foreword

The Multi-National Corps–Iraq logistics staff and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) support operations cell, an element of the Iraqi Assistance Group, merged at the operational level to publish plans, policies, and procedures that met the strategic aims of the coalition forces, the national goals of the government of Iraq, and the joint campaign plan published by Multi-National Force–Iraq. Corps sustainment planners published operational objectives for execution at the operational and tactical levels in an effort to develop a sustainment-based system for the ISF. Based on experiences and observations over the past 18 months, the partners, advisors, and planners gathered the best practices for advising and assisting security forces at all levels of the sustainment system. This handbook presents partnering considerations in developing a fundamental base for a self-sustaining, host nation security force.

Although based largely on the experiences of units deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2007–2009, the sustainment development ideas and concepts presented in this book are worthy of consideration by any leader assigned the challenging task of developing host nation logistics. This publication is not just for logisticians. All leaders are charged to sustain the force, and many of the lessons learned over the past two years highlight gaps at the collective task/green-tab leader level. Many of the leaders in the Iraqi Army; Iraqi Police; National Police; Department of Border Security; Ministers of Defense, Interior, Transportation, Health, Oil; and many others, including coalition partners were themselves challenged by force sustainment and are critical elements to the solution.

Key Concepts

- Commanders must avoid providing direct support to host nation security forces—if a system exists—and instead provide recommendations supporting the development of a host nation sustainment culture.
- Host nation logistics development requires organizations to assess processes outside their level of war to determine friction points.
- Leaders must recognize the importance of moving from initial assessment and continuing the planning process and plan implementation.
- Development of a process to synchronize efforts across all headquarters to gain unity of effort without unity of command is key to developing host nation systems.
- Systematic problems should be solved rather than symptomatic problems.
- Development of sustainment capabilities for local security forces is essential to establishing a viable local security structure.

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Lieutenant General, US Army
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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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Introduction

COL Edward F. Dorman, Multi-National Corps–Iraq C4

In January 2008, XVIII Airborne Corps deployed to Iraq to serve as the Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) headquarters for the second time in three years. On 22 March, 2008, during the initial assessment phase, Lieutenant General Austin, the MNC–I commander, directed the multi-national division commanders and his staff to “take logistics off the table in the next 12 months as the primary inhibitor of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) effectiveness.” This complex problem in the adapting operational environment required planners from all levels of war to convene and develop a sustainment plan to meet the commander’s intent. To accomplish sustainable security, it was first necessary to unravel the Gordian knot of Iraqi logistics currently existing in Iraq, or, as Alexander the Great decided, to cut through the organizational morass by assessing the baseline, developing a plan to develop workable solutions, directing units and leaders at all levels, and monitoring the progress that currently defines the situation 12 months later: an ISF logistics capability that enables the security of a fragile state.

Assisting the government of Iraq to transform from a consumption-based force to one of sustainment requires unity of effort from all three headquarters in Iraq. MNC–I partners with the operational and tactical units, while Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq partners at the national level. Additionally, Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) provides additional support through engagements at the ministerial level. The process complimented the MNC–I commander’s decision cycle to assess, plan, direct, and monitor the framework for development as outlined in Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. As partners in the sustainable security mission with the ISF, a fifth step was added to the process between direct and monitor—accept. A key part to acceptance was shaping operations through key leader engagements (KLEs). The KLEs focused on understanding Iraqi priorities and discussing implementation through Iraqi means—not coalition solutions—and agreement from the Iraqi leadership was obtained. It was an honor and humbling to serve with the quiet professionals of the ISF.

This handbook is not just for sustainers but for all leaders. Early in the deployment it was discovered that similar to the U.S. Army, ISF commanders drive logistics. In the U.S. Army, operations drive logistics, but in the ISF, logistics drives operations. It is not just partnering at key logistical nodes, but at all levels, and ensuring unity of effort despite unity of command. As the role of advising and assisting becomes the primary role for brigades in Iraq, and as elements begin surging to Afghanistan, this handbook provides a foundation of best practices and lessons learned in assisting the development of a self-sustaining force.
Chapter 1
Forging a Sustainment Culture: What You Didn't Get in Field Manual 3-24

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Introduction

Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, prepares units for nontraditional force sustainment missions above and beyond their normal mission set. So, it was no surprise when the staff and commanders were charged by the Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) commander to “take logistics off the table in the next 12 months as the primary inhibitor to ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] effectiveness” and achieve sustainable security in Iraq. After the surge in 2007, logisticians were faced with three challenges: continue to sustain a larger force, develop and execute a plan for theater logistics reposture (equipment retrograde), and develop the logistics backbone of a self-sustaining ISF. Chapter 8, “Sustainment” of FM 3-24 begins by explaining the logistical considerations for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and the difference from conventional operations. In Iraq, the considerations are not different, they are in addition to sustaining the force.

On 14 February 2008, XVIII Airborne Corps (XVIII ABC) conducted its transfer of authority with III Corps and continued the surge that brought stability to Iraq. In conjunction with the coalition surge of forces, there was also a surge in force generation by the ISF. The government of Iraq (GOI) and coalition forces focused on generating COIN forces. At the same time, coalition forces assumed the risk in developing a logistics capability. Once operational, the formations revealed gaps in the implementation of logistics systems across security forces in Iraq. This assumed risk allowed host nation units to build a dependency on coalition enablers. Sustainment support to training and employing the ISF built a dependency resulting in slowing down their ability to self-sustain. Commanders must direct coalition forces providing sustainment support to host nation security forces. Even if the current host nation system is immature, coalition forces must develop host nation solutions to host nation problems. Developing host nation capability reduces reliance on coalition forces. Coalition strategy must begin partnering while simultaneously gaining an appreciation for the host nation culture. The strategy leverages coalition experience with host nation systems to develop a united solution.

Support to Training and Employing Host Nation Security Forces

True to the doctrinal word, “ISF capability development” became one of the most important lines of operation for coalition forces during the tenure of XVIII ABC in Iraq. Chapter 8, FM 3-24, highlights that in a COIN fight, “some of the most valuable service that military logisticians can provide to COIN operations includes the means and knowledge for setting up or restarting the self-perpetuating sustainment designs. . . . Logistic units provide some of the most versatile and effective nonlethal resources available. . . .”
During the initial assessment, coalition forces provided the support prescribed in FM 3-24. Coalition forces equipped, sustained, trained, and assisted to develop civil capacity and ISF operational capability in the operational environment. However, the problem was coalition forces became the ISF support element. Coalition assistance created a dependency that needed to be broken. The initial tasks listed in FM 3-24 for U.S. forces became a cycle that bred dependency. ISF units came to coalition supportable locations instead of their own, submitted requests for support through the coalition rather than their own channels, and wanted coalition training rather than Iraqi training for logistical military occupational specialties. FM 3-24 sets forth a model that creates a COIN force sustained by coalition forces. The logistics function culminates once coalition support is removed from the structure.

Equipping and Sustaining the Iraqi Security Forces

In November 2008, at the General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC), an MNC–I general officer turned to a Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) general officer and said, “I like the tank as much as the next guy, but the Iraqis can barely maintain the M1114, and now we are going to add an even more complex system?” It was clear there was an internal debate about systems fielded to the Iraqi Army (IA) and the IA’s ability to maintain and sustain them. Currently, the IA utilizes U.S. tanks for training and awaits the delivery of 140 M1A1s. Despite political, national, and military aims—while Iraqi soldiers train—U.S. Soldiers continue to sustain and develop solutions for the ISF.

Developing coalition plans and programs for sustaining the ISF was not a problem. By the fifth year of the war, sustaining coalition forces and the ISF had become the standard for support units. Commanders on the ground had the authority and the money to assist their Iraqi partners regardless of the criticality of the mission. The ISF utilized the coalition’s logistical systems rather than their own at the tactical level. Requesting support from coalition forces was easier than using their own process and resources, and combined combat operations became the ISF’s and coalition’s justification for enabling this dependency. Transition teams shared bases and tents with the ISF, so they shared generators and light sets. In November 2008, one multi-national division (MND) ISF cell leader reported that “there are only two things we continue to provide assistance with... one is Class III (fuel) to the MOI [Ministry of the Interior] entity... and the other is Class VIII (medical supplies).” Additionally, he noted the significant decrease of support over the past seven months. He contributed this success to partnership.

Sustaining through coalition forces made things easier for all involved, but it hid the true source of the problem—at the national/international base there was not a plan for suitable sustainment stocks, equipment, and training. In the U.S. equipping battle update assessment on 31 July, 2008, coalition forces identified the GOI’s aspiration to invest $11 billion in new equipment. The GOI lacked a force development structure to sustain all of its security forces, yet the forces continued to grow. Although FM 3-24 recommends developing a plan with the host nation, it was clear that coalition forces led the charge. As sustainment plans were developed, ISF planners were not engaged in the process.

Motivating the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to publish a process at the national level and promulgate it down to operator level proved to be a challenge. Despite the inability to gain concurrence on an overall national concept of support, coalition forces influenced smaller processes by addressing growing concerns at the tactical
level. Over a period of three years, the IA coded out five vehicles. The low number resulted from a lack of understanding about the process and the cultural fear of punishment for a damaged vehicle. In October 2008, as a result of GOSC direction and numerous key leader engagements, a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) was conducted with IA leaders. This TEWT explained and rehearsed the code-out process. Following the TEWT and now with a published process, the IA coded out over 829 vehicles in the next 4 months. Prior to publishing a process, tactical-level units held vehicles damaged beyond repair. The Iraqis insisted there was an unwritten policy, but the practices were not being applied nor were the appropriate decisions exercised. Units needed damaged vehicles replaced to achieve mission success. At the national level, the policy was not understood or applied. Once the process was in place, the IA began identifying and retrograding equipment.

Developing host nations fail to appreciate the challenges of acquisition and sustainment. As a result, in Iraq, logistics drives operations rather than operations driving logistics. It is hard to explain the budget challenges and predict planning and budget requirements necessary to support a 20-year project to a host nation that speaks in a language without a future tense. It is also hard to plan based on a budget dependent on oil prices. Over a period of about two months, the national budget was reduced by one-third, and the ISF lost a large portion of its force generation money. As the IA purchases M1 tanks, there are inherent challenges in shaping a consumption-based culture to build and sustain a complex system like the M1 tank. Sustaining the M1 requires more than ownership of that capability by the MOD; it requires the synergy of multiple GOI ministries. The complexity of the enterprise of delivering the capabilities necessary to sustain M1s provides its own set of unique challenges.

**Coalition Sustainment**

This was one of the first stories told at the September 2008 sustainment symposium:

A lieutenant general of the IA travels to a certain country to buy 1,000 up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles. He has enough money to buy the vehicles and the sustainment packages, but when he arrives in the country, he is offered 1,000 vehicles with the sustainment packages or 2,000 vehicles without the sustainment package. The lieutenant general arrives back in Iraq, proud of his negotiating skills, with 2,000 vehicles and no sustainment packages.

A group of senior coalition partners are trying to grasp the burden placed upon them to remove logistics as an inhibitor while working with a consumption-based culture. XVIII ABC inherited the plans and programs for equipping and sustaining the ISF from the national level. The mission involved generating and replenishing the ISF and improving the quality of the institutional performance to develop institutions capable of sustainable security. The effort focused at the national level, while MNC–I focused at the tactical and operational levels.

**Iraqi Security Forces submitted requests through the coalition**

There were many days when the ISF support operations cell became a hotline center. In January 2009, a brigade support battalion (BSB) field grade officer phoned the cell and stated, “I have a battalion commander on my FOB [forward operating base], and he has a memo he signed authorizing the KBR [Kellogg,
Brown, and Root] fuel point to issue fuel to the National Police . . . they can’t get fuel through their own channels and he states it would be easier to just issue them fuel from us.” The battalion commander felt empowered because he was the FOB commander, but with over 400 bases in Iraq and an order from the corps commanders directing units to cease this support, it was evident that supply discipline would be a challenge for both coalition forces and the ISF to stop supporting from coalition locations.

On the coalition side, operation order (OPORD) 09-01 directed units to cease support unless the result of not supporting would result in critical mission failure at the national or operational level. Although this directive was issued, it would require green-tab intervention to cease the support. From the corps perspective, it would take more than an order. The corps logistics staff added coalition forces to ISF reporting to the ISF line of operation battle update assessment slide twice a month. MND commanders briefed the corps commander on their support to the ISF through actions taken and resources given to the units. Additionally, the corps issued a fragmentary order (FRAGO) directing units on the proper fuel procedures for the ISF and the coalition process to assist the implementation of the Iraqi system. Both the MOI and the MOD (Director of Transportation and Provisions) issued memorandums directing their forces not to accept fuel support from the coalition.

At least from the MNC–I perspective, equipping and sustaining the ISF had become a procedure units were comfortable executing. In September 2008, MNC–I and the Iraqi Assistance Group hosted a sustainment symposium. The message from the MND–I, MNF–I, and expeditionary sustainment command (ESC) commanders was clear—the IA had become dependent on coalition forces. In June 2008, over $318,000 worth of supplies were given to ISF formations to build force protection platforms, repair vehicles, or fuel the force. Most of the effort focused on the IA. It was assumed later that the MOI elements had matured quicker than the MOD elements because the lack of support from coalition forces left them to develop their own systems.

It was a lesson learned early on—the only way to truly enforce a policy was through the coalition and ISF orders process. Both ministries struggled to capture requirements and establish allocations when they were issuing less fuel due to coalition support. Despite written directives, stopping support continued to be a challenge.

**Coalition training sought for logistical military occupational specialties**

Providing individual training for a host nation is acceptable in the absence of a structured training program. On-the-job training is often required in an operational environment where there is an immediate need to build a capability. However, coalition forces providing the host nation individual training does not produce long-term solutions. Instead, providing the same training as what is available from host nation institutions cripples their system and reduces student enrollment. It became evident while planning OPORD 09-01 that MNC–I needed to get out of the individual sustainment training business and consolidate training efforts at the institution level to ultimately empower the organization established by the GOI to carry on after the coalition leaves Iraq.
The MOD established the Iraqi Army Service and Support Institution (IASSI) on March 15, 2005. The school provides a range of courses to literate IA service members of the IA and the general command of the ISF. According to the IASSI course catalog mission statement, the institution develops logistics support doctrine and delivers quality, forward-thinking, and relevant training and knowledge and skills for soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers in combat service support disciplines for the ISF. Instruction includes maintenance, transportation and fuel, ammunition, food service, medical, and personnel courses.

However, the institution falls short of its mission statement. Coalition training at ISF locations is the primary choice because units do not lose the soldier for a period of time only for them to return without being properly trained. The support for the IASSI is dependent on the number of students who attend. Similar to coalition to ISF resource support, the ISF became dependent on coalition training efforts. It had become a routine procedure for military training teams to call up their local BSB and request individual training. Although individual training enhanced ISF performance, ISF units began choosing coalition training over IASSI instruction.

Resources for training must be consolidated at the institution level. There are 14 divisions with the same low-density training problems. Coalition forces conducting the same courses at the various units within the divisions are not an effective use of time and resources. The coalition needs to focus its resources on producing quality blocks of instruction at the IASSI with the IA that are worthwhile for units to send their soldiers to.

The IA cannot send all of its soldiers to school because it is conducting stability operations and has mission requirements to support. If training is required on site, this training should come from regional training facilities, traveling training courses from IASSI, and from the Iraqis themselves. If the Iraqis do not have the parent skill set to teach the required course, the coalition—if it conducts any low-density training—should train the ISF in the form of train-the-trainer to achieve sustainable results.

The coalition has a finite amount of money, time, and resources, and should focus at the division level on collective tasks, logistics management, and training the IA to teach its soldiers individual tasks. Agencies working with the IASSI and training institutions have the mission of creating worthwhile individual training that lives up to the IASSI mission.

**Iraqi Security Forces Logistics**

The coalition struggled to understand the structure, culture, and logistics of the ISF. This resulted in a downgraded ability to develop ISF sustainment functions. Despite the lack of a mature national sustainment system, and minor challenges with corruption, there was a system in place to sustain the ISF. Coalition forces viewed the host nation logistics system through a western sustainment concept lens. Coalition forces fielded, supported, and wrote doctrine and processes for the ISF. Similar to the vignette in FM 3-24, the ISF was receiving mature equipment systems from many countries wishing to assist in rebuilding Iraq or involved in foreign military sales. The ISF remained challenged by a lack of fleet standardization; supply discipline problems; no published plans, policies, procedures; and a lack of materiel management. The coalition further exacerbated
this problem by directing a sovereign government’s way ahead rather than developing a combined solution through coalition experience and ISF systems.

In February 2009, the IA had over 140 different vehicle fleets, but lacked a mature sustainment base to maintain, sustain, and repair them. Advising and partnering at the national level must occur to assist controlling fleet standardization. The Iraqi director of electrical and mechanical engineering stated to his partner that the GOI “appreciates the coalition gifting them, but very few came with spare parts, and almost none came with repair parts manuals. In short, he has to manage the maintenance liability with very austere resources.” The result was the need for a more diverse and robust support system.

Supply discipline continues to be a symptomatic problem in the ISF. The IA joint headquarters (JHQ) deputy chief of staff for logistics (DCOS LOG) lacks asset visibility and, in turn, withholds delegated authority to release repair parts at his discretion. Through key leader engagements and partnering at all levels, coalition forces assisted in the development of policies to enforce supply discipline, materiel accountability, and Iraqi-produced materiel.

The ISF had informal equipment accountability processes. It was evident during the initial assessment that the only way to establish supply discipline and materiel accountability was through processes developed at the national level and disseminated to the lowest levels. From a western sustainment perspective, the need to establish and promulgate policies and processes are necessary for supply and materiel discipline. On 1 February 2009, the Ministry of Defense DCOS LOG signed and released the Materiel Circulation Processes Handbook to codify logistics processes. The handbook was written by advisors along with IA input. The handbook discusses the supply process and begins to shape a chain of responsibility; however, it fails to address equipment accountability.

Coalition forces added to the problem by issuing additional items directly to units without involving the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC). The IGFC serves as an operational headquarters charged with plans, policies, and procedures for property accountability. The lack of visibility on equipment gained from the coalition resulted in poor accountability. In January, the Multi-National Security and Transitional Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I) published a FRAGO through MNF–I directing coalition forces to conduct a 100 percent inventory of IA equipment in an effort to regain accountability. Circumventing the host nation system caused a loss of supply accountability for all forces and an increase of coalition manpower to resolve the issue.

To institutionalize the materiel management effort, coalition forces worked with the MOD to establish the Combined Logistics Operations Center (CLOC). The purpose of the CLOC is to provide fast, accurate, and actionable logistics readiness information; and receive, track, and recommend viable solutions for key logistics issues influencing the effectiveness of joint forces. Additionally, the CLOC provides asset visibility and increases data analysis, enabling viable options and logistic-readiness reporting.

The establishment of the CLOC began in November 2008. The CLOC was a seven-person organization (composed of one Air Force and six Army personnel) designed to provide the commander, JHQ Iraqi Armed Forces, fast, accurate, and actionable logistics readiness information to include key equipment serviceability.
status and the availability of critical sustainment commodities. MNSTC–I partnered to develop the organization and increase asset visibility for the JHQ. A lesson learned was that increasing capabilities, especially at the national level, required an increase in both advisors and partners. Reflecting back, the ESC had the most similar organizations to partner with and advise the CLOC. The 3d ESC commander, Brigadier General Michael Lally, and his staff scheduled numerous key leader engagements to demonstrate relevant systems in the support operations section that were similar to Iraqi concepts.

The purpose of the CLOC included improved asset visibility, improved funding for a new facility with an expected completion date of 26 January, and improved information technology. The result was a logistics library incapable of actioning data. Additionally, JHQ directed units to submit a weekly report to the CLOC. The laborious process required ammunition, fuel, equipment inventories, life support status, deadline reports, and production updates.

A joint, automated maintenance program was installed and slowly passes information down to logistics and repair facilities at the operational level throughout Iraq. The program allows the CLOC visibility over depot repair parts. Formal training was necessary for both coalition forces and ISF service members to ensure full implementation. Additionally, the manning for the CLOC is expected to expand to 30 personnel to manage the task at hand. There are dedicated subject matter experts (SMEs), improved data flow, and compilation from unit data reports. The CLOC now receives, tracks, and recommends viable solutions for key logistics issues influencing combat effectiveness of the joint forces. Although the systems have developed, the CLOC still does not meet the DCOS LOG’s vision due to a lack of manpower, adequate office space, documented processes, materiel management center–SME partnership, and a partnered plan ahead.

Summary

The guidance in FM 3-24 provides an outline yet very little substantive information on how a multinational force can truly develop a nation’s sustainment base for all the security forces. Corruption, supply discipline, and materiel accountability were all symptomatic problems with the inability of the ISF to self-sustain, but they were not the root cause. Decades of requiring many signatures and minimal delegated authority combined with a lack of plans, policies, and procedures convoluted the ability to train supply discipline, and maintain materiel accountability. Additionally, coalition forces must simultaneously learn and reinforce partner-nation systems that foster an appreciation of host nation logistics.

Although COIN doctrine prescribes support to training and employing host nation security forces, deployed logisticians must provide recommendations and guidance against providing direct support to host nation security forces. Projecting a sustainment culture on a consumption-based security force increases the sustainment challenges, increases host nation dependency on the advising force, and requires leveraging mature systems on a fragile state.

Fragile states have limited resources. Convincing leadership to prioritize resources toward sustainment is often difficult in a consumption-based society. The initial tasks listed in FM 3-24 for U.S. forces became a cycle that bred dependency. Coalition forces focused on establishing a COIN force dependent on coalition logistics, and is currently attempting to transition responsibility back to the GOI.
Chapter 2
Assessing the Iraqi Security Forces Sustainment Structure

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“As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is
directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed.”
—Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

Introduction

The complexity of the coalition structure in Iraq stagnates the decision making
process beginning with the assessments conducted during mission analysis.
Developing host nation logistics requires organizations to assess outside their level
of war to determine friction points. If each level of war assesses internally and
doesn’t explore other levels, then the ability to move a host nation support structure
forward could stagnate. Through a western lens, sustainment is interdependent on
other levels of supply.

The corps commander’s directive to remove logistics as an inhibitor to sustainable
security required a synchronized plan at all levels. An organization—especially one
annually rotating smaller units through it—faces the challenge of getting stuck in
the initial assessment phase. Further, the addition of two more headquarters
elements, with individual augmentees rotating through leadership positions and
directing further initial assessments adds to the challenge. The result is a high
personnel rotation with a lack of institutional knowledge about the host nation. A
lack of unity of effort through a structured process exacerbated the development.

Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) struggled to develop a unified common plan
driven by the headquarters responsible for the operational environment in which the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are employed. Other organizations remained focused on
data collection and assessing the problem. According to Field Manual Interim
5-0.1, The Operations Process, assessment is the “continuous monitoring and
evaluation of the current situation and progress of an operation.” Despite the
measurements of performance and effectiveness utilized to monitor progress, an
initial assessment following the surge both reviewed the changing conditions and
developed a plan to assist Iraqi leadership to determine what was important and
unimportant, categorized problems, dealt with the issues that did not fit into a
category, and assessed the ISF issues from its perspective at all levels. Leaders
must recognize the importance of moving from initial assessment, while continuing
the planning process, and ultimately implementing the plan. Additionally, coalition
forces ensure continuity of execution and directing implementation and evaluate the
process.

The mission began months before the sustainment charge from the corps
commander or the establishment of a committee by corps. The resources and
sustainment staff (C4) developed several venues to assess the baseline, progress, and future needs of a self-sustaining force. The assessment process, conducted by XVIII Airborne Corps (XVIII ABC), began at Fort Bragg, NC, continued during the predeployment site survey (PDSS), and through the initial assessment phase following the transfer of authority (TOA) by the coalition and the government of Iraq. Prior to planning, an assessment resulting in direction from the ministries provided the tools necessary to begin planning.

Assessing During the Mission Readiness Exercise

During the mission readiness exercise (MRX), the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) staff travelled to Fort Bragg to participate with the XVIII ABC staff. The C4, Colonel (COL) Ed Dorman, met with Major General Khudhair, the IGFC G4 (senior sustainment staff officer—an operational level command) to discuss and assess the current state of logistics in the Iraqi Army (IA). He presented the Iraqi concept of logistical support and force structure. The two logisticians visited American logistics units, observed training, and reviewed equipment. COL Dorman observed that it took approximately “90 days to develop and engender the trust in my new culture.” Past experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan taught him that “you must invest the requisite time building trust, understanding the Iraqi terms and approach, and not force a U.S. perspective and solution on your host.” It was during the exercise that the C4 staff learned about the Iraqi logistics system and the four levels of support: (1) first line is company through brigade level; (2) second line is division; (3) third line is a direct support unit to the division which does not report to the division; and (4) fourth line is the national depot level. It is important to note that during the corps’ tenure, the four levels of support morphed into five levels. The fifth level focused on developing an international sustainment base.

Based on COL Dorman’s past experiences, he knew the only way to get his staff to truly embrace Iraqi logistics was through an Iraqi lens. Part of the assessment involved understanding ISF logistics. He was also well aware that the charge was not just the IA, but all the security elements including those under the Ministry of Interior (MOI)—National Police (NP), Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), and Iraqi Police (IP).

Both the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the MOI would require partnerships to mature their sustainment systems.

Predeployment Site Survey

During the PDSS, COL Dorman assessed the complexity of the ministerial relationships in achieving ISF self-reliance. Utilizing a systems-thinking approach he recognized the interconnectedness of decision making, budgetary constraints, and executing sustainment functions. For example, fuel support for the NP requires an authorization from the Ministry of Oil, budget approval from the Ministry of Finance, and contract approval from a different ministry.

The other challenge during the PDSS was the ability to assess the grievances of both the leaders at the national level and soldiers at the tactical level. As the operational headquarters, it would take issues from both leaders and soldiers and assist developing a plan for the way ahead. Additionally, there was no provision to assess the goals of the MOD and MOI in reference to their sustainment systems.
For the assessment to be valid and effective, it would need input from leaders and soldiers and up until this point, the only input was from the IGFC.

**Assessment Following Transfer of Authority**

The assessment phase continued through the first months following the MNC–I TOA on 14 February, 2008. The initial assessment determined ISF logistics systems were ineffective. From the PDSS to TOA, conditions were changing and systems shifting. Internal to the ISF, Iraqis lacked confidence. Both MOD and MOI logistics processes were documented but not standardized across the individual forces. There were major differences between the MOI processes and those of the NP, DBE, and IP. Coalition forces focused primarily on the IA and the priority for support neglected the MOI. Multi-National Forces–Iraq (MNF–I) commissioned a study looking at the ministerial level. Coalition forces lacked the capacity to partner across all elements focused on counterinsurgency. Coalition forces main efforts developed the IA, then the NP. Additionally, the C4 observed the Iraqi dependence on coalition forces for easy solutions to its sustainment problems. The well-intentioned efforts by coalition forces provided short-term solutions to Iraqi logistical issues and were counter-productive to creating Iraqi systems.

Immediately, the new partners began to execute the logistics initiative which originated at the August MRX at Fort Bragg. During this MRX, the C4 and the IGFC G4 laid the groundwork for this initiative. The key to implementation lay in partnering between coalition force logistics units and their counterparts within the ISF to enable and professionalize the ISF. The C4 began to analyze how to approach the issue of building and developing self reliance. The key to a successful logistics initiative using the commander’s vision required the partnership of coalition and Iraqi units at critical logistics nodes. The approach used U.S. experience and standards to augment Iraqi experiences and performance to ensure Iraqi terms and workable solutions to Iraqi problems.

Following the charge from Lieutenant General Austin, it was clear that the plan ahead must be a combined effort among all three headquarters and most importantly, the Iraqis. In May 2008, MNC–I hosted the first sustainment symposium in an effort to bring all the coalition stakeholders together. The purpose and focus allowed participants to share a common perspective of logistics partnership activities through an initial assessment; update the field on current policies; and share ideas, best practices, and progress towards ISF self-reliance.

Each symposium, held over a 12 month period, featured an update from each multi-national division, the expeditionary sustainment command, and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Arabian Peninsula; logistics initiatives from Iraqi units; objectives for the next quarter; and potential coalition force rotations to ensure continuity. Featured speakers from Multi-National Security and Transitional Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I) discussed projected force structure, units set fielding for ISF units, specific training courses, and other ISF force generation activities. MNF–I provided situational awareness of strategic engagements with ministries and U.S. national-level partners (such as the Defense Logistics Agency, Army Materiel Command, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, and Training and Doctrine Command). The symposium provided a venue for stakeholder collaboration and synchronization of individual efforts. This effort was most often brought about during breakout sessions which were scheduled in advance and specific members were identified and prepared to attend with...
supporting ideas and required input to support the desired change or defined end state. Breakout sessions ended with an outbrief to a general officer panel that considered the issue, provided guidance, and recommended whether to include it in the next quarterly update to the MNC–I and MNSTC–I commanders on ISF logistics development. A critical note and lesson learned—there was no direct Iraqi input to the symposiums; this was a common observation by participants. The recommendation surfaced but the common answer became, “we have to get our ducks in order before we invite the Iraqis.” Leaders spent so much time trying to develop the perfect plan that it was forgotten who needed to own the plan.

**Iraqi Security Forces Goals Based Upon Iraqi Security Forces Assessments**

Following the September symposium, MOI and MOD guidance was provided to the coalition forces to assist in assessing and developing a plan. Input was received indirectly from the joint headquarters deputy chief of staff for logistics (DCOS LOG), the MOI, and various advisors. The goals directed by the DCOS LOG were:

- Reorganize all logistics directorates and units.
- Bring outlying logistics units having been separated out back under the DCOS LOG.
- Elevate the level of performance for all logisticians.
- Ensure availability of financial resources.
- Establish logistics policies.
- Conduct logistics training to achieve a common understanding.
- Develop a comprehensive and integrated logistics system.
- Develop an acquisition strategy.

Two of the goals established by Minister Bolani, MOI were sustainment focused:

- Develop capabilities of the MOI and its field troops by closing up the gaps, training personnel, supplying, supporting, and enhancing infrastructure through importing modern and up-to-date equipment.
- Modernize and update activities of the MOI through improving efficiency to develop MOI capacities in the field of planning, improved programs of human resources administration, procurement (contracting), logistics, administration reform, financial administration and budget managing, execute investment projects, and make use of international experiences and experiments for the advance countries in the field of security.

**Summary**

Developing a host nation’s sustainment system requires an assessment of complex and challenging systems that determine progress, create desired conditions, achieve objectives, and more importantly, assess the host nation. The direction given by
Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, “the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed” is not true in developing host nation logistics. The logistics system developed by the host nation may drive the direction of assessments which occur at every level and in Iraq the levels tend to shift and be a bit blurred. Additionally, in Iraq there are two operational level headquarters with their own objectives and desired conditions. Both are dependent on each other to assess, plan, and direct to meet their commander’s intent.
Chapter 3

Unity of Effort Without Unity of Command:
The Iraqi Logistics Development Committee Process

COL Edward F. Dorman, Multi-National Corps–Iraq C4, and MAJ Michelle M.T. Letcher, Multi-National Corps–Iraq Sustainment Planner

Introduction

As the corps began to cut through the organizational morass that defined the logistical task organization in Iraq, logisticians had to find the next Gus Pagonis and establish a clear and unconvoluted logistics task organization to ensure sustainable security. The introduction of Lieutenant General (Ret.) Gus Pagonis, the Chief of Logistics (Forward) for U.S. Central Command, and his exploits as a manager and leader during and after Operation Desert Storm is meant only to produce thought and discussion in the logistics community. The current operational environment required a logistical leader who had the capability and ability to establish a commander’s intent and develop the plan to support that vision across all three headquarters in Iraq. Whether this was accomplished through the existing logistical task organization or through changes to current task organization, the strategic implications were clear, this change was needed for both the coalition and Iraqis to succeed logistically, and the change was needed now rather than during the Operation Iraqi Freedom after action review.

At times there appeared to be a lack of unity of effort in developing Iraqi logistics capabilities. Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) focused its efforts on developing the Ministry of Interior capabilities while Multi-National Security and Transitional Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I) focused its efforts on the Ministry of Defense. This conflict in priorities resulted in an inability to surge capabilities across the theater.

Leading the Effort (Staff Officer or Commander)

In the absence of a senior logistical commander at the force level, and an operational sustainment commander partnered only at the operational level, who has the lead to synchronize efforts? Some of the biggest challenges facing the development of host nation logistics in Iraq included the lack of an empowered decision maker, leaders with directive authority over all of the executors, and an inability to influence at the ministerial level. Additionally, there was a lack of general officers with a sustainment background. (Note: Following transfer of authority, there was only one logistics general officer in Iraq and he was the expeditionary sustainment command commander. In the absence of this individual, the task fell to commanders and staff officers across all three organizations). Joint forces coordinate and share information across staff functions. In Iraq, the need was for synchronization across three headquarters and the government of Iraq. Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, states the following:

Effective joint operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates. The most common technique for promoting this cross-functional collaboration is the formation of centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, planning teams, and other enduring or
temporary organizations that manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment.

Sustainment leaders understood the requirement to develop a process that could build the same synchronization from the action officer to the two senior operational commanders in Iraq and across headquarters. The Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG) commanding general, Brigadier General Keith Walker, and the corps C4 (senior resources and sustainment staff officer), Colonel Ed Dorman, partnered with MNSTC–I and Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I). They brought their commanders’ intent, visions of resolution, and end state to one synchronization process to achieve sustainable security in Iraq. The Iraqi logistics development process established a methodology for synchronizing unity of effort without unity of command.

The Iraqi Logistics Development Committee

The Iraqi Logistics Development Committee (ILDC) is a MNC–I C4/1AG/MNSTC–I J4 (logistics) initiative was proposed as early as September 2007, but achieved maturity during the February to August 2008 timeframe and continued to change as the conditions improved in Iraq. The initial assessment showed synchronizing efforts and building a plan in unison would help drive success in building logistics for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The process aimed to synchronize coalition logistics efforts—primarily at the tactical and operational levels—to maximize partnering and advising outcomes.

The IAG Breeze is an on-line conference that allows stakeholders in multi-national divisions to identify challenges, problems, and best practices in their ISF logistics partnering. The issues are taken forward to the ILDC Council of Colonels. This has transitioned into a combined Council of Colonels and more recently termed the Combined Sustainment Council. Combined refers to both coalition and Iraqi participation. It is at the Council of Colonels where the key leader engagement (KLE) synchronization process begins. Messages, based on feedback from the tactical level, are assessed for relative priority and potential for success. Impacts and approaches are synchronized across the KLE levels. This ensures that issues are elevated to national/ministerial level advisors.

The General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC), chaired by the IAG commanding general, meets monthly to take the unresolved issues presented by the Council of Colonels and provide guidance, concurrence, direction, and, if necessary, KLEs. As the operational headquarters, MNC–I chaired the efforts to nest the national/strategic aims to tactical outputs. The decision making and unity of effort is provided by the direction of this committee.

Each quarter welcomes the beginning and end of a process. The quarterly update to the operational commanders in Iraq nests all levels of logistics (national/strategic, operational, and tactical). The brief provides the leaders an overview of past progress, current efforts, and future goals. At the conclusion of the brief, the two three-star commanders direct the way ahead and provide additional guidance. It is also another venue to prompt KLEs. It is important to note that the MNC–I and MNSTC–I commanders met on a weekly basis and there were numerous opportunities to prepare a KLE packet for the MNC–I commander to engage the MNSTC–I commander on issues between updates.
The process begins again with the quarterly symposiums. The May symposium began the process and delivered the five focus areas: codify processes, logistics enablers, repair parts/maintenance, advisor requirements, and metrics. Additionally, the symposium highlighted the need for a logistics partnering effort in support of the logistics advisor on the military transition team. The symposiums began with opening comments by the Security Force Assistance (previously the IAG) general officer and then a series of briefings. Advisors across all levels received guidance, priorities, and interacted with other subject matter experts to create options to resolve difficult challenges. For example, an advisor questioned the Iraqi process of tying fuel allocation to operational readiness. The result clarified the process so advisors could assist and coach their counterparts on problem solving. Finally, the attendees broke into groups addressing the five focus areas. The groups had members from each of the ISF logistics levels.

Once the corps partnered with coalition organizations and established a synchronization process they were able to provide cross coordination and information sharing. September saw a surge in the process with a united sustainment symposium of over 160 participants and a GOSC with eight general officers. It was through this process that the assessment, planning, directing, and monitoring of ISF self-sustainment was monitored during the XVIII ABC tenure. The process continues to transition and grow. The inclusion of Iraqis began in December with the first combined Council of Colonels and in March for the first combined GOSC.

The process, although very successful, still has several opportunities for growth. First, coalition forces must begin the process immediately, even if there is a deliberate decision to wait on logistics enablers. Additionally, there must be an overarching advisor strategy and synchronization process. All three levels advised on their own priorities and, in some cases, even after there was concurrence through the ILDC, the efforts were not nested. Developing a strategy for approval by the GOSC, to be tracked through measures of performance and measures of effectiveness can add to the successes of developing host nation logistics.

Summary

Despite the lack of unity of command, leaders from all three headquarters were able to assess, plan, and direct the way ahead for ISF sustainment. One plan translated down to the tactical levels and ensured synchronized actions. This deliberative process required great patience at a time when patience was wearing thin. National will and political shifts expedited efforts for sustainable security. Logistical leaders, both commanders and staff, established a commander’s intent and developed the plan to support that vision across all three headquarters in Iraq. The result was a plan that was actionable by all elements of MNF–I. The unity of effort required to remove logistics as an inhibitor overcame the lack of unity of command.
Chapter 4
Planning the Year Ahead

COL Edward F. Dorman, Multi-National Corps–Iraq C4, and MAJ Michelle M.T. Letcher, Multi-National Corps–Iraq Sustainment Planner

“We have been assessing for the past eight months; it is time to execute.”
—MNC–I general officer at the September 2008 General Officer Steering Committee

Introduction

The way ahead for Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) self-sustainment required adaptive planning. Although it began as a stand alone plan, it was clear it would turn into a tab/annex to the Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) operation order (OPORD) and then tucked into the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) joint campaign plan as an appendix. OPORD 08–02 directed a logistics partnership plan based upon outputs from the first symposium in May, but after the September symposium leaders realized there would need to be a more systemic, rather than symptomatic, approach to the plan. Joint sustainment operation planning was directed by the September General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC), approved by the November GOSC, and this decision resulted in the formation of the MNC–I/MNF–I/Multi-National Security and Transitional Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I) planning team that published a plan in December 2008.

Operational Planning Team

The September GOSC directed the establishment of an operational planning team (OPT). The logistics staff (C4) developed a weekly planning meeting (online) from the symposium sustainment plan breakout group that morphed into an OPT. The team consisted of force planners from the ISF strategic planning cell, MNSTC–I advisors, and a representative from MNC–I. About halfway through the planning process, an Army Materiel Command (AMC) representative assisted and helped mold the effort. The real missing element was Iraqi participation, but requests for their inclusion fell on deaf ears as the team pushed forward. Much of this was due to the lack of a synchronized, overarching advisor strategy. Input was received indirectly from the Iraqi joint headquarters deputy chief of staff for logistics, the Minister of Interior (MOI), and various advisors.

Early guidance focused the team on the Ministry of Defense because the Iraqi Army (IA) had a more mature logistics system than the MOI. It seemed plausible at the time, but looking back, less might have been more. It could be argued that coalition assistance enabled reliance instead of self-reliance. However, that is an assumption that is not validated.

There had been some initial analysis conducted by leaders in the field; a white paper on the “Logistics Capability Assessment and the Way Ahead for the Iraqi
Security Ministries,” dated February 2008, and gap analysis conducted by force planners. The team also received some guidance from the symposium, the Council of Colonels, and the Iraqi Assistance Group commander (who chairs the GOSC) to focus on five key areas: codify processes, logistics enablers, metrics, advisory requirements, and repair parts and maintenance. The team took the guidance, about 24 shortfalls, and feedback through Adobe Connect forums and reduced the list to sixteen gaps and assigned a timeline.

After the September symposium assessment, members of the sustainment plan breakout group agreed to focus on repair parts and maintenance. Leaders chose repair parts and maintenance because secondary gains could be made with the supporting elements in the areas of distribution to push the parts, fuel to move the trucks, and supply management for supplies delivered. Development of a sustainment culture versus that of attrition warfare proved key to this effort. This focus required movement and fuel assets, which drive more than one logistics core capability for the ISF. Once those areas were identified, the OPT hosted an Adobe Connect symposium 10–11 October 2008 with participants from the expeditionary sustainment command, multi-national divisions, and advisors from MNSTC–I. Once this was complete, the group broke and began working on individual plans. C4 worked on the corps order, and a member of the ISF strategic planning cell worked on the appendix to the joint campaign plan. The lesson learned from this approach was all plans must be nested. MNSTC–I developed a separate plan that did not nest with MNC–I and MNF–I. Desynchronized execution resulted from different plans.

Elements of Operational Design

Following the direction from the GOSC and utilizing the national strategic end state and guidance from the joint campaign plan, the planning team focused on a sustainment-centric operational design to ensure all operations were “by, with, and through” the ISF.

Termination criteria

The termination criteria were different for MNF–I, MNC–I, and MNSTC–I. MNSTC–I’s termination criteria focused on unit set fielding. Units from MNC–I tied their criteria to the operational readiness assessment (ORA) percentage. MNC–I picked up the organization from unit set fielding and partners until they become ORA 1.

End state

ISF achieved initial operational capability (IOC) no later than April 2009. IOC was defined as the ISF demonstrating the ability to delegate authority, make responsive decisions, gain asset visibility, and conduct life cycle management functions verified through procuring, requisitioning, distributing, and retrograding principle items across strategic, operational, and tactical levels; and having the capacity to maintain an operational readiness rate of 70 percent on M1114s.

Effects/Desired conditions

MNF–I referred to these conditions as cornerstones, but from an operational perspective they were necessary conditions to achieve the commander’s vision. The
desired conditions support the operational objectives by clarifying the relationship between the tasks and objectives:

- Delegated authorities. Obtained authority from another as an appointed right to command by a person in virtue of his office or trust.
- Responsive decisions. Making decisions at the lowest level commensurate with responsibility for the desired outcome.
- Life-cycle management. A concept of life-cycle management from acquisition to obsolescence for equipment fleets.
- Asset visibility. The capability to provide timely and accurate information on the location, movement, status of equipment, materiel, and supplies, enabling commanders to manage the asset.

**Center of gravity**

Given MNC–I OPORD 09-01 and the joint campaign plan, the OPT attempted to look at the elements of operation design to put the planning effort in perspective. At the operational level, the planners identified the Combined Logistics Operations Center (CLOC) as the center of gravity. The CLOC—although woefully understaffed—mirrored, in theory, a materiel management center.

- Critical capability. Timely, accurate, and responsive reporting/executing the budget to meet requirements.
- Critical requirement. An approved budget to support sustainment.
- Critical vulnerability. Lack of a process or plan.

**Decisive points**

There were several decisive points and all were tied to gaining concurrence and process production from the ISF and tied to accomplishing the commander’s intent. Prior to publishing the plan, corps planners briefed the GOSC on the decision points. On 3 November 2008, the briefer explained the need to gain Iraqi concurrence on the plan by 18 November 2008 and publish a policy to be promulgated down to the battalion level of the IA by 1 December 2008. The MNSTC–I general officer stated that the time line would not allow a policy, but they would be able to publish a process. MNC–I utilized these two dates as the first two decision points for the commander. The lack of a published process or gained concurrence triggered a key leader engagement (KLE) between the two commanders.

**Direct versus indirect approach**

At the MNC–I level, it was required to do both. The MNC–I C4 staff partnered directly with the IGFC logistics staff. Indirectly, MNC–I struggled to balance partnering at the national/strategic levels. Toward the end of the tour, the C4 put an experienced advisor as a liaison officer to MNSTC–I. In turn, MNSTC–I placed the
liaison officer as the advisor to electrical mechanical engineering at Iraqi joint headquarters. Indirectly, MNC–I influenced a synchronized effort for repair parts at the national/strategic, operational, and tactical levels in the IA.

Lines of operation

From a sustainment perspective, self-sustaining ISF became a line of effort but did not create lines of operations. The line of effort had four operational objectives. The objectives chosen followed the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) format. The planners recognized the lack of a tool to manage capabilities and reverted to a familiar western model. It was clear after conducting the Adobe Connect symposium that in an effort to achieve any sustainment goals it would be necessary to standardize processes throughout Iraq. The team decided to develop a plan around the following four objectives:

- Establish doctrine. The ISF has the ability to develop and promulgate plans, policies, and procedures across all sustainment functions.
- Organizational structure. The ISF has the understanding and ability to develop and field the appropriate personnel and equipment to field capability gaps within their security forces.
- Training, personnel, and Leadership. The ISF can train, man, and provide oversight to allow planning and execution of sustainment missions to support security forces. Formal and informal venues through the ISF internalizes and enforces the correct execution of policies and procedures. Leadership represents those specific actions taken by leaders at all levels that influence behavior and ensure compliance with policies and procedures.
- Infrastructure. The ISF has the ability to establish a foundation to build an infrastructure that represents physical locations, equipment, and capabilities that facilitate a given action.

Simultaneity and depth

The corps shifted priorities in OPORD 09-01 to the MOI while directing continued development of critical IA enablers like logistics. Due to a lag in logistics, the effort on the IA needed to be conducted simultaneously with the MOI forces. Additionally, the lack of depth of partnering resources reduced as military transition teams remissioned and ISF units continued to force generate. For example, the Iraqi Police established eighteen general directorates of police, one per province, but coalition forces are not in all provinces at a time when the depth should be on the corps effort.

Timing and tempo

The end state tied to a date rather than conditions. The plan allowed for flexibility if there was a change in U.S. administration and anticipated an accelerated reduction of coalition forces.
Forces and functions

It was clear during the OPT and even back during the initial assessment that all three headquarters needed to attack all levels simultaneously to move forward. Synchronized effort was critical. Additionally, a bottom-up approach proved to be successful. In the Iraqi culture there is a hesitancy to tell superiors that help is required to move forward. Partnering at the lowest levels built confidence and allowed Iraqi problems to be addressed through Iraqi leadership with the proper advisors to assist with process development.

Leverage

Action officers and the plan required leveraging KLEs to accomplish the objectives. The KLEs would not just be coalition forces-to-ISF but MNC–I to MNSTC–I and MNF–I. This was written in the plan.

Balance

The plan for balancing the effort required mixing capabilities at the national/strategic levels. Although MNC–I was not partnered at these levels, it still required the proper advisors at the proper levels. The proper timing required the proper advisors from AMC, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Army Training and Doctrine Command and information technology experts to assist in setting the conditions for growth.

Anticipation

Looking back, there were many opportunities to exploit the situation at the ISF/MNSTC–I level. The fielding of equipment and trying conditions based on establishing policies or process could have resulted in accomplishing more.

Synergy

In addition to balance, there was a lack of synergy utilizing assets outside the U.S. military. There were a large number of resources and governmental agencies that could have assisted the mission but gaining momentum for these efforts were part of the planning efforts but near impossible to execute. Although both the AMC and DLA commanders agreed to provide policy development expertise at the operator level during visits to Iraq, a deliberate coalition approach at the national level refrained from requesting support.

Culmination

At the time of planning, it was evident that the result of the presidential elections would play a role in culmination as MNC–I begins to shift focus to retrograde and base closure. ISF self-sustainment was front loaded with the realization that depending on the outcome of the U.S. elections, sustainment units would begin to shift on retrograde and away from logistics partnering.

Arranging operations

In addition to the culmination, the phased plan tied to time rather than conditions. Planners wrote three phases:
Phase Ia: Set the conditions.

Phase Ib: Logistics surge.

Phase II: Reduce the sustainment force.

Conclusion

After two weeks, the OPT briefed their plan to the November GOSC for direction and at the MNC–I/MNSTC–I commanders quarterly update for approval. Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin, the MNC–I commander, provided additional guidance. He observed that the ISF had made significant progress and we needed to assist them to build confidence in their own systems. He stated there were two ways this could be accomplished: (1) by an automated process that allows an opportunity for that confidence to grow and (2) informing their senior leadership of the progress and strengths in the ISF system. Lieutenant General Frank Helmick directed the GOSC to begin combining the ILDC process and increase dialogue for the way ahead. The other element the MNSTC–I commander would like to see added to the goals is infrastructure development. MNC–I planned to publish OPORD 09-01 in December 2008 with an implementation date of 1 January 2009. The Iraqi sustainment development plan required immediate implementation. As a result, the GOSC agreed to publish a portion in the 08-02 Bridging FRAGO and then the remainder would be published as a tab in OPORD 09-01.
Chapter 5
Directing: The Iraqi Sustainment Development Plan

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Sustainment Planner

Introduction

Counterinsurgency operations cover diverse missions, tasks, and activities achieving not just the military end state but strategic aims. Built upon previous plans, XVIII Airborne Corps developed each plan over the course of 15 months and provided direction to the multi-national divisions (MNDs), multi-national force (MNF) and the expeditionary sustainment command (ESC) to increase the self-reliance of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). There were a series of fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) directing various tasks, but most of the sustainment directions came from operation order (OPORD) 08-02, the bridging FRAGO, and OPORD 09-01. Corps shifted to an aggressive partnership, key leader engagements, and a synchronization process that resulted in ISF initiatives. The momentum increased as the government of Iraq (GOI) in conjunction with Multi-National Security and Transitional Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I) continued the force generation process; the ISF took the lead and the need for partnerships increased. Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) developed internal plans and provided further direction as the both the coalition and ISF worked towards sustainable security.

Operation Order 08-02

There were a series of OPORDs and FRAGOs issued throughout the deployment based on assessments and planning efforts to develop a self-sustaining force. The first symposium assessed the need to develop a logistics surge through an aggressive logistic partnership program to augment the logistics advisors on the transition teams. Partnering was not a new concept as maneuver formations routinely fought together in the operational environment. In fact, during the surge, MNC–I’s primary focus was developing combat formations to meet an increasing threat. Now it was time to close the gaps and ensure that the combat formations could sustain the line. The natural progression was to expand the partnered maneuver relationship to organic logistics formations for both the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Ministry of Defense (MOD). Added benefits came from coalition logistic units understanding the current fight and Iraqi logistics processes keeping the focus on known logistical shortcomings for pending operations. Reflecting back, MNC–I learned that coalition forces didn’t know the units in the operational environment to the level necessary to influence progress.

OPORD 08-02 established an objective to utilize logistics advising through the military transition teams to assist Iraqi leaders, staffs, and units increase logistics capabilities and efficiencies of MOD and MOI forces. The plan was originally written through June 2009 but altered by the publication of the bridging FRAGO and OPORD 09-01. The three-phased plan first set the conditions through planning, training, assessing, establishing, and measuring the ISF. The second phase adjusted, built, taught, resourced, and reported conditions and changes. The final phase reduced some tasks from the second phase and focused primarily on assessing, adjusting, and reporting. MNC–I recognized the shortfall of not synchronizing the
plan with the GOI and MNSTC–I. The plan published coalition-focused goals, not shared ones.

During the time OPORD 08-02 was published, the infrastructure and organizational structure, which the ISF needed to sustain, continually changed and morphed. Base renovations and the construction of additional location commands provided future logistics enablers to the Iraqi Army (IA). Coalition forces were challenged by the need to understand Iraqi doctrine and systems—doctrine and systems that were not yet published or promulgated.

**The June 2008 Logistics Training and Advisory Team Fragmentary Order**

In June 2008, MNC–I developed logistics training and advisory teams (LTATs) to partner with IA formations at the tactical and operational levels, and MNSTC–I developed the logistics military advisory teams to advise the location commands minus the regional maintenance companies. The LTATs’ mission required partnering with ISF logistics units to provide relevant and viable sustainment training packages to the standard training teams to improve maintenance, supply, and other readiness aspects of the ISF and build self-reliance. The corps commander described partnering as an embedded activity. The LTAT drives the partnering effort; it is not a partner.

Core competencies, necessary for LTAT partnering included logistics planning, sustainment training, operational logistics synchronization, and ISF logistics doctrine. Key tasks included partnering with divisional, location command, and provincial logistics units; planning and executing individual and collective tasks based on current unit assessment; conducting multi-echelon training to include logistics planning; measuring logistics efficiencies; and monitoring and reporting metrics of ISF units in the operational environment. Specified tasks to build ISF logistics capabilities included:

- Assist ISF units in building and filling prescribed load lists and authorized stock levels.
- Assist ISF leaders to obtain all authorized maintenance tool sets, kits, and outfits from ISF stocks.
- Assist ISF leaders with enrollment in the Iraqi Army Support Services Institute.
- Train and enforce ISF maintenance processes at individual, supervisory, and leader levels.
- Train and enforce ISF repair parts requisitioning and management procedures.
- Train ISF leaders to develop and enforce ISF repair parts reconciliation.
- Enforce ISF property accountability.
- Develop ISF leaders able to plan and forecast training requirements.
Advocate and track individual IA enlisted personnel and leader continuing education through vocational training, apprenticeship programs, and other educational opportunities.

Train ISF leaders to forecast fuel requirements.

Train and enforce Iraqi standards for proper storage, protection, and distribution of all classes of supply.

The LTAT normally consists of eight personnel including an officer in charge, noncommissioned officer in charge, four planners, a support operations officer, a translator and technical cultural advisor and, most importantly, a materiel management team to ensure a constant flow of repair parts.

**Bridging Fragmentary Order**

The operational planning team developed four operational objectives. To achieve the commander’s guidance to “take logistics off the table” by April 2009, planners needed to issue an order prior to 09-01. Due to time sensitivity, the General Officer Steering Council (GOSC) decided to publish part of the plan in an order prior to 09-01. The bridging FRAGO, published November 1, 2008, tied together OPORD 08-02 and OPORD 09-01. The bridging FRAGO provided a lock-step approach to establishing five policies that supported the five focus areas determined by the GOSC in May 2008. Although the five focus areas had been discussed, they had not yet been published. The concept of operations for the bridging FRAGO required a nested effort among all headquarters in Iraq. The plan required a series of key leader engagements (KLEs), first within MNF–I and MNSTC–I, with a desired engagement between advisors and the IA leadership to include the Iraqi joint headquarters deputy chief of staff logistics (DCOS LOG). It was through process codification that all elements could ensure implementation and a fully developed capacity. It was the first operational objective, and, according to the partners on the ground, it was the number one inhibitor to validating and assisting the ISF.

The MNC-I senior sustainment staff officer (C4) briefed the bridging FRAGO to the Council of Colonels and at the December GOSC it was the approved way ahead by corps, MNSTC–I and MNF–I logistical leaders. It is important to note that only two of the eight general officers sitting on the GOSC were logisticians. All the general officers agreed to the plan ahead but what MNC–I planners learned was agreement did not necessarily mean it would become a priority for their respective organization. MNC–I became dependent on KLEs to direct the plan. All ISF plans required unity of effort because nothing could be accomplished without agreement to partner, advise, and mentor the same issues at all levels.

**Battle Update Assessment, December 2008**

It was clear after OPORD 08-02 and OPORD 09-01 were published there was a need to hold subordinate units responsible and accountable for their actions towards ISF development. MNC–I altered its battle update assessment (BUA) schedule in November to report along the lines of operation. The Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG), along with MNC–I staff, decided to optimize the BUAs to the corps commander to have units report their progress. The slides required units to report their combat service support (CSS)-to-ISF support, manning, supply status reporting, training updates, and partnering efforts. The MNC–I C8 (finance staff) under money as a
weapon system required a monthly CSS-to-ISF report from each MND/MNF/ESC. The report allowed C8 to reimburse Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) for items provided. The MNC–I C4 attempted through OPORD 09-01 and the BUA process to reduce CSS provided to the ISF from coalition forces.

The commanders briefed the corps commander twice a month in an effort to align and streamline reporting. The MNC–I C4 optimized this opportunity to nest the corps’ efforts with the MNDs/MNF/ESC. The support operations cell contacted the subordinate cells and coordinated prior to the BUAs. This provided another opportunity to open communication between the cells and the commanders to remove logistics as the primary inhibitor to sustainable security.

**Repair Parts—Mapping the Process, January 2009**

During the monitoring phase of the bridging FRAGO, it was clear that the agreed upon processes needed from the national/strategic levels were not going to be published. In October 2008, the DCOS LOG—with coalition help—conducted a tactical exercise without troops to codify informal processes across Iraqi army divisions. Based on a series of vignettes, contractors recorded processes for future publication for a series of logistics functions to include the repair parts process. The DCOS LOG published the materiel circulation processes, and the Iraqi joint headquarters director of electrical and mechanical engineering (DEME) published the repair parts policy, but both failed to standardize and address all applicable levels of supply and maintenance. In turn, MNC–I published a FRAGO directing subordinate units partnered with MOI and MOD units to map the repair parts process.

The repair parts and maintenance policy provided a better baseline for units but had two shortfalls. First, IA units continued to lack confidence in the published processes because they are changed so easily, and secondly, the automation process caused confusion to an Army familiar with a manual system. The policy directed units on what to do but not how to do it. It would direct transportation processes that did not match the maintenance annex’s process for transportation requests. The maintenance flow charts did not match the written directives in the annex. Much of the information was correct, however it appeared the policies and procedures were too fragile because they were changed so easily by Iraqi leaders. For example, the DEME revoked the operational level logistics commander’s authority to issue parts to operational units. He added his signature as a requirement after the processes were published. Finally, the policy did not address the automated system (Iraqi Automated Maintenance Program [IAMP]) which is currently being fielded to some operational level logistics units.

Coalition forces coached the IA to rely on IAMP as its storage management tool but again there was nothing in writing explaining how this tool worked and what it managed. It is important to note that as the IA automated, coalition forces were not trained on this contracted system. Contractors (from the ANHAM firm) trained the IA with very little incentive to have a trained force. An untrained force increases the opportunity for contract renewal.

As a result of a lack of codified processes, MNC–I took the initiative to map the process at the tactical levels. This FRAGO directed coalition forces to assist the IA divisions to codify and promulgate logistics policies and processes for the synchronization and integrated repair parts tracking and status processes. The
The purpose of this task was to elevate the level of performance of the repair parts process to include a decrease in days to receive status and/or parts and increase efficiency in maintenance procedures.

The units mapped the process and provided the results to the IAG support operations cell. The cell collected the data and drafted a codified process for presentation and signature at the national/strategic levels. The purpose of the task was to codify the process, but what the task demonstrated was that units were unsure how the process worked. One IA division commander (responsible for signing the parts requests) did not understand where the request went next and therefore spent very little time worrying about the parts he was not receiving.

Research from this process showed that the division did not have any parts on order but believed they were waiting for parts. Coalition force divisions subsequently reported in the BUA that “repair parts are the long pole in the tent” when in truth there were zero parts ordered. Neither side understood. In turn, MNC–I increased partnering and LTATs focused on the process.

**Operation Order 09-01**

Coalition forces shifted from MOD to MOI security forces. The self-sustainability of the ISF, historically, has been a direct approach that attempted quick fixes to intricate problems. As a complex adaptive system, the ISF adopted different policies at different levels, resulting in a desynchronized effort to self-sustain and standardized plans, policies, and procedures within the MOD and MOI.

Under the ISF line of operation, coalition forces set forth the following mission statement to drive efforts: MNC-I, in coordination with ARCENT, Army Materiel Command, Defense Logistics Agency, MNF-I, MNSTC-I, theater support command, Army Field Support Brigade, non-governmental organizations, and the ISF, plans and synchronizes sustainment efforts and conducts operations to enable initial operational capability (IOC) of the ISF and set the conditions to develop a self-sustaining ISF that aims towards full operational capability. The mission set forth to the MND/MNF/ESC required unity of effort to meet the commander’s intent of a self-sustaining ISF.

The operational planning team, based on Iraqi Logistics Development Committee (ILDC) guidance, decided to take a phased approach to meet the commander’s April 2009 guidance to “take logistics off the table.” OPORD 09-01 focused on a more coordinated effort to develop an IOC of the ISF. IOC was defined as the ISF’s ability to procure, requisition, distribute, and retrograde principle items for the M1114 and maintain an operational readiness rate of 70 percent. The corps achieved this in March 2009 up through the strategic level. Some, measuring against a western model, could argue that this was not achieved but based on the MNC–I established standard in OPORD 09-01 and after engaging the key logistical leaders in the ISF, MNC–I C4 assessed the IOC of the ISF.

The methodology to accomplishing the mission followed the corps’ decision cycle. First an assessment, followed by planning, then direction, followed up by monitoring. Based on the task, acceptance would be added to ensure concurrence was gained by Iraqi counterparts. Key tasks to coalition forces included validating processes established by the ISF in the areas directed in the bridging FRAGO and increasing partnering efforts to include re-missioning LTATs to MOI security.
forces. MNC–I directed coalition forces to focus their efforts around the five focus areas determined through the following ILDC process:

- **Codify processes.** The ISF demonstrates the ability to develop plans, policies, and procedures. Published policies must be developed by from the national/strategic levels of Iraqi logistics then promulgated down to the lowest levels. Once policies are promulgated to the operational and tactical levels, coalition forces assist in validating adherence to the processes, and measuring the established ISF standard.

- **Logistics enablers.** Coalition forces understand Iraqi doctrine and processes, identify and develop Iraqi logistics leaders, ensure collective training/application of principles, and properly analyze lessons learned to make proper recommendation for improvement.

- **Advisory requirements.** Partnering, advising, mentoring, and KLEs provide the ISF subject matter experience and technical expertise while it conducts current operations and future planning. Partners should progress into mentoring roles.

- **Maintenance/Repair parts.** The three main capability shortfalls identified through gap analysis were maintenance/repair parts, transportation, and distribution. In an effort to synthesize all three shortfalls, MNC–I assisted the improvement of procurement, requisition, distribution, and retrograde plans and processes across the tactical and operational levels.

- **Metrics.** OPORD 08-02 measured logistics capacity. OPORD 09-01 shifted to both capacity and capability at the operational and tactical levels. Measuring both drives the ability to identify systemic rather than symptomatic problems, requirements, and solutions.

In addition to the focus areas, MNC–I provided units specified tasks focused on partnering at the key critical nodes for both the MOD and the MOI security forces. MNC–I provided additional instructions to increase reporting requirements, increase engagements, and establish personnel planning teams. Additionally, corps directed the units to stop coalition forces-to-ISF support for all classes of supply unless failure to assist results in critical mission failure. Measures of effectiveness and measures of performance were based on acceptance of the plan by the host nation and publication of the processes. The final measure of effectiveness was determined by the operational readiness rate of the M1114.

**Summary**

MNC–I published a series of orders directing sustainment tasks. The gaps and shortfalls identified in the assessment phase and flushed out during planning resulted in directing tactical tasks to achieve operational objectives. MNC–I directed units to achieve partnering goals, increase ISF logistics capabilities, and assist the ISF in establishing processes. These three areas proved a theme throughout all of the orders published. Additionally, MNC–I developed an assessment requirement to streamline reporting and increased KLEs to assist with outcomes.
Five focus areas were established in May 2008 and published in OPORD 09-01: codifying processes, logistics enablers, advisory requirements, repair parts/maintenance, and metrics. Although these five areas were agreed upon by all three headquarters, there continued to be a lack of unity of effort. Corps directed an aggressive partnership, KLEs, and a synchronization process that resulted in ISF initiatives.
Chapter 6
Monitoring the Plan

MAJ Michelle M.T. Letcher, Multi-National Corps–Iraq Sustainment Planner

“The challenge of being the planner is that you informally become the owner for execution.”

—MNC–I planner

Introduction

The corps commander’s decision cycle operated in an assess-plan-direct-monitor cycle with communication threaded throughout all four elements. Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, describes monitoring as “the ability to monitor and compare actual with scheduled events is crucial to assessing mission accomplishment, terminating operations, and conducting redeployment.” Field Manual (FM) 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, assigns Army leaders with the task of monitoring “their implementation and compare results to criteria of success and the desired end states established in proposed solutions.” Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) monitored the published operation orders (OPORDs) and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) to measure the results of removing logistics as the number one inhibitor to operational effectiveness in Iraq. As an operational headquarters, the requirement to tie strategic aims into tactical tasks shaped all planning efforts. The development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) required close monitoring.

Following OPORD 08-02, the bridging FRAGO, and OPORD 09-01, MNC–I used several tools to monitor mission accomplishment. MNC–I monitored results through the corps assessment board (CAB), the operational readiness assessment (ORA), and the battle update assessment (BUA).

MNC–I Monitoring Tools

CAB

The CAB ran monthly and provided the corps commander a periodic assessment of MNC–I progress in achieving desired conditions from the operational objectives in the OPORD. Additionally, the CAB provided recommendations to guide future planning efforts to support the commander's end state. This polling data linked to the lines of operation (LOO) owner’s recommendations and provided the commander with validation of his observations during battlefield circulation.

ORA

Congress mandates an ORA with Public Law 101-252 Section 9204 (2) I, and requires a quarterly report assessing the “operational readiness status of the Iraqi military forces.” The report must include the type, number, size, and organizational
structure of Iraqi battalions. Additionally, the report must identify the force capability in relation to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations: independent, coalition assisted, or not ready to conduct COIN operations. The ORA contains baseline reporting information compiled by commanders and reporting organizations. Commanders categorically and quantifiably report personnel, command and control, sustainment/logistics, training, equipment, leadership, operational effectiveness and reliability, and a subjective performance assessment.

BUA

The multi-national divisions (MND), multi-national forces (MNF), and expeditionary sustainment command (ESC) commanders briefed the corps commander weekly on a specific ISF element [Iraqi Army (IA), Department of Border Enforcement, National Police, or Iraqi Police] in an effort to align and streamline reporting. The MNC–I logistics staff (C4) optimized this opportunity to nest corps’ efforts with the MNDs, MNF–I, and the ESC.

Each order had an ISF LOO, but the role sustainment played shifted from a condition, to an objective, and then back to a condition. This may suggest that during the surge toward logistics, improvements were made that reduced the need to make logistics an operational objective, in OPORD 09-01. The lesson learned highlighted the lack of focus by the warfighter on sustainment when logistics takes a back seat as a condition rather than an objective or even as a LOO. It is the LOO owner’s continued situational awareness and directed actions that bring about command emphasis and development.

Operation Order 08-02

The ORA standing operating procedures published in December 2007, and again in March 2009, directed quantifiable data be used to measure the progress of the ISF. Originally, logistics reports were not part of the ORA but rather were used to augment other objectives as outlined in OPORD 08-01. OPORD 08-02 established logistics as an objective to achieve the desired end state: a “population secured by a capable, professional ISF.”

In July 2008, XVIII Airborne Corps, as the MNC–I headquarters, briefed the first CAB based on FRAGO 08-02. The new CAB provided an update on progress towards the increased number of objectives, provided recommendations to guide future operations, and, more notably, added “ISF are self-sustaining” as an objective. This objective required five conditions to achieve the end state. The five conditions revolved around maintenance, transportation, force structure, materiel management, and ammunition. In the first briefing with the new objective, the C4 briefed ammunition as green, transportation as red, and all other conditions as amber. Developing host nation logistics requires rudimentary tasks to initially build up a fragile state.

Prior to the bridging FRAGO, the C4 briefed significant improvements in the self-sustainment of the ISF. In October 2008, IA units maintained a 10 percent increase in the operational readiness rate of up-armored vehicles. Transportation improvements occurred in the division as motorized transportation regiments (MTRs) came on line but still lacked the strategic level transportation capability. The initial fielding of the ground transportation regiment (GTR) occurred on August 28, 2008 and the second fielding was scheduled to occur in January 2009.
The GTR capability would relieve the MTR of transportation requirements between the strategic and operational levels. Force structure continued to lag due to personnel shortages for logistical units with the divisions and at the operational level and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) still lacked the strategic level capability. Materiel management reporting improved but the Combined Logistics Operations Center manning requirements were not met. The reports submitted never drove decisions that contributed to improved maintenance or repair parts flow. Finally, as initially reported, ammunition remained green. The coalition and host nation success resulted from Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) logistics staff (G4) and C4 efforts to position two lines of ammunition at each location command. The lesson learned on reporting was not to focus on an area that begins in the green. The coalition remained focused on developing the IA forecasting and developing procurement procedures for ammunition. Multi-National Security and Transitional Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I) engaged the IA to create a fourth-line inventory objective/reorder point based on average demands for one year and ability to support 14 divisions. Host nation sustainment development should focus on those areas that cause friction points at the critical nodes, and should not seek to achieve western standards.

Similarly, the ORA measurements mirrored the CAB data measurements with more specificity on the logistical units. In July, 50 percent of the headquarters and service companies (HSC), 60 percent of MTRs, and 40 percent of logistics battalions, which were force generated, were at the highest two levels. The biggest shortfalls for the units with the lowest ORA levels were substandard life support and a lack of facilities to conduct maintenance. In October, 54 percent of HSCs, 70 percent of MTRs, and 60 percent of logistics battalions were at the highest levels. In October, a new wave of logistical issues began to surface. A shortage of trained personnel, lack of repair parts, limited Class III supplies (petroleum products), and limited operational-level maintenance ranked among the primary inhibitors. The increased performance of an individual unit allowed the systemic problems to surface. This allowed planners for OPORD 09-01 to capture gaps and take a systems approach to problem solving.

**Logistics Training and Advisory Teams, June 2008**

The logistics training and advisory teams (LTATs) developed in June had an immediate effect on increasing the sustainment posture of the IA. Many of the tasks assigned to the LTAT supported the desired conditions for the ISF self-sustainment objective. In the areas of maintenance, transportation, force structure, materiel management, and ammunition, MNC–I charged the LTATs, through their MND/ESCs and brigade support battalions (BSBs), to provide logistics enablers.

LTATs were built by the units meeting the October 2008 goal of 60 teams. Nine of the teams focused on Ministry of Interior (MOI) with the remainder focused on the IA. Units accomplished this task by reaching into the companies in the BSBs to conduct partnering missions. MNC–I directed LTATs to embed with their partnered units but MND/MNF/ESC altered the plan based upon limited resources. There was no one size fits all LTAT model. MNC–I directed a standard but units deviated based on mission requirements. Some provided “dial-in training.” The BSB coordinated through embedded military transition teams (MiTTs) for low density training for a specific partnership unit. The second type embedded to augment the MiTTs. The BSB coordinated logistics training for the brigade combat team (BCT). It embedded LTATs at the G4 and MTR to augment MiTT coverage and provide a
majority of the logistics partnership efforts. Finally, there was the “milk run.” The BCT ISF cell travelled to the ISF units in the operational environment and communicated with the ISF to identify their shortfalls and dispatch low-density trainers to embed with the unit for the duration of the training. The ISF cell provided follow-on visits to assess training effectiveness. MNC–I learned through monitoring that successful units embedded in its LTATs, and partnered daily to execute missions and provide daily feedback. Additionally, those units visited by the MNC–I/Iraqi Assistance Group support operations cell, shared an appreciation for the commander’s vision and remained focused on the assigned tasks and desired conditions.

Maintenance tasks assigned to the LTATs included assisting in filling modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) positions, developing authorized stock levels, developing a pacing item list, assisting in tracking trained personnel, assisting in developing periodic maintenance schedules, and training ISF leaders in maintenance procedures. The results of these efforts included an increase in tactical-level jobs and a number of operational-level jobs repaired. As LTATs increased partnering efforts, the biggest challenge to surface was the lack of processes and policies to direct the Iraqi standard from the national/strategic level to the tactical level.

Transportation tasks assigned to the LTATs included assisting the ISF in forecasting future training requirements, developing capacity, tracking personnel, filling MTOE, and tracking operational readiness rates for the MTRs. The result was an increase in MTR manning versus its authorization and the percentage of equipment on hand and fully mission capable.

Force structure tasks included assisting developing capability and developing guidance, policy, and regulation. The result was an increase in field workshops and HSCs that were rated at the highest levels.

Materiel management tasks included assisting the ISF to develop inventory management practices, assist with the review and update of ISF logistics doctrine, assisting to prepare and submit accurate and timely reports, assisting ISF development of a supply distribution policy, and finally assisting in filling the MTOE. The result was an increase in IGFC manning and an increase in the percentage of on-time reporting.

Finally, LTATs were directed to assist the ISF in developing supply distribution policy. This task proved difficult due to the lack of ISF processes. The problem with most of the tasks assigned to LTATs required a higher direction in the MOD to produce a result. This lesson was learned over several months and finally highlighted and acted upon at the September sustainment symposium.

The Bridging Fragmentary Order

MNC–I monitored a theme through the execution of OPORD 08-02. It highlighted the lack of plans, policies and procedures and resulted in friction points for change and progression in the ISF. As partners tried to assist, there was not an established, published system to measure against. The bridging FRAGO served as a forcing function to try and get advisors at the national/strategic level to coach their counterparts to establish five policies that supported the five focus areas determined by the General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) in May 2008.
The plan required a series of key leader engagements (KLEs) in an effort to codify processes for the IA. It was the first operational objective, and, according to the partners on the ground, it was the number one inhibitor to validating and assisting the ISF. Although the objective and timeline was approved by the GOSC, the respective decision points were not met. Since there was no overarching and integrated plan between MNC–I and MNSTC–I, independent decisions made by the commanding generals became the priorities for each organization.

None of the decision points were met, and this required additional KLEs to be set up between the three-star commanders. On 1 February 2009, the MOD published a handbook based on vignettes exercised during the Taji tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) and input from coalition advisors. Additionally, the MOD and the Iraqi joint headquarters deputy chief of staff of logistics introduced the handbook at the Iraqi division commanders conference and shaped the conference to include logistics. The handbook did meet the intent to codify processes, but not in the five key gaps identified during the planning process. As a matter of fact, nationalategic level advisors worked independently of the Iraqi Logistics Development Committee (ILDC) and coached on their partner observations and initiatives. This slowed progress to increase sustainable security. Coalition forces learned that when developing plans with Iraqi input, the outputs must match and cover identified gaps. Due to competing priorities between commanders, nationalimpact level advisors worked independently of the ILDC and coached their counterparts towards different initiatives. This slowed progress in logistics development.

**Battle Update Assessment, December 2008**

It was clear after OPORD 08-02 and OPORD 09-01 were published there was a need to hold subordinate units responsible and accountable for their actions towards ISF development. Logistical issues at the tactical and operational level were a green-tab issue and required green-tab intervention. As commanders briefed nightly at the BUA, it was apparent there was a lack of unity of effort in achieving logistics goals as outlined in the bridging FRAGO, Iraqi sustainment development plan, and OPORD 09-01. BUA briefs continued to address symptomatic problems rather than focus on systemic ones. Simply stated, units were unable to articulate the root causes to problems and their actions towards resolution.

MND/MNF commanders consistently briefed that “repair parts continue to be an issue.” Almost all commands briefed this very point throughout the BUA process, most briefed the same statement week after week. One MND reported “no repair parts on hand” but did not discuss the issue behind that symptom. It could be a process issue, ordering issue, distribution issue, a lack of delegated authority, or simply a cultural issue. Another commander consistently briefed repair parts as an issue, however after the MOD general officer responsible for repair parts conducted an investigation the problem surfaced as a distribution issue. The supporting location command (located on Al Asad) had spare parts ready for pick up for over two months. Coalition partners did not shadow track or understand the IA systems. They coalition needed to be able to articulate the root cause by researching the process, understand the shortfall, and shape or influencing the Iraqi divisional leadership to understand and enforce subordinates to use their own system. The BUA process revealed this coalition shortfall.
Commanders commonly reported “a lack of trust and confidence in the logistics system.” Following the feedback through BUAs, the Iraqi joint headquarters director of electrical and mechanical engineering (DEME) and an MNC–I advisor traveled to the locations briefed by the coalition as friction points. The DEME engaged the IA commanders and agreed to support them with repair parts. He encouraged division commanders to contact him directly if there were any issues. Instead, units go to the coalition for solutions despite an agreement between the two Iraqi general officers. Despite the agreement, coalition forces fail to understand and reinforce the higher headquarters direction. The coalition needs to coach KLEs internal to the IA. A cultural aspect of the Iraqi people is they do not reveal weaknesses or issues to their supervisors. Coalition forces must coach communication between the leaders; IA division commanders drive logistics. The division commander signs off on the Form 101 (repair parts request form). In one meeting between the DEME and another IA commander, the commander described a process that was inconsistent with MOD published policy, and if followed would result in the division never receiving spare parts. After researching, it was revealed that the division had zero parts on order. The division commander remains a critical key log node in efforts to increase trust and confidence in the system.

Finally, commanders briefed combat service support to the ISF. OPORD 09-01 directed units to cease providing combat service support to ISF unless the result would be critical mission failure at the strategic or operational levels. Units made amazing progress and forced the ISF to utilize their own processes. Coalition forces operated as an operational reserve for sustainment capabilities. MNC–I directed coalition forces provide only emergency materiels in support of a specific operation when determined by the tactical commander. The BUA provided a forum for the MND/MNF/ESC commanders to back brief the MNC–I commander on support given to the ISF. As a result, there was a 59 percent overall reduction of supplies given. Coalition forces reduced supplies provided from classes I (subsistence), VII (major end items such as trucks, tanks, or buses), and IX (repair parts) by 100 percent. The most significant was the 76 percent reduction of fuel. The MOI support reduced from 82 percent to 4 percent. When host nation forces rely on their own systems then self-sustainment occurs.

**Operation Order 09-01**

MNC–I published OPORD 09-01 in December 2008 with an implementation date of 1 January 2009. Based on the guidance in the bridging FRAGO and early release of OPORD 09-01 guidance, units had already begun shifting priorities to MOI forces while ensuring continued development of IA logistics capability. As the C4 main effort during Phase Ia (set the conditions) of OPORD 09-01, coalition forces assisted the ISF to remove logistics as the primary inhibitor to ISF operational effectiveness by April of 2009.

Despite the fact that “developing a self-sustaining ISF” was no longer an objective, it remained a relevant part of the ORA, CAB, and BUA. In the CAB, the conditions briefed changed to focus on the MOI security forces. In December 2008, the CAB revealed the IA had maintained an operational readiness rate of well above 80 percent for 6 of the last 7 months. The GTR was established and began executing missions at the end of 2008 although the formal GTR transportation requests were not yet formalized. Force structure continued to grow with a peak in November 2008. Most logistics infrastructure enablers would not be in place until mid to late 2009. Materiel management also continued to improve to include a code-out
campaign that accepted 543 vehicles for code-out. Finally, ammunition reported a solid 100 percent over 8 months when the Bayji National Ammunition Depot (BNAD) was turned over to the IA as of October 1, 2008. However, when the BNAD was handed over, it became evident to the coalition that partnering was necessary for situational awareness.

In OPORD 09-01, the conditions focused on the IP, DBE/Port of Entry units, and the NP demonstrating the ability to secure key populations centers, borders, and key terrain. Additionally, forces demonstrating the ability to conduct COIN, counterterrorism, and command and control. The OPORD 09-01 objective focused on logistics was titled: “Achieve Sustainable Security Through the ISF.” The assessment tools are less quantitative than the OPORD 08-02 measures. The real measurements are deferred to the ORA.

Unlike OPORD 08-02, ISF sustainment is no longer an objective but a desired condition for the ISF LOO. In December, 70 percent of HSCs, 73 percent of MTRs and 67 percent of logistics battalions—which were force generated—were at the highest 2 levels. In February, 62 percent (dipped due to force generation), 82 percent of MTRs and 67 percent of logistics battalions were at the highest levels. Despite improvement, the increase in the force generation of units had highlighted a shortage of personnel, leaders, and supplies.

MNC–I assigned two objectives for completion by April 2009. Coalition forces achieved both objectives and an initial operational capability (IOC) of the ISF. The ISF demonstrated the ability to develop and promulgate plans, policies, and procedures across all sustainment functions through publishing the MOD materiel circulation processes in February 2009, the DEME’s repair parts policy in September 2008, the execution of the TEWT, and the establishment of the code-out policy. The second objective required the ISF to understand and demonstrate the ability to develop and field the appropriate personnel and equipment to field capability gaps within their security forces. Coalition forces achieved this objective through force generation and the increased improvements in personnel and equipment across all forces.

**Summary**

MNC–I utilized three tools for monitoring the plan. The CAB, ORA, and the BUA allowed the corps commander to receive periodic updates and allowed planners to publish additional plans to continue momentum. MNDs/MNF/ESC commanders continued to brief an inability to improve logistics. However, monitoring revealed a failure to properly partner with ISF counterparts at all levels. Additionally there was a lack of understanding of the Iraqi processes and a general apathy towards ISF logistics development. Critical analysis revealed a superficial approach lacking in-depth analysis of ISF problems and tangible steps towards resolution of logistics issues.

Although units brief a struggle to improve logistics, they continued to brief high operational readiness rates through the BUA. Units need to increase partnering efforts at the critical logistics nodes and reduce individual training and shift collective tasks and materiel management. Combined operations and planning needs to become a focus area.
Finally, MNC–I achieved taking logistics off the table as the primary inhibitor to operational effectiveness by April 2009. Major operations in Diyala and Mosul demonstrated its ability to achieve this goal and move divisions across the operational environment. Additionally, it met the IOC of the ISF definition by remaining above 70 percent operational readiness in the security forces that maintain operational readiness rates. The Iraqi leadership also has confidence in its ability to be self-sufficient. It is by, with, and through the ISF they have achieved a self-sustaining force and ensured sustainable security.
Chapter 7
Logistics Training and Advisory Team Partnering
Defined Considerations

COL Edward F. Dorman, Multi-National Corps–Iraq C4

“Key to implementation is tasks executed through unit partnering.”
—LTG Lloyd Austin, 15 May 2008

Introduction

In 2005, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I) utilized established transition teams as one of three pillars designed to focus on the development of the host nation military at the battalion level and above. As the Iraqi system matured, so did the requirements for partnering. The military transition team (MiTT) assigned had two logistics advisors, an officer and a noncommissioned officer (NCO), but the critical logistics nodes requirements outweighed its capabilities. Following the operational troop surge and the continuous, rapid generation of forces, it became evident that there needed to be a logistics partnering surge following the operational one. The XVIII Airborne Corps (XVIII ABC) logistics staff (C4) completed the initial assessment following the transfer of authority. At that time, Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) logistics leaders understood the Iraqi system, reframed the problem and mission analysis began with a review of on hand resources and the current processes. A key task common to all courses of action developed refined the commander’s intent resulting in a logistics partnership program.

The most important aspect during this phase was the inclusion of Iraqi partners so the coalition could understand their priorities and their definition of a self-reliant force. Once the coalition understood the framework, it began to analyze how to approach the issue of building and developing self reliance. The commander felt partnering between coalition and Iraqi logistics units was the solution. The commander envisioned a deliberate approach to partnership including logisticians at all levels working to synchronize logistics processes to foster relationships and mentoring with the Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Interior (MOI), and joint headquarters (JHQ) leaders from the tactical to national/strategic levels.

The approach consisted of taking U.S. experiences and standards to augment partner experiences and performances to ensure Iraqi terms and solutions to Iraqi problems. Although logistics training teams existed at the motorized transport regiment, like military transition teams, they consisted of limited personnel, usually numbering no more than 11 personnel. Depending on the mission, limited personnel often prevented full-time focus on a specific area. Compounding this shortfall was the unfortunate fact that many of the MiTT logistics advisors were not logisticians. Many advisors were newly promoted captains or first lieutenants without the requisite experience. Those possessing experience, usually branch specific (quartermaster, ordnance, or transportation), lacked multifunctional experience or expertise.
Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) logistics leaders developed a partnership program based on these shortcomings and found a method to harness the organic logistics formations and their commanders and staffs from across the operational environment. Leader-defined partnering developed a framework and organizational structure, identified the mission and key tasks, established a training program, and implemented the program resulting in a surge to remove logistics as the number one inhibitor to operational effectiveness in Iraq.

**Salient Points:**

- Developing local security forces sustainment capabilities is essential to establishing a viable local security structure.

- Partnering involves the entire unit not simply the logistics training and advisory teams, otherwise the experience and logistics power of the coalition forces battalion is not brought to bear and the host nation force does not develop and progress.

- Training the host nation’s military in logistics art and science was not anticipated prior to deployment, but became the single most challenging aspect of OIF 07-09 sustainment operations.

- Logistics training and advisory teams (LTATs) taken out of hide played a significant role in enabling the Iraqi Security Forces to improve operational readiness assessments to self-sustaining levels.

**Partnering Defined**

Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, briefly discusses partnership as a tool. The doctrine prescribes partnering to train host nation forces on equipment. Although partnering to develop host nation forces receives minimal attention in Army doctrine, the concept executed has been nothing close to minimal. MNC–I defined partnership as the operational relationship between host nation and coalition forces whereby all operations are conducted “by, with, and through” the host nation force. Close working relationships and the co-location of coalition force partner units and/or transition teams enables the partnership. Combined planning, preparation, and execution in which the host nation forces increasingly take the lead over time characterize the partnership end state.

Partnership develops the host nation force, provides access to coalition enablers when needed, and ensures situational awareness between the coalition and the host nation force. As host nation forces increase in capability and capacity, unit partnerships shift their focus to collective tasks, sustainment planning, and continued improvement of policies; process; and tactics, techniques and procedures.

It is important to note that the definition of partnering changed over time. Operation Order (OPORD) 08-02 spoke to tactical, operational and strategic overwatch, which changed based on the operational environment and the maturity of the host-nation force. However, this OPORD had a connotation which led to confusion. Many units stepped away once the conditions for overwatch were met based on the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) taking the lead in the operational environment, even though that particular ISF unit was not completely mature in terms of logistics or other enablers. As a result, the MNC–I commander revised his partnership definition and OPORD 09-01 focused on “by, with, and through” which specified and targeted focused advising, training, and assisting at every level and leveraging transition team and unit relationships. Thus, to execute partnering correctly means that a coalition force unit commander knows and understands his host nation (ISF) unit and commander’s mission and tasks in detail. Furthermore, the coalition force unit is working to execute that mission and those tasks on a daily basis to shape the desired outcome through direct action and indirect influence. Anything less and partnering will not be effective. If a coalition force unit simply engages and reports “ISF unit screwed up, time now,” as if at a combat training center rotation, then the partnership and subsequently logistics development will be ineffective.

Key aspects of the partnering framework included:

- Establishing formal partnerships (normally took up to 90 days to develop trust).
- Establishing priority of effort (such as maintenance or Class IX [repair parts] supplies).
- Conducting multi-echelon training to include logistics planning
- Conducting key leader engagements focused on refining tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and common doctrinal understanding.
- Conducting assessments of recent operations to resolve friction points.
- Host nation leaders and unit personnel (ISF) educating coalition leaders and advisors on Iraqi logistics concept of support and TTP.
- As a combat multiplier for training teams coordinating training and advisory efforts within existing MiTTs, national police transition teams (NPTTs), border transition teams (BTTs), port of entry transition teams (POETTs), and ISF leader’s intent.
- Executing combined logistic readiness conferences quarterly.
- Improving reporting mechanisms to ensure logistical operational picture.

**Logistics Partnering Framework**

In reviewing the current situation, it seemed that each Iraqi unit and its organic logistics structure were in a different phase of development. Planning had to provide a flexible, adaptable concept to facilitate development and ensure operational success. In establishing a framework, the corps C4 took the corps partnership definition, solicited input from units, drew upon lessons learned from the field (both coalition and Iraqi), identified the focus and key functions required and developed a partnering model which became known as the logistics training and advisory team (LTAT). The C4 team had to consider several aspects in developing the LTAT framework. Initially leaders examined the existing transition team structure which included logistics training teams. Next, the Iraqi system of
support, which was based upon an early British system that consisted of four “lines” of support, needed to be understood and partnered with the commander’s vision of unit partnering and number of organic logistics capacity that could be brought to bear. Finally, leaders articulated the interface with MNSTC–I elements in the field and aligning mission sets of the logistics units in partnering with a similar organization to ensure adequate development through the application of the correct expertise and resources. Since most of the real logistics activity within the Iraqi Army (IA) divisions occurred at the tactical level, the C4 team evaluated the ratio of on hand brigade sustainment battalions (BSBs) and current operational partnerships between brigade combat teams (BCTs) and IA divisions and decided that multi-national divisions would focus LTAT coverage at the tactical level. The expeditionary sustainment command (ESC) would also establish LTATs via its sustainment brigades and combat sustainment support battalions; however, these were at the operational level (direct support regional support commands not under the command and control of the division). The C4 partnered with the Iraqi Ground Forces Command logistics staff. MNSTC-I had partial responsibility for the operational level via its logistics military advisor team (LMAT) and at the national/strategic level with JHQ and ministerial advisors, however, a partnership between JHQ and the operational environment lacked and often created friction.

Organizational Structure—The Logistics Training and Advisory Team

The LTAT formed the cornerstone of the U.S. logistics battalion partnership. The intent behind the LTAT was a vehicle that could drive a logistics battalion partnership. Unfortunately, over the long term, the LTAT often became the partner rather than the logistics battalion. LTATs were formed as out of hide organic elements and consisted of approximately eight personnel minimum. Assignment to an LTAT required an individual to learn force structure and Iraqi doctrine and processes; synchronize the coalition forces battalion or brigade’s efforts to train, partner and advise Iraqi logistic units and leaders to increase logistical capabilities of MOD and/or MOI to develop and sustain self-reliance as their primary mission. Serving on an LTAT required an individual to conduct in-depth analysis of specific partnered unit shortfalls and develop a deliberate plan to assist.

LTATs focused on maximizing existing coalition logistics experience and systems to leverage efforts at critical logistics nodes within Iraqi formations. Logistic partnering and advising assisted Iraqi leaders, staffs, and units to increase logistical capabilities and efficiencies, and provided a relevant, logistical operating picture for all forces from tactical through operational levels to develop and sustain self-reliance. While the MiTT had a logistics officer and NCO, these individuals could not be subject matter experts in all aspects of logistics. The LTAT brought a commander, staff, systems, and a broad depth of talent across the battalion to bear on specific areas requiring improvement. Additionally, since the BSB fought and supported the same operational environment and consistently planned for pending operations, it understood requirements and could shape the logistics of a particular Iraqi formation to ensure logistics planning and mission success.
Mission and Key Tasks

It was critical that the LTAT drive the battalion’s partnership, but not become the sole partner because it limits experience. While the LTAT could still “reach back” into the battalion, it ran the risk of limiting the battalion leadership’s interaction due to the operations tempo and risked not leveraging the combined experiences of the battalion. It also inhibited the relationship with the MiTT team as well as the Iraqi unit. Since the MiTT team lived with the Iraqis day in and day out, the linkage served to reinforce Iraqi processes to develop capacity. They also had a requirement to interface with the operational level, something that Iraqis were unaccustomed to based on cultural mores. Benefits naturally included a synchronized approach, a habitual bond, and relationship with individuals trained and steeped in Iraqi logistics doctrine and processes. This would often prove invaluable during combat operations in the field since BCTs were partnered with combat formations where the advisors resided and the logistics units supported the same combat operations.
LTAT key tasks included the following:

- Drive partnership with divisional, location command, and provincial logistics units.
- Conduct multi-echelon training to include logistics planning.
- Develop and execute monthly maintenance meetings.
- Plan and execute individual and collective logistical tasks based on current assessments.
- Track and reconcile logistics requests on a monthly basis.
- Assess unit logistic capabilities and provide feedback to coalition units and ISF leadership.
- Monitor and report metrics of ISF units in the operational environment.
• Provide regular reports through MNDs/MNF to C4, Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG), and MNSTC–I.

• Implement monthly maintenance meetings.

• Implement and conduct recurring combined logistics training meetings.

**Training**

As implementation of a new structure began mid-stride, it became readily apparent that it required a system to train all personnel who would serve as LTAT members. This would ensure understanding of roles and responsibilities and, most importantly, allow partners to ensure Iraqis followed the correct Iraqi processes as these changed frequently. Adding to the complexity was the combination of contingency processes executed via cellular phone and a lack of formal published policies and constantly changing processes.

FM 3-24 devotes only three sentences to host nation logistics and it mainly speaks to the challenges with dysfunctional military culture and the requirement to focus on the long-term benefits of supply discipline and materiel accountability. However, it does not speak to how one self trains to “put on a host nation lens” in an effort to understand and apply coalition experience to host nation problems using host nation systems. As MNC–I implemented an Iraq-wide LTAT program, this required corps resources to be brought to bear to expedite implementation. The central question was whether to use an MTT or a fixed site. MNC–I decided on a fixed site, the Phoenix Academy located at Taji. This was a logical choice for two reasons. First, the IAG already ran a transition team training program at that location; therefore, classrooms and resources were available. Secondly, Taji is the central hub of Iraqi logistics which includes the Iraqi Army Service Support Institute, the Joint Repair Parts Command, the national depot with wheeled and tracked vehicle repair lines, and many other institutional and national logistics entities. Taji also allowed visits by LTAT students and trainers to these locations to interface with the Iraqis. Finally, Taji provided for local LTAT members stationed on and in the vicinity to provide guest instruction and present applicable lessons learned.

The program was centered in a six-day period of instruction. Each day focused on a particular area such as maintenance, followed by best practices and any emerging policies or future structures. One significant lesson learned is that the existing contract which ran the academy was not flexible and instructors were not well suited to teach the logistics/LTAT courses. This required the MNC–I C4 support operations cell to take on this task, develop programs of instruction (POIs), and teach one to two weeks a month. Maintaining lesson plans soon became a full-time job and subsequently, the C4 support operations cell found it necessary to place a full-time liaison officer at the academy which increased the workload of others. The highlight of the course was most frequently the visit to Iraqi training institutions and workshops followed by visits to LTAT on-site partnering locations to interact with coalition and Iraqis engaged in daily partnering.

**Implementation**

Often the size, scope, and complexity of MNC–I operations and initiatives made it difficult to effectively orchestrate the critical components of the commanders vision
and guidance in support of objectives. Therefore, formal implementation occurred through a published fragmentary order (FRAGO). FRAGO 434 was published on 15 June 2008 to ensure a succinct method to effectively communicate the relocation, responsibilities and specific tasks required, over time and space, to efficiently synchronize/communicate ongoing efforts and ever-changing dynamics such as policies and procedures aimed at a variety of audiences. As MNC–I began to work through implementation, it became necessary to shape both coalition and Iraqi elements participating in logistics development. Like leadership, influence is the ability to motivate a person or party to act in accordance with the intent. The limits of an individual partner or advisor’s influence are shaped by access to people and resources. The stratified nature of daily contacts clearly limits the influence BCT LTATs and division ISF cells have on the government of Iraq (GOI) and the ISF. BCTs engage at the local level while units engage at the provincial level. To resolve issues, the C4 support operations cell began a weekly Adobe Connect session to influence both MNSTC–I as well as operational and strategic ISF/GOI leaders. This occurred through the synchronization process outlined in chapter three and through corps key leader engagements at the national level to influence GOI and ISF leaders who directly enable division and BCT operations. FRAGO 434 included the key LTAT tasks outlined earlier in this article and also required reporting of metrics which fed into the corps assessment board to help measure progress.

C4 held quarterly logistics symposiums which brought together LTATs, transitions teams, LMATs, and MNSTC–I to discuss issues, updates on policy and process changes, and to solicit feedback on progress.

A best practice was the 225th BSB logistics targeting meeting. Symposiums enabled the partnering units to synchronize efforts at the tactical level and create desired effects. The partnership assessment process coordinated actions among the MiTTs, individual company commanders, LTAT, BSB commander, and the Iraqis. The meeting also identified “targets” for the next two weeks which fed both near- and long-term goals.

**Lessons Learned**

**Issue 1. Setting the conditions so that the ISF creates and maintains long-term, self-contained training.**

**Discussion:**

- When the coalition presents ISF commanders with training opportunities by coalition forces, Iraqi commanders are willing to immediately commit. However, when it is suggested that the training is Iraqi-led (by individuals who have already attended training from U.S. units), many commanders are reticent, stating they are not ready to conduct their own instruction.

- It is very difficult to get the ISF to commit to long-range calendars that would outline an effective training plan.

**Recommendation:** Embed leaders in the Iraqi units. This technique proved extremely successful to show the ISF “what right looks like.” After they have seen the effectiveness of long-term planning, they look to emulate similar concepts. This
starts small with ISF battalions partnered units slowly integrating battle tracker and current operations systems into their units and culminates with the long-term planning systems and products.

Issue 2. A lack of institutionalizing home station LTAT training led to a lack of continuity in the operational environment.

Discussion:

- Exacerbation caused by the constant transferring of units between the MiTT, BCT, and divisional elements. In many instances, a new MiTT was unaware that LTATs existed, and in many instances, the division ISF cells were not connected to the LTATs and their activities.

- ISF training in logistics art and science was not anticipated prior to deployment but became the single most challenging aspect of Operation Iraqi Freedom 07-09 sustainment operations.

- LTATs taken out of hide played a significant role in enabling the ISF to improve operational readiness assessments to self-sustaining levels.

- Development of host nation security forces sustainment capabilities is essential to establishing a viable local security structure.

Recommendations:

- Identify requirements for local national sustainment development requirements early in training and the Army force generation cycle.

- Establish key training team leaders at brigade and division level no later than day 180.

- Integrate local national security force sustainment training into unit situational training exercise lanes and mission rehearsal exercises at combat training centers.

- Implement a six-day POI.

- Expand FM 3-24.

Issue 3. Changing ISF development symposiums from quarterly to semi-annually led to a breakdown in the program.

Discussion:

- Loss of focus.

- Loss of continuity between MiTTs and LTATs.

- Add to predeployment site surveys.
Recommendations:

- Quarterly symposiums.
- Forced participation.

Conclusion

Developing local security force sustainment is essential to establishing a viable local security structure. MNC–I logistical leaders recognized the requirement to partner at the battalion level and above to create a unity of support in developing the ISF. Partnering, by design, should involve the entire unit. A minimal partnering effort results in a lack of experience and depth required to develop the host nation force. Training host nation security forces in the arts and sciences of logistics was not anticipated prior to the XVIII ABC deployment, but became the single most challenging aspect of OIF 07-09 sustainment operation. After five years, coalition forces sustained the force and cleaned up the battlefield. Though daunting, this was not nearly as complex as developing a host nation sustainment force. The strategic implication of sustainable security required the ESC and BCTs to build LTATs from their organizations, assume risk, and play a significant role to enable a self-sustaining ISF to ensure sustainable security.
Chapter 8
Rebuilding Indigenous Logistics Capacity in Iraq:
Enabling Iraqi Strategic Logistics

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Introduction

By the start of summer 2008, it was becoming clear that coalition efforts to raise
and train Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), most notably the Iraqi Army (IA), but also the
National Police, had turned the corner and were delivering encouraging results.
Building on early, faltering success in Operation Charge of the Knights, in Basrah,
the government of Iraq (GOI) became increasingly willing to commit their forces to
a burgeoning range of host nation-led, coalition operations. Iraq’s infantry and
nascent armored units and formations worked with increasing confidence in Mosul
and Amarah. However their capacity to sustain themselves lagged badly.

Significant progress was made in building logistics force structure at the tactical
and operational levels. The skeleton of a logistics system was in place, but it lacked
the organizational muscles, sinews, and nerves to become a functioning force. Of
greater concern was the realization that the ISF did not possess the institutional
brain to drive sustainment of the ISF from the strategic level.

From as early as fall 2007, but with increasing urgency from spring 2008, coalition
logisticians from Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I), Multi-National Security and
Transitional Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I), and Multi-National Forces–Iraq (MNF–I)
started the long, arduous, and often uncertain journey to raise the profile of ISF
logistics and thereby ensure that sustainment was recognized and acknowledged
equally alongside "raise and train" in the generation of ISF capabilities.

This article will discuss four key lessons learned in the coalition process of
rebuilding indigenous logistics capacity in Iraq from May to December 2008. The
following areas will be addressed:

- Importance of understanding host nation derivations and expectations
- Force structure versus institutional capacity
- Combat service support and logistics
- Development and delivery of a shared logistics vision

These four lessons were pivotal to the prosecution of the ISF logistics mission with
senior GOI and military leaders, Iraqi civil servant leaders, and with senior
coalition leaders. Due to their strategic focus, these lessons are valid as prompts for
any future activity of a similar vein. The lessons reinforce logistics shibboleths all
too frequently ignored or inappropriately unprioritized vis-à-vis operational
demands.
Understanding Host Nation Derivations and Expectations

Time spent in reconnaissance is seldom wasted. This is certainly true of military operations in general, but must be afforded equal importance in matters outside the purely operational. Detailed understanding of the adversary’s logistics processes and organizations can provide insight to warfighting capacity, the identification of culminating points, and a general sense of the national psyche.

In this case, the coalition lacked an in-depth understanding or appreciation of the pre-existing Iraqi logistics system. Perhaps more correctly, if it existed, it was impossible to access at the appropriate level to inform analysis and execution of the ISF logistics enabling mission.

These failures delivered immediate, well-documented, and detrimental effects in the control of Iraqi ammunition stocks following the cessation of offensive operations in 2003. The ISF and coalition forces continue to suffer from the insurgents’ access to former-regime ammunition and explosive ordnance.

Had the coalition had a better understanding of the Iraqi logistics system under Saddam, significant resources could have been saved that were committed to building bespoke systems. This lack of understanding was in part due to an arrogant belief that coalition systems provide the best option for a developing nation-, being rebuilt to mimic Western, democratic models.

National logistics systems are as much a reflection of national psyche as any other pillar of national power. Business processes and its supporting decision making and delegation systems are directly influenced by national, ethnic, and religious realities. That said, caprice and calumny were more apt characteristics of the former regime system than were foresight and responsiveness.

It is also worth highlighting that logistics, at every level, is a function of command. The link between the effectiveness of the command and control of the organization and prevailing logistics preparedness, responsiveness, and robustness is irrefutable.

The pre-existing Iraqi approach to logistics can best be encapsulated as consumption-based. In this model, military capability is generated, consumed, and replaced rather than being husbanded throughout its planned life. Iraq’s performance and execution of sustainment through the Iran-Iraq War and both Gulf Wars supports this contention. Strategic logistics, as part of Iraqi higher command processes under Saddam, would have been centralized and executed in an atmosphere of distrust. At the tactical level logistics would have been executed in quasi-fiefdoms, with maximum use—and abuse—of local civil capacity and industry.

Regardless of the good or bad of the pre-existing system, the majority of senior leaders in the new ISF were raised and trained under this system. Understanding this history and building from this base rather than casting it aside and deriding it, is a path more likely to deliver agreed and shared outcomes. Regrettably, and for too long, the coalition patronized and lorded over ISF logistics, seeking to expunge the pre-existing system and replace it with coalition systems.

Pride and proclivity are far stronger motivators than coalition planners understood. After spring 2008 attempts were made to incorporate ISF personnel into the design
and decision-making processes. A subtle transformation in approach from
patronage to mentorship began to take place. Logistics planning forums that were
exclusively comprised of coalition members began to incorporate ISF peers.
Agendas were increasingly designed to address ISF—raised topics and issues
instead of those the coalition thought might be appropriate for the ISF.

Not surprisingly, this more mature and inclusive approach enabled relationships
based on trust, mutual understanding, and professionalism. It is in an environment
characterized by these traits that discussion of alternate approaches to military
logistics can be conducted and where expectations on both sides can be aired and
managed.

**Force Structure Versus Institutional Capacity**

One of the earliest questions in the re-creation of the ISF was that of generating
force structure over building institutional capacity. In the face of a resurgent enemy,
the appropriate decision was taken to build units and formations with a focus on
combat capability. In doing this, Iraqis would be able to accept part of
the operational burden. Over time, as military capability strengthened and broadened,
the Iraqis would be able to take the lead.

This concept was encapsulated in the operational continuum of
lead-partner-mentor. In the early stages, while ISF were being generated, coalition
forces would lead operations and provide enablers (such as logistics; fires;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; engineering; and aviation) with Iraqi
forces (combat troops [infantry/armor] and police) in support and under instruction.
Over time this would swing to a point where Iraqi forces led in planning and on the
ground, with coalition forces in overwatch and providing niche-enabler capabilities.

Generating military capability is a complicated, time consuming, and expensive
business. It is too easy to overlook or forget that every capability, from the
individual *jundi* to the ISF as a whole, is made up of and represents an investment
in a complex matrix of individual inputs. The U.S. Army uses the acronym
DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel, and facilities) to describe this complexity and synergy.

It is not only the interrelationship of the elements comprising capability that
constitutes a complicating factor. It is also the relativity of the fundamental building
blocks of warfighting capacity, across the levels of war that must be measured and
prioritized. Warfighting capacity can be described across the strategic- to
tactical-levels of war as comprising three essential building blocks, being the
capacity to conduct intelligence, logistics, and maneuver.

Steps were taken to build logistics units and organizations at the tactical through
operational levels. This was done without an equal investment in the business
processes and systems around which the units would operate.

It is necessary to bear in mind the need to understand Iraqi aspirations, as discussed
above. The parlous state of professional military logistics understanding across the
ISF and the GOI detracted from attempts to inculcate strategic level processes. The
reality is that the ministerial and joint headquarters (JHQ) levels were incapable of
longer-vision planning in the face of the tactical imperative to defeat the
insurgency. These circumstances certainly prevailed through June 2008.
Fortunately from that time, as operations proved more successful and ISF forces showed their worth in the tactical fight, higher commanders could afford to focus on strategic and long-term issues such as investment and strategic sustainment. It was a happy coincidence that coalition efforts to address ISF strategic logistics enablement were making headway at the same time GOI and ISF leaders were beginning to look more strategically.

**Combat Service Support and Logistics**

Following from this discussion is the need to address the competing priorities of combat service support (CSS) over logistics development.

The effort to build force structure, was focused on raising operational and tactical units trained and equipped to provide CSS to Iraqi ground forces. These elements of the logistics support capability lagged behind combat and combat support units in force generation.

However, these support organizations remain dependent on the processes, policies, and higher governance concepts found at the strategic level of logistics. It is here that the foundation of the capacity to generate forces must be found. In the case of the ISF, many of these logistics functions were overlooked. Because there was little legacy understanding of contemporary management requirements, this oversight went unidentified for too long.

Concepts such as long-term budgeting, provisioning, and whole of life management of capabilities were alien to nascent Iraqi strategic thinking, whether in the military or broader whole of government spheres. Nevertheless, Iraqi capability investment aspirations inevitably looked to higher-end platforms. It became clear that developing these concepts and applying them would be essential to achieve value for money for the Iraqi government, and service life management to ensure that the capabilities remained fit for purpose.

The goal for coalition logisticians, therefore, turned to ensuring that the top-end of the supply, personnel, and maintenance chains of the ISF were open and delivering the stocks, personnel, and equipment that the CSS units and formations required. Strategic engagement of ISF logisticians and decision makers working in the strategic logistics space became the focus of coalition efforts. Synchronization of messages, cueing of key leader engagements (KLEs), and ensuring that outcomes at the strategic level delivered improvements and achievements at the tactical level was essential. Pivotal to success in these endeavors across the CSS and logistics continuum was the development of a shared logistics vision.

**Developing and Delivering a Shared Logistics Vision**

The catalyst for the development of a shared logistics vision was the GOI’s aspiration to undertake major capital investment in increasingly expensive and complex equipment. That is not to say that Iraq had not previously fielded high-end capabilities. They had, but the support mechanisms and, most importantly, replacement processes for what was predominantly Soviet equipment placed far fewer demands of accountability on the GOI. Similarly, Saddam’s regime was not constrained in its spending by the needs now imposed on the GOI to deliver goods and services to the people of Iraq.
In such an environment, good governance, accountability, and husbandry of resources become critical. These were developing concepts for the GOI and JHQ. The desire to field high-end military capability, predominantly sourced from the U.S., drove the need for a greater professionalism within the highest echelons of government and security forces.

Coalition efforts to support, and where necessary, shape these developments took a bottom-up approach. The earliest steps were taken by MNC–I and MNSTC–I logisticians, at the O-6 level, to establish a working group to address tactical- and operational-level challenges within the nascent ISF logistics and CSS systems. It quickly became clear that despite a plethora of lower-level problems, the real hurdle lay at the strategic level. The absence of institutional capacity and understanding, the focus on generating force structure and the Iraqi’s underpinning education and training, all worked against clearing the blockages that were constipating support to the ISF. To address this strategic level vacuum, MNF–I logisticians became involved in May 2008.

To overcome these challenges, steps were taken starting in May 2008, to alert the MNSTC–I commanding general, LTG Frank Helmick, to the dire straits of the sustain part of the raise–train–sustain continuum. Through May and culminating in August 2008 with a decision brief to MNF–I commanding general, GEN David Petraeus, significant staff effort was expended to identify the holes in the ISF and GOI logistics systems and to propose a way ahead. A synchronization process was designed to support both coalition and Iraqi decision makers.

The bedrock of this process was the Iraqi Logistics Development Committee (ILDC) synchronization process. This process drew lessons and issues from the tactical level, from coalition units partnered with ISF units, and passed them up for resolution through the O-6 level working group, to the monthly one-star General Officer Steering Committee, to the quarterly three-star briefing, and ultimately for the biannual four-star review. Initial cycles of this process were conducted by coalition forces in isolation, but by October 2008 the ISF were running their own O-6 level working group and plans were in place for ISF participation at the one-, three-, and four-star forums.

Running parallel with the ILDC, and drawing issues from it for injection at the strategic level, was the KLE strategy. This process supported engagement by senior coalition logisticians and other general officers whose portfolios had a logistics input.

Critical to these processes, however, was the need to provide a compelling message to Iraqi decision makers of the complexity of the environment they were entering and of the risks associated with failing to adopt contemporary concepts. This had to be nuanced, cognizant of the points raised above in terms of Iraqi aspirations.

October and November 2008 saw real advances in Ministry, JHQ and GOI thinking on these issues. Building on the concepts presented in “ISF Strategic Logistics Enabling,” the following four strategic themes were developed:

- Responsive decision making. Iraqi processes were stove-piped, centralized, and executed in slow time. The types of equipment and processes they aspire to field at the tactical level demand streamlined strategic-level thinking.
• Delegated authorities. Subordinate commanders needed to be provided with the authority to control their logistics system, without cause to refer all issues to the ministerial or JHQ levels. Without these delegations the system would remain constipated, capability could not deliver the outcomes required, and investment would be wasted.

• Whole of life systems. The Ministry and JHQ have to understand that their investment decisions will have impacts into the medium-term future. The consumption based, “use-abuse-replace” concept has no place when dealing with high-tech military equipment and its highly-trained operators.

• Asset visibility. This is the key to delivering the other three goals. Knowing what is where allows leaders and commanders to empower subordinates, speed up decision-making, and adopt a mature and long-term approach to investments in Iraqi security.

By December 2008, coalition logisticians working with their ISF counterparts were able to sit at the conference table and discuss issues of concern to the Iraqis through the lens of contemporary military logistics.

**Conclusion**

Building an indigenous Iraqi logistics system has been a key enabling activity for the OIF mission. The huge advances in capability and confidence of ISF combat forces are now being supported by commensurate leaps ahead in ISF CSS and logistics. Equally important are the advances in the strategic logistics understanding across GOI, the Ministries of Defense and Interior, and the JHQ.

Planning efforts of coalition logisticians, from MNC–I, MNSTC–I and MNF–I from late 2007 and culminating in late 2008, delivered a heightened awareness of CSS and strategic logistics issues among senior coalition and Iraqi leaders, together with a shared logistics vision. The resulting initiatives are producing a more professional, capable, and sustainable ISF.

The four key lessons addressed in this article were central to the success of Iraqi strategic logistics enabling. Professionalism, dedication, and a fervent desire to deliver Iraqi solutions to the logistics challenges faced by the ISF have been the hallmark of coalition efforts. In future operations to build indigenous security forces, coalition planners could do worse than to reexamine the lessons of this endeavor.

**Endnotes**

1. Iraqi Army enlisted soldier.

2. Doctrine, organization, training, management, leadership, personnel, facilities (sometimes expanded in MNF–I TF ISF logistics usage to include an additional F [finance]).

3. CSS is provided to combat forces by predominantly military logistics, health, personnel, and ancillary enabling capabilities.
4. Logistics encompasses the gamut of support services provided to military forces. It can be delivered by uniformed, government civilian, or contracted personnel. The proliferation of contractors in the operational environment sees the logistics bubble expanding well into areas previously seen as the preserve of CSS.
Chapter 9
Developing Iraqi Solutions Through Financial, Commercial, and Claims Processes

MAJ Shane Armstrong, United Kingdom, MND–SE, SO2 Iraqi Security Forces Logistics Development

A key element of developing Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) capacity to conduct sustainable operations lies in the ability of the ISF to plan and manage their financial affairs. This is an area that has been overlooked by both multi-national forces and the government of Iraq. It impacts the ability of the ISF to maintain momentum when moving toward self-sufficiency. With the introduction of the financial training team in Multi-National Division–Southeast (MND–SE), J8 (finance), sought to mitigate this area of concern through financial, commercial, and claims process development. MND–SE assessed, planned, directed, and then monitored the efforts of financial advising.

Operation Larkin

The future tense is nonexistent in the Arabic language resulting in a cultural challenge to develop an Iraqi Army (IA) division to forecast financial requirements. As the MND–SE ISF logistics cell, developing self-sustaining plans required overcoming financial gaps and shortfalls. Through a series of assessments, MND–SE developed a plan and directed the establishment of a financial partnership.

The initial assessment proved there were significant shortfalls in financial management for sustainment in the 14th IA Division. Initially, due to the corruption that existed under the previous regime, Iraqis needed to prove they could be trusted and held accountable with IA funds. A second order effect of corruption fed the belief that asking for financial assistance for resupply was a sign of weakness. As a result, coalition forces began supplying and funding the 14th IA Division. The units learned early on that if they expressed the need to coalition troops and stated they were not supported by their own government, coalition forces provided the support. The result of these assessments uncovered a third order effect—a lack of financial management and ignorance in the friction points in their systems, both financial and supply.

The above observations drove the need for a partnering plan to overcome these gaps. The United Kingdom Civil Secretary and the MND–SE ISF logistics cell structured a planning team to develop a way ahead to overcome these shortfalls. MND–SE published a fragmentary order in September 2008 directing the establishment of the financial training team. The financial training team’s primary role was to mentor and train the IA on how to obtain, spend, and monitor its finances to be self-sufficient. It is a combination of influence and ISF activities.

The financial training team was issued an operational name, Operation Larkin, to enable freedom and priority of movement. The Civil Secretary briefed Operation Larkin to the MND–SE G4 (logistics staff) partners planning group. The G4 elements of every training team in the Basra Region, Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I), and Multi-National Security and Transitional Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I) attended the meeting and was briefed on the multi-national division
(MND) effort to add a more deliberate financial advising effort to building ISF capacity. The meeting addressed the task and purpose of this effort and allowed all levels of partnering to gain an appreciation for the need of a unified effort.

The financial training team mission required advisors to assist in the development of financial management in terms of sustainable security. The team engaged primarily with the 14th IA Division headquarters and Basra Operations Command. As a result, relationships were built between the financial training team and the ISF, which instilled the importance of finance management as a credible and sustainable method of achieving enduring Iraqi-led security and stability (Money as a Weapon System).

Effects of Operation Larkin

Six months following the initiation of this effort, MND–SE recognized significant improvements to trust and confidence in the supply system, forecasting, and financial management. The following effects were achieved:

- Forward financial planning. After a series of key leader engagements, the 14th IA Division began to accept the concept of forward financial planning, which is crucial to engendering trust in funds managers in the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) and Ministry of Defense. This was a gradual process given the corruption that existed under the previous regime and the centralized control of funds by officers. A lack of forward planning still remains, such as requesting funds to buy blankets well in advance of the winter.

- Audits. IA finance staffs (G8) now understand that there is a need to demonstrate the ability to account for their allocated annual budget, as it will be audited against expenditure. Importantly, the IA appreciates that external auditing should be welcomed as it would enable them to justify budgetary shortfalls to meet their requirements.

- Management tools. The financial training team advised the IA on the construction and management of spreadsheets to monitor its finances along with hard copies its processes demand. The 14th IA Division possessed the facilities to provide basic Microsoft Excel tutoring for G8 staff and agreed to request laptops.

- Local acquisition of spare parts. Operation Larkin brought together the staff of G4 and G8. This manifested itself in the local acquisition of spare parts. The 14th IA Division, like most of the IA, have little faith in the supply system and prefer to use life support funds to purchase spare parts from the market or cannibalize destroyed vehicles. The IA simply deemed completing the IA Form 462 and IA Form 101 for spare parts as a pointless exercise because it was too slow, or for cultural reasons explained elsewhere in this book. Local purchase and cannibalizing of spare parts is common practice in coalition armies, but it requires financial management—forward planning, funds monitoring and auditing.

- Funds management process. The financial training team managed to unlock many of the unknowns in the funds management process. There is
now fewer unknowns and choke points have been identified and managed.

Six months following the initiation of this effort, the following challenges for both the coalition forces and IA remained:

- Coalition forces funding the ISF. Operation order 09-01 was clear in its direction that coalition combat service support (CSS) should only be provided to prevent mission critical failure. However, MND–SE continued to fund ISF CSS projects through the commander’s contingency fund—$27,000 in December, $11,000 in January, and $32,000 in February—this was done despite ISF cell advisement.

- Coalition forces supply discipline. The financial training team was working on coalition forces-to-ISF CSS support and found it difficult to convince the IA that the coalition would not provide CSS when there were conflicting messages. When coalition forces ceased bailing out the IA logistics, the IA found a way to solve its own problems.

- Sharing lessons learned. Best practice is not shared within the ISF. Some units of the 14th IA Division have developed sound accounting and planning procedures, but there is no system or willingness to share this information amongst brigades due to cultural tendencies. External to the ISF, coalition forces failed to utilize this grassroots effort by an MND and populate the plan across MNC–I and MNSTC–I. The ministerial, joint headquarters, and IGFC staffs require the same crosstalk and advisement.

Summary

Developing ISF capacity to conduct sustainable operations lies in the ability of the coalition forces to advise, partner, and assist the ISF to plan and manage their financial affairs. MND-SE assessed, planned, directed, and then monitored the efforts of financial advising. Operation Larkin achieved significant success in the financial partnering with the IA. The term FiTT was born in MND-SE and engagement with the IA effected the following:

- Forward financial planning.
- Auditing requirements.
- Spreadsheet management tools.
- Need to share best practice.
- Engagement of G4 and G8 staff.
- Unlocking of budgetary process.
- Cessation of coalition CSS to ISF.

However, the overarching theme drawn from Operation Larkin was that fundamental to ISF financial success was for Iraqis to determine their requirements
and derive their budget from that, and not for coalition forces to decide what the
ISF needs.

**Endnotes**

1. Operation Larkin is a randomly generated term for operations. United Kingdom
operations are always one word and exercises are two words.

2. Ministry of Interior units were not financially partnered.
Chapter 10

Iraqi Defense Force Logistic Capability

MAJ Richard Baxter, Australian Army, JHATT LOG, MNSTC–I

Historical Observations

Before evaluating the current situation, it is prudent to revisit lessons learned from previous situations as a check-safe to prevent avoidable errors. From a relatively straightforward review of available online lessons the following was drawn:

- Military intelligence empires focus mostly on the familiar, the size and location of enemy mainforce units—to the neglect of such other vital targets as the opponent’s politico-military control structure. The coalition tended to see the enemy in our image.

- The concept of institution building turned largely on encouragement of American democratic forms, a kind or mirror-imaging which proved hard to apply in the local conditions.

- It was natural instinct to mold a conventional armed force as a mirror image of U.S. forces. The coalition organized, equipped and trained the Iraqis to fight American style, the only way the coalition knew to train the Iraqis. When local forces buckled, the U.S. took over and sought to do directly what the Iraqis had failed to do. Molding the conventional armed forces also requires adequate machinery at all levels for effective follow-through, an effective means of stimulating optimum indigenous performance, and a need for specially tailored programs, with flexibility and adaptiveness. Instead of applying the school solution, emphasize innovation and experimentation rather than conformity.

- Each agency ran its share of the war with essentially a peacetime management structure consisting of largely separate bureaucratic compartments. The proliferation of overlapping programs reached a point where programs competed excessively for scarce resources and even got in each other’s way.
• Leadership, administration, and the armed forces were inadequate to accomplish the task. Incapable regimes largely frittered away the resources given to them which was the greatest constraint on the aims of the coalition. Instead, the coalition fully takes into account the ability of the institutions carrying out the policy to execute it as intended, and understand adaptation can occur only slowly and incrementally no matter how clear the need (or perceived need) for change.

• The Iraqis used their weakness far more effectively as leverage on us than the coalition used its strength as leverage against the weakness. The coalition's response was overwhelmingly conventional and militarized. The coalition was also reluctant to adapt (for institutional reasons) when it was clear missions were carried out ineffectively.

• Institutional factors such as institutional inertia and the inherent reluctance of organizations to change their ways of functioning are reasons there was little change in Iraq. Coalition and Iraqi agencies preferred continuing doing what they were accustomed to doing instead of changing patterns of organization or operation.

• The diffusion of authority and fragmentation of command that characterized the efforts and interrelationships provide another reason it proved so hard to translate policy into practice. Yet the coalition perceived the differences it confronted better than its responses would suggest. The constraints—largely inherent in the behavior patterns of the institutions involved in the struggle—made it difficult for them to gear their responses sufficiently well to those perceptions.

• Institutional change tends to be forced in the wake of what is widely perceived to be a catastrophe, when accepted patterns of behavior are severely challenged as having failed.

Lessons may not be applicable in quite different situations; analogies which could lead to gross misperceptions about how best to deal with different contingencies must be avoided. Wise policy should take into account the institutional realities that will largely shape its execution. The better the nature of the problem is understood and the impact of the constraints involved, the more likely sensible remedies for change will be sought; atypical problems demand specifically tailored solutions.

**Change Management**

The basic tenets of change management are unfreeze–change–refreeze. The amount of time this requires is dependent upon the time taken to unfreeze the target group; to attempt to rush this process usually guarantees the group/organization will not successfully transition, and will return to the old behavior. It is important to understand that defense (certainly Australian) does not have a good track record for allowing sufficient time for change management.

**Current Actions**

In commencing my initial analysis following my handover (and with the overarching direction to have logistics “off the table”), I started by seeking actions already undertaken by Multi-National Security and Transitional Command–Iraq
(MNSTC–I), from a brief entitled “Iraqi Army Logistics Capability” dated 26 March 2008. In this brief, the following ten critical gaps were identified:

- No materiel management center exists within the Iraqi joint headquarters deputy chief of staff, logistics (DCOS LOG). This absence prevents the Iraqi Army (IA) from properly managing and replenishing repair parts, performing fleet maintenance management, or gaining visibility and control of assets.

- No standard catalog or cataloging system prevents the effective management of materiel and the automation of logistics processes and hinders the requisitioning of correct parts.

- Training program of instructions (POI) is outdated, therefore, current maintenance, Class IX (repair parts), and property accountability POI do not reflect current Iraqi processes or procedures.

- Lack of standardized forms prevents the IA from eventually automating its logistics processes. The lack of standard forms also hampers various logistics organizations from interacting efficiently.

- Some policies do not exist and others are not followed.

- No Class IX support to the motorized transportation regiment (MTR) logistic battalions and location commands.

- Limited capability to procure replenishment parts. Within the IA (DCOS LOG) there is limited and insufficient ability to procure repair parts, which directly affects the mission readiness of the IA.

- No coalition supply expertise at Taji National Depot.

- MTR not providing maintenance support to headquarters and service companies.

- Lack of modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) change procedures.

Four solutions were proposed as the way ahead to address these gaps, with the intended end state of coalition forces working with their Iraqi counterparts to reestablish Iraqi doctrine:

- Develop Iraqi doctrine, and codify it in writing for use at both the Iraqi Army Service and Support Institute (IASSI) officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) academies.

- Develop a timeline for the introduction of automation for both supply and maintenance.

- Develop a timeline for the creation of the materiel management center.

- Train logistics military advisor teams (LMATs), and military training teams (MTTs) on Iraqi doctrine and observe/control the Iraqi system.
While there was certainly action occurring to meet these identified gaps, it appeared to be more a result of individual handover actions by the original participants in their lanes rather than as a continuing collective response.

The following are other factors I noted that will impact strategies:

- *In sha’Allah.* Culturally, the Iraqis do not appear to necessarily attach the same importance to time, urgency, or the overall coalition plan that the coalition does. Thus, the coalition will be constantly disappointed by the Iraqis’ seeming lack of cooperation. While some of this is certainly deliberate helplessness on their part, it is also suggestive they are working to a different plan. Therefore, while not a foe, the continued collection of logistic intelligence would be beneficial to assist both planning and the shaping of advisor questions to ensure we understand their intent. Sometimes, however, it is simply they do not particularly consider it important, therefore *in sha’Allah,* which I believe can also be explained by the Iraqis not considering they have suffered a catastrophe that invalidated their processes.

- MTOE. From the 7th IA Division example, it would appear the location commands are not necessarily following the MTOE model, and are attaching their own (yet to be clearly ascertained) priorities. Again, understanding of their higher intent, and specific direction within their chains-of-command, is required to ensure the coalition is not making nugatory effort.

- Fuel. It had been highlighted in a previous coalition army advisory training team weekly report that ground transportation regiment would apparently not issue fuel allocations under 10,000 liters to location commands or divisions. This raises the issue of IA fuel allocation in general, which is a fixed process determined by DCOS LOG based on the vehicle and equipment holdings of dependencies. This system has a number of layers, such as the willingness to shut down facilities, profiteering, and theft, which have been entrenched for so long that it may take a substantial amount of time to undo.

- Supply. Before considering how to modernize the Iraqi supply system (and by extension, the distribution and maintenance systems), the exact state of holdings needs to be ascertained accurately. Even in Western armies this is the subject of never-ending corporate governance and accounting with the intent of providing maximum visibility of all items acquired using public monies. It is clear from dealing with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) that such accountability was not necessarily required under Saddam, and was entrenched in so many layers of bureaucracy that it was effectively impossible to truly understand stock holding. In the first instance, overcoming the institutionalized mistrust and fear will be required before any effective restructuring can occur.

- Visibility tracking. Implementing a visibility management/tracking system (commercial or otherwise) by coalition forces in any foreign location can always be problematic due to vandals or theft. Before this could be implemented within the ISF. However, the issue that looms even before the training of personnel is the codification of all trackable items.
In the first instance, full accountability of stock is required, which will require institutionalized change first.

- Information technology (IT) connectivity. Overlaid across this planning is the national IT connectivity plan. Regardless whether the scope of the network is defined, the availability and connectivity of hardware will need to be confirmed and installed in the first instance. Levels of access and security measures, and down to what level, will need to be determined. Will all users have access to help desk functionality? Such issues should be resolved before user training commences as there will be a loss of confidence should such support not be available. This is particularly important when attempting to introduce such a capability. It is important to remember the cultural breach here. For example, this generation of Iraqi enlisted soldiers will not necessarily be computer literate (or in some cases literate).

- Redundancy. In the background is the issue of redundancy. If the coalition pushes ahead with the technological solution, are there sufficient fallback systems in place to negate significant loss of momentum?

I deliberately avoided training as an individual issue as it crosses every area, and I do not want to go into the depth that requires in this brief.

The Way Ahead

Grounding the way forward in the logistic capabilities solutions, I offer the following:

- Develop Iraqi doctrine, and codify it in writing for use at both the IASSI officer and NCO academies. The Iraqis have doctrine, albeit not well used. The coalition is faced with a culture that fundamentally does not want it here, and (arguably) in all probability will revert once the coalition has left. The extant doctrine should be sourced through the advisors and modified as appropriate to achieve realistic aims at both academies. Use of their own doctrine, with only relatively minor adjustments, is more likely to (and therefore achieve positive change management).

- Develop timelines for the introduction of automation for both supply and maintenance. The primary consideration (at odds to coalition training) is that the coalition may not be able to see this aim achieved during its presence, and significantly for each new rotation of command team, not within the coalition's tenure. This is not to say a timeline should not be developed, but in understanding the significant cultural and institutional limitations it should be based on a much longer change management timeframe. Accept this is at odds with the coalition's ingrained training that drives us to seek tangible results within its tenure and/or control.

- Develop a timeline for the creation of the materiel management center. This is certainly more achievable, but perhaps not in the manner originally envisioned. In understanding the nature the Iraqi method of providing visibility, the coalition needs to remain both adaptive and (perhaps) unconventional to achieve the intent and always remember it is
the Iraqis’ system—if they choose another methodology then ultimately that is their choice.

- Train LMATs/MTTs on Iraqi doctrine and observe/control the Iraqi system. How does the coalition achieve this in practice? Be prepared to utilize subject matter experts for each level; experienced senior NCOs, warrant officers, prior service officers at the workplace level; O3/O4 at the company level; and so on through command level. As much as possible, this should be intensively managed to ensure personnel experience is maximized to task.

Conclusion

There have been ten critical gaps identified in IA logistics capability dating back to March 2008. In short, these center around the lack of standardization, policies/doctrine, agreed MTOE, cataloging, tracking, visibility, fleet management and a limited capability in identifying replenishment requirements. There is also no materiel management organization to oversee any implementation.

Four solutions have been determined—development of doctrine, timelines for the introduction of automation (supply and maintenance), creation of a materiel management organization, and training of coalition teams in this doctrine/system. However, what is currently lacking is the identification of subject matter experts to target these specific solutions.

Continued provision of appropriately qualified (and supported) coalition personnel should provide an effective ongoing contribution toward ensuring effective management of materiel, automation of logistics processes, and correct requisitioning procedures. Coalition personnel will be able to mentor ISF logistics organizations to interact efficiently, and facilitate more effective provision of tactical level support within the logistic process through provision of coalition supply expertise at supply depots. Consider this as a necessary stepping stone to achieving effective ISF logistic capability, never forgetting those who fail to learn their lessons are doomed to repeat them.

References


Chapter 11

Turning Over the Keys, Not Turning Out the Lights: Transitioning Forward Operating Base Rustamiyah to the Iraqi Security Forces

MAJ Kenneth Letcher and CPT Kenneth Lutz, 82d Brigade Support Battalion, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division

Introduction

As the 82d BSB (Brigade Support Battalion) waited at Camp Buehring, Kuwait for movement into Iraq, the task of transitioning forward operating base (FOB) Rustamiyah to the government of Iraq (GOI) loomed overhead like the sand storms of the Middle East, darkening thoughts and causing some consternation as staff officers plodded through the military decisionmaking process to recommend courses of action to the BSB commander, LTC Greg Boyd, and the 3d Brigade Combat Team (3BCT), 82d Airborne (3/82 ABN) commander, COL Tim McGuire, for transition of the base. Key to the brigade was first, whose mission should it be? And second, how should that unit conduct the mission?

The BSB leadership quickly realized that this was going to be a difficult problem set that would stretch the BSB thin, but it was achievable. Looking back on the achievement, the BSB did not realize how difficult it would be. Over 250 paratroopers, Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, civilian contractors and local national laborers worked in concert to transition Rustamiyah to the Iraqi Military Academy. This chapter outlines the frustrations, the many obstacles overcome by the individual tenacity of several key individuals and teamwork, and many lessons learned that provide a way ahead as many more units take on the daunting task of transitioning a base to the host nation.

Reframing the Problem

According to Field Manual 3-90, Tactics:

The tactical problem accounts for the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations, the variable whose infinite mutations always combine to form a new tactical pattern. They never produce exactly the same situation; thus there can be no checklist that adequately addresses each unique situation.

In Kuwait, the BSB commander took the first step toward understanding the problem and visualizing solutions. As a tactical-level unit, the first assumption would be to use a traditional model, but transitioning a coalition base to the government of Iraq (GOI) appeared anything but tactical.

With white boards and dry erase markers, the commander and his staff quickly sketched out the key issues surrounding the transition toward developing a comprehensive understanding of the situation. Future expansion possibilities for the BCTs operational environment, the pending decision to move combat forces out of the city in compliance with the security agreement, the timeline established in the Multi-National Division–Baghdad (MND–B) fragmentary order (FRAGO), and a
laundry list of other tasks all provided a framework for the transition effort. The initial problem statement developed by the staff for the commander stated: Given the changing dynamics of theater basing and force protection requirements, how does 3/82 ABN transition FOB Rustamiyah to the GOI within the predetermined timeline while ensuring property accountability and installation integrity? The problem statement appeared to bridge all three levels of war: 3/82 ABN, a tactical unit, and transitioning a theater-managed base (operational) to the GOI (strategic).

Building the Plane While in Flight

The hypothesis provided a framework from which the battalion and brigade commander could visualize the plan ahead. This helped the BSB commander and his staff frame the problem and understand, that while the priority mission within the framework of transitioning Iraq back to the Iraqis, the transition of Rustamiyah was really just another cog in that engine of change—the whole of Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) and the goal of sustainable security in Iraq. During mission analysis and the transfer of authority with 4BCT, 10th Mountain Division, the difficulties began to present themselves. The relieving in place units, MNF–I personnel (CJI), logistics (CJ4), finance (CJ8) staffs, Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) C4 (logistics), Army Materiel Command (AMC), the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the North American Treaty Organization Training Mission–Iraq (which is partnered with the Iraqi Military Academy–Rustamiyah), MND–B G4 (logistics), MND–B G4 Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the MND–B administrative contracting officer (ACO), and Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) representation gathered for a meeting to discuss the “checklist.” Unfortunately, this was to be the last time individuals from each of the shareholder organizations came together either in one place or virtually to discuss the transition. Here were the facts presented:

- Almost 250 acres of real estate
- Over 3000 paratroopers, Soldiers, Airmen, civilian contractors and local/third country national workers
- Over 400 containerized housing units and shower/bathroom trailers
- Over 170 buildings, 17 guard towers, and several additional pieces of real property
- Over 1,700 truckloads of contractor-managed, government-owned property valued at over $22 million
- Over 175,000 gallons of JP8 fuel on the ground
- Over 1200 cubic meters of contaminated soil to be removed

After realizing the complexity of bringing over ten military and civilian agencies together for a common aim without a common planning team, the staff looked at the key tasks, which emanated from the MND–B FRAGO. The first one specified transition no later than 31 March 2009. Overlaying the tasks associated with the transition, the unit movement and occupation plans associated with the units still based on the camp, and the additional requirements for the BCT and the BSB, not least of which was supporting the elections in late January 2009, leaders realized
that the transition should be based on conditions rather than driven by time. Given the size of the FOB and the amount of materiel, equipment, and personnel on the FOB, estimates revealed it would take 30–45 days from the departure of the last major element of an operational unit to transition the FOB. This time estimate was driven partly by the KBR sub-contract for the dining facility (DFAC) which specified it was to be given 30 days from the transition or closure of the base to discontinue food service to the base. Unfortunately, the truth of the matter surfaced, and the driving factor for closure remained time.

This discussion of time over a conditions-based transition is important because on 1 January 2009 there were still over 3,000 paratroopers, Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen contractors, and third country and local national laborers living and working on the base. 1-66 Armor Regiment and 1-319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment controlled the operational environment to the north, west, and south of Rustamiyah and were actively conducting operations in and around their areas of operation, while maintaining almost 1,300 Soldiers on the base. Additionally, the 91st Military Police Battalion operated its headquarters and several company elements from Rustamiyah. Lastly, the 82d BSB supported the 3/82 ABN with a forward logistics element (FLE) that consisted of Level II combat health support and a ground medical evacuation quick reaction force, bulk and retail fuel support (over 175,000 gallons in storage on 1 January 2009), a logistics release point with materiel handling equipment, time-sensitive and outsized vehicle recovery, mortuary affairs support, and vehicle sanitization operations. The BSB provided command and control for this element by standing up an alternate command post led by the battalion executive officer (XO), with small personnel (S1), intelligence/operations (S2/3), signal (S6), and support operations officer (SPO) elements to command and control the elements on the ground and synchronize the transition team and the FLE. KBR provided life support and essential contracted services to support over 2,000 military service members operating from the base.

The 82d BSB conducted all of this while operating on the base that received more indirect fire in east Baghdad than any other coalition installation. Additionally, there was the ever-present threat of explosively formed projectiles, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and suicide bombers to convoys, vehicles, and at the gates.

Planning the Team

Mission analysis began in Kuwait, with several members of the staff, the company first sergeants, and the battalion command sergeant major (CSM) identifying several major tasks which all believed needed troops allocated to them (Figure 11-1).

The battalion CSM identified several key individuals within the BSB to serve in essential billets on the transition team and then return back to their regular mission with the battalion; these individuals provided vital leadership at particularly troublesome points of friction.
While this was the original transition team task organization as envisioned in Kuwait and upon assumption of the mission in January 2009, the team quickly morphed into what the battalion CSM termed the “Rusty A-Team” (Figure 11-2).

There were several nodes that were key, both to the transition team and to the FLE in support of 3BCT: the SPO transportation section, the bulk and retail fuel point, the establishment of a “four corners” retrograde yard under the command and control of a single noncommissioned officer (NCO), and the mayor’s cell which provided daily interaction with tenants and KBR. Additionally, the battalion CSM relocated to Rustamiyah for the last month of transition operations to focus execution at the NCO level, put the finishing touches on the transition, and prepare...
for the transition ceremony. Even more support came from echelons above division assets in the form of laundry support, mobile postal team support, MCT support, and AMC’s mobile redistribution team.

One of the key personal lessons learned is one which my wife, who served for the past ten months as a logistics planner for MNC–I, C4, constantly reminded me that “planners plan, the hard part is letting go of your plan to the executors.” The executor in the case of the Rusty transition team was the mayor’s cell, the SPO transportation cell, and the other 200-plus paratroopers, Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, civilian contractors, and workers who executed their assigned tasks to the highest standards. Chief among the executors was the battalion CSM, who moved to the decisive point on the battlefield and led from the front ensuring the paratroopers understood their tasks and executed to the highest standards.

**Figure 11-2**

DEVELOPING SELF-SUSTAINING SECURITY FORCE CAPABILITIES

Legend:
- BN: Battalion
- RO: Radio operators
- LNO: Liaison officer
- SOC: Special Operations Consulting (contractor)
- DRMS: Defense Resource Management System
- Ex-Pats: Ex-patriots
- FP: Force protection
- CP: Command post
- SOG: Sergeant of the Guard
- Div: Division
- SPT: Support
- CF: Coalition forces
- LN: Local nationals
- TCN: Third country nationals
Executing the Plan

MND–B made the initial closure plan based off the MNC–I plan. The MND–B FRAGO provided a 150-day transfer timeline (Figure 11-3.)

As all departed the planning conference on 28 December, one of the supporting organizations had a question to which the outgoing BSB XO cheerfully replied, “You don’t understand . . . this is the 82d ABN and this is as far as the bastards are going.” What he meant by that is the transition team exuded a no nonsense demeanor to the task at hand, and to get the job done it would sometimes mean

Legend:
FLIPL - Financial liability investigation of property loss
ESCS - Emergency Satellite Communications System
ISF - Iraqi Security Forces
FEPP - Federal excess personal property
JARB - Joint Acquisition Review Board
JFUB - Joint Facilities Utilization Board
TMRs - Transportation movement requests
CONPLAN - Contingency plan
CLSS - Combat Logistics Support System

Figure 11-3
knocking on a desk or travelling to a higher headquarters to get the answers or support required for the mission.

For example, one of the tasks on the MNC–I transition timeline is “update initial environmental site compliance survey.” No one could give the status of that survey until the team ended up talking to the MND–B environmental compliance officer directly. Not only did the team receive a copy of the survey, but it was able to coordinate with MND–B environmental to conduct an updated site visit. And MND–B and MNF–I environmental representatives ended up back down at the base to supervise the environmental reclamation of contaminated soil from the bulk fuel point before they conducted the final clearance inspection.

The transition team realized that it would not be able to eat this elephant alone, and that it needed to start eating to meet the imposed timeline. To establish the process of transitioning the base, the team first had to establish how it would remove all of the materiel and equipment such as force protection barriers, containers, trash, scrap metal, old Class III (petroleum products), random Class IX (repair parts) that had accumulated, etc. Drawing on experiences from the National Training Center, the transition team established a “four corners” operation run by one of the senior NCOs on the ground. He worked hand-in-hand with DLA defense reutilization management program in theater to establish a scrap metal collection point, which eventually accumulated over 200,000 pounds of scrap metal for which DLA coordinated removal. The turn-in NCOIC also established points for turn in of hazardous materiels, Class II (clothing and equipment), Class IV (construction and barrier items), Class VII (major end items), and Class IX. There was also a multitude of Class VII found on the installation such as mine plows, trailers, a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle egress assistance trainer for rollovers trainer, and several other items. With the assistance of the movement controllers, the SPO transportation section was able to submit TMRs and retrograde that equipment to the receipt, processing, and turn-in yard in theater.

One of the key issues that required additional help was the drawdown of the fuel system supply point (FSSP). Not only did the transition team need to draw down over 175,000 gallons of JP8 fuel that was on-hand in the FSSP on 1 January, 2009, it also had to coordinate the environmental assessment and clean up with the MND–B environmental and engineering assets. The fuel handlers from Alpha Company, 82d BSB did an amazing job managing the day-to-day operations of the Rustamiyah bulk and retail fuel points, supporting the units in the 3BCT footprint while executing the physical tear down of the FSSP. In addition, the 82d BSB SPO general supply office worked diligently with 553d Combat Sustainment Support Battalion that provided M969 fuel tankers for hard storage to alleviate FSSP requirements to manage the drawdown of the on-hand fuel balance as required.

The mayor’s cell did an outstanding job of liaising not only with the tenant units on the FOB, but with KBR and with the gaining Iraqi unit, once it was identified. The mayor’s cell focused on the current operations required to run the FOB on a day-to-day basis, coordinating the execution of closure tasks with the KBR closure team, and the real property inventories required to be completed with the gaining unit or organization. As 31 March drew closer, the mayor’s cell focused more and more attention on ensuring the integrity of the facility and the accountability of property to be transferred.
As with any property inventory, the transition team worked hand-in-hand with the incoming unit, actually conducting many key leader engagements with Iraqi Ministry of Defense officials, leadership from the Iraqi Military Academy–Rustamiyah (IMAR), and leadership from the Rustamiyah Garrison Support Unit, which was not underneath the command and control of the IMAR, and this led to some interesting discussions and property inventories.

Additionally, the base defense operations cell worked in close cooperation with the contracted force protection assets to coordinate a relief-in-place with the Rustamiyah base defense battalion that would be assuming control of the security of the base after the transition of authority.

The Way Ahead

Transferring a base the size of Rustamiyah requires a series of skill sets that the BCT did not possess. The BCT became dependent on outside agencies to achieve many of the missions. As a result, the transition team learned many lessons.

Develop brigade- and division-level closure working groups

The purpose of this working group is to synchronize plans, policies, and procedures regarding base transition; synchronize the transition timing between the operational and logistical staffs; and ensure unity of effort concerning base transition. The transition of a base is a complex (and possibly adaptive) problem set that requires multiple points of synchronization from multiple organizations (MNF–I, MNC–I, MND–B, BCTs, ISF, DLA, etc.). The difficulty in synchronizing efforts caused much consternation among the staff sections involved from MNF–I, MNC–I, MND–B, and 3BCT. Multiple staff sections did not participate again after the 28 December 2008 meeting until two to three weeks from the transition date. This left the bulk of the work on the shoulders of the transition team, the BCT staff, and the MND–B G4 staff. However, most of the assets required for the transition of a base are not task organized under the command and control of the BCT or the G4. BCTs and division-level groups would allow for better flow of information and enable more responsive decision-making.

Termination of contracts

Each of the groups of contracts that provide basic life support (KBR under LOGCAP), force protection under Joint Contracting Command–Iraq, and the contracted maintenance support for the BSB (under the control of the 3ESC), are managed in different manners by different POCs within different organizations. To cancel the corps logistics service support maintenance contractors, the transition team was required to coordinate with 3ESC contracting. To cancel the FP contract, the transition team was required to coordinate with an MNF–I agency. Each contracting agency required a different standard for termination of services. The MNF–I or MND transition working groups could coordinate for and ensure the appropriate paperwork for the termination of services instead of the transition team having to identify the requirements, routing, and signature authority for the termination of services documents.
Transition guidance

Upon assumption of the mission there were three sets of guidance: MNC–I Operation Order (OPORD) 09-01, MND–B OPORD 09-01, and MND–B G4 LOGCAP. Each directed the transition or removal of different items of contractor-managed government-owned property. Based on the guidance to remove power generation it was necessary to coordinate letters of technical direction with KBR for stay behind operation and maintenance support. This has currently been remedied by General Odierno’s 20 April 2009 guidance on the return or closure of bases and facilities in Iraq.

Contract removal of equipment

Both local contractors and theater-level contractors (FP, intelligence, and communications) failed to remove equipment or coordinate equipment removal from the base. This equipment included latrines and trash dumpsters that were locally contracted as well as FP and communications equipment that had to be removed at the last minute by the transition team. This caused difficulty for the closure team as it prepared to depart the base. Additionally, the failure of the local contractor to remove its contracted equipment (dumpsters and latrines) caused a tremendous amount of angst for the closure team and unit. The contractor failed to recover the equipment prior to the closure team departing the base, and when the contractor arrived the following day, the ISF would not allow the workers entrance to the base to retrieve the equipment. The closure team must include in local contracts a timeline for removal of equipment and termination of services and the possible outcome if that timeline is not adhered to. Also, with theater-level contracts, the MND–B (or higher) closure working groups should ensure that all provided equipment is accounted for and removed by field service representatives and/or subject matter experts.

Identification of materiel handling equipment (MHE) requirements

The FOB transition team failed to adequately forecast MHE requirements, which forced the BSB SPO to react and support with additional forklift assets from the supporting supply activity. If the transition team had adequately forecasted, it could have contracted for additional MHE (cranes, forklifts, etc.) to support the mission. Additionally, proper forecasting would have allowed for field ordering officer dollars to be better spent. Unfortunately, one must overestimate MHE requirements. MHE will break, be required elsewhere for other missions, or additional assets will be required.

Conclusion

While the transition of Rustamiyah to the Iraqi Military Academy was a tremendous undertaking for the 82d BSB and 3/82 ABN, it certainly opened our eyes to the complexity of the operational environment currently existing in Baghdad, Iraq. While multiple organizations above the BSB proclaimed that this was their priority of effort, the multitude of mission sets and operational requirements in and around Baghdad serve to cloud this prioritization.

This required the BSB to dynamically re-task organize, and, while the BSB was stretched nearly to its breaking point, many of our paratroopers learned invaluable
lessons about themselves and their capabilities as they operated levels above their pay grade in multiple, complex mission roles.

As MNF–I returns or closes more bases, the units involved will better hone their processes and synchronization required to enable the retrograde of personnel, equipment, and materiel out of Iraq as the mission dictates.

As coalition forces become more practiced at closing or returning bases, Rustamiyah may serve as a case study for what not to do, but for now it illustrates many lessons learned, both positive and negative, and has already served the 3/82 ABN as a guide as the BCT moves to close or return multiple bases during the summer of 2009.
Chapter 12

Advising at All Levels of Logistics

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“Move yourself to move forward.”

—MG Muniem, Iraqi Army
Director for Electrical and Mechanical Engineering

Introduction

U.S. Army logistics and the ability to support the mission transcends the “art and science” and takes on an element of magic. To those not involved in logistics the trucks get fixed, Soldiers get fed, housing is available, and supplies arrive. It is difficult to fathom the amount of support, talent, and man-hours required to make Army logistics happen—until you have to advise a host nation’s army logistics from the ground up.

Logistics advisors have one of the toughest jobs on the battlefield because inherent to a successful logistics program is the reliance on a web of different agencies that must be developed simultaneously. One can teach small-unit tactics in near isolation whereas logistics at the lowest levels is affected by national policies for procurement, life cycle management, asset visibility, and a host nation’s cultural perspective on self-sustainment. The logistics mission does not start and end at teaching a mechanic to change an engine but is tied to procuring the right tools, building the motorpool to conduct repairs, ensuring power to the facility, tracking the work completed, requesting additional parts required, moving the parts to the location, developing the contracts to procure the parts, requesting the budget for spare parts requirements, etc. An advisor, at any level, must understand the impacts of culture on advising, the role of the commander in the sustainment process, and have an appreciation for understanding current and developing systems.

Impact of Culture on Logistics Advising

Nan-in, a Japanese master during the Meiji era (1868–1912), received a university professor who came to inquire about Zen. Nan-in served tea. He poured his visitor’s cup full. And then kept on pouring. The professor watched the overflow until he could no longer restrain himself, “It is overfull. No more will go in!”

“Like this cup,” Nan-in said, “you are full of your own opinions and speculations. How can I show you Zen. Unless you first empty your cup?”

—Zen Flesh Zen Bones, 101 Zen Stories
Do not underestimate the importance of culture and the effect it plays on both the advisor and the advisee. It is human nature to approach problems with cultural biases. To reach an understanding with your counterpart and be successful you must strive for solutions that best fit your advisee within their cultural pretexts and not your own. An advisor must first reflect on his advisee's culture in terms of the military environment, diplomatic environment, and personal biases.

**U.S. Army Logistics Culture**

The U.S. Army and U.S. Army logistics represent mature systems and a distinct culture. An advisor must understand how this culture shapes an individual's thinking. There are several military cultural challenges that the advisor brings that will impair their work. An advisor's abilities are limited by time, quantitative results, and constraints based upon an operations-based force. In Iraq, logistics drives operations as compared to the U.S. Army where operations drive logistics.

**Long-term solutions in the context of a deployment**

Advisors search for long-term solutions, but live in a world of 6- to 15-month deployments where the measure of success is an evaluation report and an award covering a relatively short period of time. Consciously, or subconsciously, many advisors in Iraq drive for the tangible solutions and low-hanging fruit rather than long-term goals. Rather than advisor system development, advisors are forced to attack symptomatic problems. Advisors become victims of the U.S. Army award and evaluation systems requiring quantifiable data and measurements of success. Logistics solutions are slow moving in nature and sometimes results are not seen during a normal tour length. For example, the operational readiness assessment (ORA) has rating categories of 1–4 (1 being the best) and it is not surprising to see the months to an ORA 1 unit often matches the number of months to redeployment. A new unit rotates in and drops the assessments for improvement through their tour. XVIII Airborne Corps established, “getting logistics off the table by April 2009.” The date corresponded to the corps’ relief in place/transfer of authority. For the leaders in charge of advisors, it is important to be the bulwark against this trend and enable advisors to seek long-term strategies.

**Action-driven Army**

In the U.S. Army, leader evaluations reflect what leaders do; however, a successful advisor can often be measured by what they don’t do. As the Iraqi Army (IA) becomes more self-reliant, the coalition needs to allow the IA to take the lead. This means reducing the amount of training, materiel support, and oversight given. Sometimes the advisor that doesn’t train and doesn’t provide materiel is the better advisor because the cycle of dependency is broken. Unfortunately, the rating system is based on quantifiable data and often the most benign task on paper takes an incredible amount of effort for a logistics advisor. For example, the advisors for the 35th Brigade, 9th IA Division logistics battalion took three months to get its counterparts to track equipment by serial number—three months of effort described in one sentence.

**Combat arms and combat service support relationships**

Logistics advisors have the added challenge that often their efforts go unappreciated in their own Army. Due to a mature logistics system, many combat
arms Soldiers receive seamless support and therefore are not required to understand the complexities of U.S. Army logistics. A logistics advisor becomes forced to convince their team on the need for logistics advice. Irrespective of how unappealing host nation logistics may be to certain demographics in the military, it is essential that it is part of daily operations and advising for all personnel regardless of branch. The logistics advisors must be able to articulate the importance of their mission to both the host nation and other branches of service. Partnership units and advisors of all branches need to bring logistics to the forefront of their actions.

Combined operations do not begin when the vehicles leave the gate—it includes vehicle preventive maintenance checks and services and logistics planning. The logistics advisor must also educate other branches on the importance of sustainment independence and forcing the host nation to become self-reliant. For example, infantry units were providing Iraqis with fuel to conduct combined patrols. The infantry soldiers are rated by the number of patrols that they conduct; however, the IA has a system for obtaining fuel that they were not utilizing because U.S. forces provided the support. Arguably, it is better to not go on patrol (which would not cause an operational failure) and force the IA to use their system to obtain fuel properly.

**Iraqi Army Logistics Culture**

An advisor must understand the unique IA logistics culture if an advisor hopes to be successful. The first thing to understand as a logistics advisor is the legacy the new IA carries, the larger historical picture, and the effects of prior advisors and coalition relationships. Coalition logistics advisors need to frame their strategy with their counterparts’ cultural considerations and to judge what areas they can influence. An advisor must understand the residual effects of past advisors and coalition exposure, the speed of business, historical perspectives, and the impact of sanctions on IA logistics.

**Residual effects of past advisors and coalition exposure**

In some instances, certain Iraqi units are on their 5th or 6th advisory team, not including British and Russian teams before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The advisors expect their supporting unit to welcome them with open arms and that is a significant emotional investment for the Iraqis. The Iraqis place a lot of stake on personal relationships and it is difficult to make relationships with their advisors knowing that they will leave in less than a year’s time and majority of the past advisors never contact their counterparts again. One Iraqi refused to work with a new team because after saying good-bye to the last team he said it would be too hard to say good-bye again. From the perspective of a deployed Soldier, a year’s time, is a long time, but from the Iraqi perspective, a year is a short time. Each advisory team will potentially have a more difficult time building relationships with their Iraqi counterparts. Furthermore, the Iraqis will endure in Iraq and their advisors will leave—they watch as their advisors make the same mistakes and ask the same questions. Advisors need to be aware that their ideas are probably not original and if their counterpart resists advice, take into consideration that someone might have tried it before and is worth asking.
Speed of business

Advisors need to realize they are working at the speed of a deployment with an Army that is operating at the speed of garrison and the two armies need to find the middle ground for daily operations tempo.

Historical considerations—an Army not at war

Take time to understand the history of a host nation, and specifically for Iraq, history that affects their logistical decisions. The senior officers of the IA have all been a part of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) during which time over 1.5 million people were killed. The Iraqis have a different perception of what constitutes an emergency and what is critical. This manifests itself in the insistence of not issuing supplies while retaining war stocks. Many advisors find it ironic and frustrating that the IA does not release war stock because the coalition considers Iraq to be in a war; however, to the IA, this insurgency is far less threatening than what it experienced in the past and does not see the emergency. However, it is more of a threat than Iran. Uncertain times lie ahead for Iraq and Iraqis are very cautious about releasing supplies. Furthermore, the IA has lost many soldiers and has a higher tolerance for casualty rates than the coalition. The IA and the U.S. respond to casualties from culturally different perspectives. Logistically, the IA is less careful with mission planning and ensuring its soldiers are prepared logistically to reduce casualty rates. Logistics advisors should imagine an officer from World War II planning with an officer today and discussing acceptable casualty rates to get a better understanding of this mindset.

The impact of sanctions on logistics

Logistics in Iraq while the country was under sanctions shaped its perspective today. Logistics drove operations due to materiel limitations. The expectation was that soldiers would fix their own vehicles and perform all levels of maintenance until their resources were exhausted. Discipline for the lines did not exist and the scarcity of spare parts made it a requirement to rebuild nearly every part. The people and the IA learned to survive without and today the legacy is that logisticians are allowed to refuse issue of supplies on hand even with valid demands.

Bringing the Cultures Together

There are many differences between the two cultures, but ultimately there are always more similarities than differences—start with the similarities and integrate new concepts afterward. First, agree with the basics and principles that hold true for any supply agency starting with the need to fight and sustain combat operations.

Good logistics advisors will create context to understand the decisions their counterparts make and be empathetic; however, there is a fine line for when empathy turns to sympathy. Advisors need to maintain the balance between personal and professional relationships. Personal relationships are essential to a good advisory relationship and trust must be developed, but the loyalty is to the mission. Develop a personal relationship that enables honest communication.
Advise around corruption

The U.S. military does not allow or tolerate graft or corruption in its system and offenses are punishable by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Logistics advisors may find themselves in situations where corruption is normal and rampant. It is difficult for U.S. advisors to work in corrupt environments. To come to terms with corruption, advisors must consider automation gives high asset visibility and less opportunity to obtain supplies. Also, when corruption is a part of every faction of life, it is certain that it will be a part of its logistics systems. Understand that the host nation understands corruption and places less trust in its own systems, this offers a good chance to introduce effective measures of checks and balances into its system.

Avoid jumping to the conclusion of corruption

Sometimes advisors might see a situation that on the surface seems corrupt, but this may not be the case. Advisors must recognize what they are looking at. For example, the Iraqi soldier receives separate money for life support and a portion is given back to the unit for the purchase of food and facility maintenance. However, sometimes soldiers give all their life support money to the command. Is this corruption? In some cases it is and in others commanders have to take all the life support money to cover the costs for their soldiers who have pay problems. Soldiers with pay problems do not get life support money and commanders will have to stretch their life support budget to feed all their soldiers. Another example is the fuel that U.S. Soldiers see being sold by the side of the road. Has the IA been selling its fuel? There are cases of fuel being sold and in other cases it is a function of entrepreneurship by individuals who sell their fuel allocation on the side of the road due to a lack of fuel stations across the country and are able to make a profit for convenience fees.

Reframe the problem

Corruption is a part of daily life in many countries. Often times leaders do not have a choice but to participate in corruption and it is accepted. To come to terms with corruption better, reframe the corruption with a wider perspective. For example, in the Arab culture hospitality is very important and officers are required to show a great deal of hospitality to their senior officers. However, the Iraqi officer does not make enough money to afford such hospitality and will therefore come up with creative solutions to afford this hospitality requirement.

Excessive corruption

The basic rule of thumb is that the corruption is too much if it impacts the soldiers’ livelihood significantly, impacts the mission, and is done in the spirit of theft.

Coalition aiding corruption

Often advisors will think they are helping the host nation when in fact they are aiding corruption because they are providing their supported unit with supplies on which the upper echelon leaders lack visibility. For example, advisors were giving their Iraqi counterparts fuel. The Iraqis were using their allocation of fuel and selling the fuel the coalition was gifting. The excess fuel enabled the IA leaders to sell fuel. Further compounding the fuel problem was the IA was not able to forecast
the needs of the Army because it did not know how much fuel its units were consuming.

Components of a Logistics Advisory Strategy at All Levels

Advisors should be the master of the unit

Advisors need to know everything about their unit, the personnel in it, and their processes. Advisors are responsible for answering all questions pertaining to their unit. Understand the scope and scale of the unit to gain reference. For example, 14 IA divisions is not the same as 14 U.S. Army divisions. Also, the country of Iraq is not the same as the entire country of the United States. Iraq is twice the size of Idaho. Sizes and functions of units will dictate their logistics requirements.

Adopt the same schedule

Advisors need to adopt the same schedule as their counterparts. If the host nation has their weekends as Friday and Saturday, the advisor should adopt the same work week. Advisors should mirror their activities with their counterparts. For coalition staff working with advisors, they need to be flexible with their meetings and deadlines to ensure it does not interfere with their advising schedule and work week. The Iraqis take Friday and Saturday as their weekend. They start work early, break for lunch, have a period of rest, and work late into the evening. The advisors should match this schedule, but often times their coalition partners will try to arrange morning meetings and try to get them to obtain information from the Iraqis on Fridays or Saturdays.

Identify key logistics nodes

The structure of the host nation will not match perfectly with the U.S. Army system and the roles and responsibilities are not always the same either. Understand who, and the position, that makes logistics decisions and where logistics activities take place. For example, the original logistics advising strategy did not take into account the Iraqi G8 (finance staff); however, the G8 was responsible for the property book, a separate property book for technical items like spare parts, and would control money to the logistics units to locally purchase goods and spare parts. In the Iraqi culture, many of the logistics units were only in charge of the execution of logistics and the decisions directing and managing these assets were controlled by commanders and their logistics officers.

Command influence

Commanders influence heavily upon logistics and logistics needs to be part of the advisory strategy. Advisors of commanders who do not discuss logistics will miss discussing a topic that consumes a significant portion of that commander’s work.

Not only is the commander a part of the logistics flow process, but also the logistics command climate in the unit. How the commander views logistics shapes its conduct in the unit. Advisors need to ask directly how the command views logistics. For example, an Iraqi division commander stated that he thought a good maintenance unit was one with no broken vehicles. In the U.S. Army a good maintenance company has the ability to regenerate combat power. The difference in attitude influences everything.
Understand host nation logistic systems

Advisors must understand the logistics systems. Advisors need to be able to map the flow of each type of supply within the unit. This exercise should be done in conjunction with the host nation counterpart and enables advisors to become the masters of their unit and identify root causes for issues. For example, in Iraq most advisors state that spare parts are their primary inhibitor; however, spare parts are not a problem. Advisors were not familiar with the processes enough to state if the root issue was transportation of spare parts, the paper work for ordering spare parts, availability of spare parts etc. Further understanding of the processes enables advisors to understand the difference between doctrine and reality as well as better educate supporting staff members who are not in contact with the host nation as frequently.

Understand relationships

Understanding personalities and interrelationships clarifies why certain decisions are made. In Iraq, there are many social dynamics that need to be understood to include knowing the tribe and religion of the key personnel in the unit. Sometimes results of these social dynamics and the impact on relationships is a non-linear logistics system that circumvents the chain of command and logistics chain.

Tactical/Operational/Strategic Advising

There are unique challenges at each level of war for logistics advisors and the unique challenges must be understood by all to better communicate and develop logistics solutions. All advisors need to know their scope of responsibility and understand what they can and cannot influence. Tactical advisors need to stay tactical and strategic advisors need to stay strategic. Literacy rates climb as you move up the chain of command. Strategic advisors trying to develop national strategy need to understand that at the execution level complicated orders may not be well understood. Also, the introduction of new forms must be a careful process. Most soldiers may not be able to fill out the forms.

Lifecycle advising

Fundamental to logistics is the ability to lifecycle manage a system. Logistics advisors need established chains of communication to lifecycle advice through a logistical problem. It is important for logistical advisors to understand the problems at all levels.

Tactical advising

Tactical advising is difficult because of the challenges in literacy and also many of the host nation logистicians at this level are not enabled to make responsive decisions. The primary function is to support the fight and maintain readiness for the unit. It is also difficult because there are many issues that affect the unit which the advisors cannot control such as the flow of spare parts and goods. However, tactical advisors have the best understanding of ground-truth reality and can best articulate the current situation. Tactical advisors to assist the overall advisory mission must package the information; in reality they see in ways that can be used by advisors at higher levels. For example, if there are communication problems, they should be mapped, or specific enough that will give higher echelon advisors
the ability to fix those issues. One important thing to remember is that all advisors are important and that tactical advisors are no less important than strategic advisors.

All advisors need to know who is influencing their counterpart as it effects decision-making and command and control structures. Tactical units are accountable to the division commander, regional support facilities are controlled by the garrison commander and the respective ministerial branch, and at the ministry they are all controlled by the chief of staff. These dynamics shape the activities and information that concern each unit.

Operational advising

Operational advisors are a bridge between the strategic and tactical realms and their focus is on supporting the customer and supporting the overall mission. Operational advisors have the added challenge of working with multiple commanders who each have their own set of unique demands. This area is very political because certain commanders have more influence than others, and regardless of requirement, those commanders with influence will be supported better. Operational advisors need to work with their counterparts to communicate and provide honest and accurate reports on their activities.

Strategic advising

The most difficult thing to do as a strategic advisor is to think and visualize at the national level. There are magnitudes of daily crises that will try to pull thinking into the minuitia. Additionally, most advisors are experienced at the tactical level and choose to advise in their comfort zone. At the strategic level, it is crucial to understand the organization and understand the politics. Advisors also need to be aware that their counterparts might not have the required skill sets to complete a task such as the ability to write a national plan or contract. Overall, strategic advisors must be able to bring in outside subject matter experts to assist with their mission. Strategic advisors must communicate their counterpart’s actions with the rest of the advisor community to keep the rest of the advisors in line and focusing on the same goals. Furthermore, it is important to understand exactly of what and of who their counterpart is in charge of. For example, in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, the logistics subordinate directors such as electrical mechanical engineering (EME), and transportation and provisioning do not have budgets, and specifically the EME has technical control of his subordinate maintenance formations, but does not have administrative control. This is crucial to understanding what he can or cannot influence and where to put pressure.

Summary

Advising logistics in a host nation requires subject matter experts to understand the logistics systems at all levels. There are a myriad of agencies and staff sections dependent on each other to sustain the force. National policies are in place for procurement, life cycle management, asset visibility, and a host nation’s cultural perspective on self-sustainment. Advising at all levels requires an understanding at the national/strategic, operational, and tactical levels of sustainment support.

U.S. Army advisors must understand their own culture. Long-term solutions versus tying goals to a deployment cycle limit progress. The IA logistics also presents a challenge based on residual effects of past advisors and coalition exposure. The
speed the IA operates at counters U.S. culture. Additionally, historical considerations and the impact of sanctions on logistics affect the way the IA makes logistical decisions. Finally, the two cultures brought together requires advising around corruption, a solid understanding of the Iraqi systems, and the U.S. role in both.

In conclusion, advising at all levels requires becoming a master at all levels, adopting the same schedule, and understanding the host nation system. Advisors, with their counterparts, must identify the key logistical nodes and the role of command influence. The key to a successful advisory role is a team approach with the host nation.
## Appendix A

### Logistic Culture Comparisons Between the U.S. Army and the Iraqi Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Army Logistics Culture</th>
<th>Iraqi Army Logistics Culture</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supplies are for issuing</td>
<td>Supplies are part of the general wealth of Iraq</td>
<td>Spare parts and other supplies have been referred to as the “general wealth of Iraq” and essentially every spare part used robs Iraq of its wealth. It is better to have a shelf full of supplies rather than prove that you have issued parts and maintained readiness. Soldiers will be wearing tattered and unserviceable gear while the store room is stocked with brand-new equipment. However, the soldiers will not ask for the equipment because if they get it dirty or damaged it they will more often than not have to pay for it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-constrained environment</td>
<td>Time is a forefront issue</td>
<td>The IA is not as time constrained as the U.S. Army and advisors need to focus on the end product rather than focus on efficiencies. For example, ensure that the IA can fix its vehicles and manage that action before introducing concepts like prescribed load lists and bench stock that attempt to decrease the vehicle down time. Time is not the issue. The IA does not have a firm work day/week/month. Time-based metrics should be avoided because time is measured differently, especially where religion consumes a significant portion of the day and there is limited power. For example, how do you track man-hours during the month of Ramadan and where the power to the motor pool fluctuates? The commanders will dictate the speed of action. Also take a look at how many of the soldiers wear watches. The notion of an hour is completely different.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force projection</td>
<td>National defense</td>
<td>Shorter supply chains. Fewer types of logistics units required and simpler logistics structures required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Logistics Culture</td>
<td>Iraqi Army Logistics Culture</td>
<td>Impact</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moving customer and moving support base</td>
<td>Fixed customer and support base</td>
<td>For the Iraqi Army (IA) supply point distribution is often the best answer for its logistical solutions. Advisors should not over-complicate a problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust budget</td>
<td>Budget-constrained environment</td>
<td>The IA operates with a high degree of uncertainty in its budget. Advisors should push for command supply discipline and preventative maintenance to maintain its readiness. Supplies are limited and demands often go unfulfilled. Furthermore, the IA is limited with its ability to write contracts and feels as if it cannot plan long term without knowing the financial status of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care for Soldiers</td>
<td>Care for the individual</td>
<td>Advisors should not expect to see IA officers overly concerned for their soldier’s welfare or put their needs first. Logistically, there is less concern about their life support and quality of life. The IA soldier is entitled to five bottles of water a day in the heat of the summer; the U.S. Soldier would be ordered to consume over a liter an hour. For logistics planning, the support requirements for the soldiers are significantly less. There is also less safety equipment for the soldiers or a real need to enforce the use of it. The examples are numerous and it is a challenge for all advisors to get the IA to realize that it needs to treat its volunteer force differently than a conscript army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated Soldiers</td>
<td>Uneducated soldiers</td>
<td>There are high illiteracy rates with the basic Iraqi soldier. An advisor cannot rely on giving IA soldiers written information or expect them to be able to fill out supply and maintenance paperwork. Most of the soldiers will not be able to read technical manuals. Before pushing paperwork, an advisor needs to know the literacy rates in the unit. Soldiers who grew up without being able to read have adapted and have excellent memories. Shape the advising style to deal with soldiers who are auditory learners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Logistics Culture</td>
<td>Iraqi Army Logistics Culture</td>
<td>Impact</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-sufficient</td>
<td>Live off the land</td>
<td>Relying on locally purchased items is a legitimate process including food, spare parts, vehicles, and general supplies. Units receive money for items as part of the process, particularly because the IA does not have much industry or contracts for goods outside of the country.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advanced logistics institutions</td>
<td>On-the-job training for everything</td>
<td>U.S. Army officers have career and logistics development programs and formal logistics institutions. The IA does not have any career development programs for its logisticians and everything learned after initial officer basic training is learned while on the job; experience levels will vary greatly from one leader to the next. The result is that one cannot assume a logistician has been exposed to basic logistics concepts. Much of what the logistics advisor needs to do is create development programs and classes that teach logistics principles and continue to professionalize the force.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations drive logistics decisions</td>
<td>Logistics decisions drive operations</td>
<td>U.S. Army division commanders routinely brief their readiness and take into consideration what their combat power and capabilities are. The name combat service support implies that the logisticians exist to support the warfighter. In the IA, the logisticians often dictate how they will support combat arms. For example, the warehouses will deny a valid request for supplies and spare parts to a division. The IA will stop work at the end of the day with workable combat vehicles in the shop for a unit directly engaged in a named operation. The aforementioned examples would be unheard of in the U.S. Army; however, this will not change until IA commanders demand their logisticians support them.</td>
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**U.S. Army Logistics Culture** | **Iraqi Army Logistics Culture** | **Impact**
---|---|---
Tied to automation | Tied to manual systems | U.S. logistics is tied to automation. Automation has become an integral part of life from standard automation management information systems, to slide shows, to email. The U.S. Army system captures and processes a huge amount of data to the point where not all Soldiers even understand why they input the data. The coalition needs to be mindful that communication is slower and often relies on personal couriers, and any data captured needs to be analyzed manually. Making the Iraqi system work includes allowing for the manual communication systems to work. Furthermore, without automation, asset visibility makes leaders reluctant to delegate authority and trust their subordinate leaders.

Demand-supported system | Proposition-supported system | Just because a supply is required does not mean a unit will receive it in the IA; this applies for all types of supplies. The Iraqis order supplies as propositions regardless of the actual requirement.
Appendix B

Preparation and Execution: Getting Ready

Actions Prior to Deployment

Actions that should be taken prior to deployment include the following:

- Learn as much as possible about logistical systems, particularly the manual systems. Advisors must learn the Iraqi Army’s systems, but it is easier with a basic foundation.
- Talk to senior service members about their experiences transitioning from manual to automated systems.
- Know how to inspect, specifically, motor pools, supply rooms, and dining facilities.
- Learn the language beyond tactical commands.
- Be familiar with the host country history, politics, and geography.
- Be familiar with U.S. history, politics, and geography; Iraqi counterparts will ask these questions.
- Pack personal pictures of family and home.
- Prepare and collect briefings on basic logistics concepts and logistics command and control structures.
- Take as many developmental courses as possible, specifically in contracting.
- Read famous poetry and fiction from the local region.
- Know the military decisionmaking process.
- Be able to lead a joint planning team.
- Collect “sergeant’s time” training plans.

Actions During the Deployment

Actions that should be taken during the deployment include the following:

- Earn respect. Respect will be earned through a combination of an advisor’s past experiences and knowledge base, interpersonal skills, and current influence. Become a subject matter expert (SME) in your field. In the U.S. Army, Soldiers are accustomed to being humble about one’s level of proficiency; however, when advising, bolster yourself and your peers. The host nation wants to be advised by someone who is competent and it needs to be made clear early in the deployment an advisor's competencies. Respect will be earned through knowledge, and the ability
to impart it, rather than physical items. Additionally, do not talk negatively about other advisors in front of the host nation counterparts, it is counterproductive.

• Develop a strategy. Teams must develop their own plans covering their near-, mid-, and short-term goals as well as their engagement strategy with their counterparts. The onus is on the team to develop a strategy and ensure it nests with higher orders. Without strategy, an advisory team will not progress much further than the relationship development phase. The task of solving host nation logistics is daunting and to help understand the problem, advisors should write down every possible issue with the unit and categorize and prioritize these issues, understanding that they will not all be solved within one deployment. Divide the issues into three categories: host nation centric, advisor/coalition centric, and combined efforts. This is helpful because at any given time there should always be something to work on. If the host nation is not being cooperative, advisors should focus on work they are predominately responsible for such as developing a block of training.

• Prepare for daily interactions. Advisors must be prepared before seeing their counterpart. Develop a simple engagement strategy for the day with a manageable number of topics to discuss. Advisors should never rush a conversation and should always allow for an easy flow of conversation and never rush towards work. Most importantly, listen to the concerns of your counterpart and be sincere.

• Manage expectations. Solving logistics processes takes time. Manage expectations on what projects can be accomplished with reasonable timelines. Do not settle for mediocrity because a problem appears to be challenging; however, be realistic. Additionally, advisors are best able to articulate what is reasonable and why with their higher headquarters and subordinate staffs. Advisory teams should develop metrics and internal timelines with their counterparts. The counterparts should also know exactly what the advisory team and host nation are working on to develop trust.

• Follow reports and shadow tracking supplies. Along with knowing the logistics flow process, know what reports the unit requests and submits. If there are advisors senior and subordinate to your units, provide feedback to them on the quality of the report. Logistics advisors should strive for accurate reporting, better asset visibility, and be able to articulate why this is important. The movement and flow of supplies will always be a challenge and advisors should shadow-track the requests or monitor where the requests are at in the supply chain. Many advisors make the mistake of doing and pushing the paperwork for their counterparts rather than having their counterpart do the work.

• Applying coalition resources. No advisor is a master of all subjects. Advisors should know on what topics they are qualified to advise. If the host nation needs help in a subject the advisor is unfamiliar with, the advisor should bring in that resource to assist. The advisor should take the time to network and know what SMEs are available and be able to bring them to their counterpart. When a SME goes to see the counterpart and is
introduced by the advisor, they fall under the advisor’s relationship and credibility and do not need to spend as much time developing their own relationship. The advisor is the continuity for their counterpart as outside organizations interact with them. Coalition resources also take the form of partnership units and key leader engagements. It is beneficial to bridge partnership elements and key leaders to speak with your counterpart; however, some advisors feel this threatens their positions and act possessive. Advisors must realize that they do not own their counterparts and the goal is to enable and assist their counterparts.
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Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS)

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Combined Arms Center-Training: The Road to Deployment

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