

The Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance Handbook

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Forward

Our Army continues to successfully meet the difficult task of security force assistance (SFA), the modular brigade is now the centerpiece of the Army's SFA strategy, and its adaptability is one of the modular brigade's proven core strengths. There is a demonstrated need, however, to rapidly move modular brigades past the adaptive phase of SFA and into a period with an institutional body of SFA knowledge, providing the optimal opportunity for force training, structuring and mission execution. When modular brigades are tasked with a SFA mission, commanders should have an institutional base from which to draw proven doctrine, best practices and helpful tactics, techniques and procedures. After nearly a decade of continuous full spectrum operations, the Army has produced volumes of professional literature and thoughts on SFA that commanders can use. This is both advantageous and problematic for those who have to resource and train their units for a SFA mission as well as sift through the current thought on SFA to find that which is usable for them. There is a need to provide concise and timely help for commanders preparing for this mission so that they can expedite their preparation for a complex mission in a constrained environment.

The *Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance Handbook* (SFAHB) should help in filling that need. The US Army Infantry School (USAIS) intends to provide a useful summary of the current SFA doctrine and give commanders a snapshot of the key elements of this mission as well as provide quick references for additional information concerning the issues and requirements from operational to tactical levels of SFA. This handbook does not attempt to reinvent doctrine - it summarizes it. The SFAHB provides clarity and resources in a condensed reference source that one might carry in his cargo pocket.

As our Army maintains its creative edge and continues to refine its approach to SFA through modular brigades, the volume of useful information will expand and necessitate updates to doctrine. The USAIS intends to keep pace with these developments and provide useful material to the force regardless of the mission. The SFAHB is the initial step in our efforts to capture and communicate useful SFA knowledge, and I believe it will be a valuable tool for commanders facing a complex mission.



MICHAEL D. BARBERO
Major General, USA
Commanding

Preface

This hand book synthesizes current doctrine and emerging TTPs into a handbook for units assigned a Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission.

Security Force Assistance is not a unit; it is a mission assigned to a unit. Army leaders will assign this mission to Modular brigades more frequently according to the realities of the operational environment. The Modular Brigade, with its broad and flexible command and control structure, is designed to conduct Full Spectrum Operations, which includes Security Force Assistance, but it requires augmentation and specific task organization to effectively accomplish Security Force Assistance tasks.

The Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force Assistance Handbook is designed as an assessment tool for brigade-level leaders as they prepare to train their BCT on the Security Force Assistance Mission. It serves as a guide for the most immediate challenges that Modular brigades will face, and as a catalogue of recently approved doctrinal literature available for commanders and staffs to access and apply.

Chapter One presents methodologies for task organizing and suggests a baseline augmentation that a BCT may require for an SFA mission. Chapter Two provides various assessment tools to evaluate the capabilities of Foreign Security Forces and to plan for their improvement. These assessment tools are drawn from current doctrine, operational units, professional journals and lessons-learned. Chapter Three describes how the BCT implements partnering, augmenting, and advising. Chapter Four summarizes how the BCT fits into the SFA strategic framework.

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Chapter 1

Preparing for Security Force Assistance

MISSION ANALYSIS

1-1. Conducting mission analysis for Security Force Assistance (SFA) has unique considerations. It includes analyzing an environment, population, enemy, *and* an external Foreign Security Force (FSF). This section provides considerations for mission analysis in SFA: analysis of the higher headquarters order, review of available assets, determination of CCIR and initial ISR. The chapter also describes brigade task organization.

ANALYZE THE HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ORDER

1-2. Brigades will be the central receiving point for orders and guidance from several authorities, and they must consider mission guidance from the following sources:

- The campaign plan of their higher headquarters. Commanders must understand where the JTF assesses the FSF along the security line of effort in its campaign plan.
- Brigades must analyze the orders that the FSF higher headquarters has issued to their partnered unit. The BCT may find that FSF plans or guidance are different from the JTF campaign plans. The BCT commander and his supporting higher headquarters must resolve these divergent plans as soon as possible. This ensures unity of effort for training between the BCT and its partnered unit.
- A brigade given an SFA mission may be the “land owning” brigade in the AO. If another unit/agency (foreign or US) is conducting operations in the same geographic space, the BCT augmented for SFA must also understand it’s mission and supporting lines of effort and be included in the planning process.
- Other government agencies will also provide contributions that the BCT in SFA must analyze such as the Department of State and USAID.

REVIEW AVAILABLE ASSETS

1-3. To prepare to train for the SFA mission modular brigades must consider training requirements for their traditional combat assets, their advisor augmentation, and the FSF that they will assist.

Modular Brigade

1-4. As the brigade analyzes its own formation it must answer these questions:

- Which of the brigade’s companies are best suited to be organized into training teams? This requires strong leaders with personalities compatible with SFA. The best units in the brigade form the training teams because they are the decisive point of the SFA mission.
- Which of the brigades companies are best suited to primarily partner with FSF units? (Chapter 3)
- Which of the brigade’s leaders are best suited to be the senior leader for the training team mission? (brigade’s DCO or senior augments).
- What standard resources will come with augmentation packages (equipment / capabilities)?

Augmentation

1-5. Brigades will receive additional leaders to augment their training teams. (Figure 1-2) The best employment for these augmenters is to provide expertise to training teams. Often the Soldiers and NCOs on the training teams will come from the modular brigade, but the team leaders will come from the augmentation force. Brigade commanders build these teams as early as possible in the Army Force Generation

(ARFORGEN) cycle for cohesion, trust, and esprit-de-corps. The current recommended best practice is for augmenters to PCS to the home station of the brigade then go TDY for specific training.

Foreign Security Force

1-6. Commanders should not consider the FSF as a traditional asset available to them to conduct operations, but should consider improving FSF capabilities as the objective. To know the capabilities and limitations of the FSF the BCT must continuously analyze FSF activities and current training plans. Typically commanders do not have nearly the information that they would like to have about the FSF that they will assist. Sources for information include:

- Units already partnered with FSFs in the theater
- Advisors currently embedded with the FSF
- Senior leaders from the FSF and its headquarters

DETERMINE THE CCIR

1-7. After conducting their initial analysis, brigades will determine information requirements. BCT leaders will develop their Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) as if they were conducting reconnaissance of a piece of terrain or an enemy force. However, in this case, CCIR will expand on Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR) which will include the FSF. Once information requirements are identified, a collection effort is designed.

CONDUCT INITIAL ISR

1-8. Brigades conduct Pre-Deployment Site Surveys (PDSS) and assessments of the AO and Foreign Security Force (FSF) they will inherit. To task organize effectively, the brigade must answer its FFIR as soon as possible. While the FFIR is often a very long list, here are some of the most immediate questions brigades must answer:

- What types and numbers of FSF units exist in our AO? Military, Police, National Police, Border, or Paramilitary?
- What is the FSF's current mission?
- What are the current capabilities and capacities of the FSF?
- What is the current assessment of the FSF and their level of training (see chapter 2)?
- How does the FSF currently intend to improve their level of training?
- What phase of SFA has the FSF achieved?
- What are the necessary augmentation requirements to assist the FSF?

1-9. Every step of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) must be applied to a SFA mission. The considerations listed above are the most different from the traditional MDMP. Upon completion of mission analysis, the brigade moves to course of action development with emphasis on task organization.

TASK ORGANIZATION

1-10. The strength of the Army's Brigade Combat Team is a robust and dynamic command and control structure on which Army leaders can attach any augmenting force that the BCT requires for mission accomplishment. Determining the shortfalls in personnel, skills, and equipment is normally the most important step during mission analysis for an upcoming SFA mission. If BCT leaders misunderstand the personnel, training, skill sets, and equipment needed for the SFA mission, it may be very late in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle before they can correct shortcomings—to the detriment of the mission.

1-11. There is no right way by which a BCT commander task organizes his unit for the SFA mission, but there are several principles, founded on the Army's recent experience and current doctrine, which govern task organization:


- BCTs organize into two elements, streamlined through one chain of command: the partnering force and the advisory force (See Chapter 3).

- BCTs expend their own internal resources to meet the personnel demands of the partnering and advisory forces; then, they request additional personnel or materiel resources.
- BCTs carefully consider each leader and Soldier assigned to the advisory force. Rank is not the only indicator of competence to conduct advisory missions. Some Soldiers are better suited to handle the unique challenges of advising than others.
- However, advisors should be no less than one rank lower than their counterparts in the unit they advise. Typically, this leaves the BCT significantly short on field grade officers, and they must be augmented.
- BCTs establish robust and highly mobile QRFs to mitigate the decentralized nature of their efforts.
- BCTs organize to establish enduring relationships with partnered and advised units. This includes trying to align their subordinate's AO with the FSF's AO.
- Every AO within the BCT is different; no one solution fits all AOs. The BCT and its battalions must organize in light of these differences.
- Partnership and mentoring are leadership intensive duties. Commanders allocate their best leaders for these missions.
- Commanders should prioritize their partnership efforts. Developing some FSF leaders and their units will take precedence over others.

METHODS OF TASK ORGANIZATION

1-12. Below is a sample task organization drafted from a unit conducting SFA:

Figure 1-1: Sample Task Organization



1-13. The 4th Brigade, 35th Cavalry Division has an extremely challenging SFA mission. It conducts SFA and is the land owning unit. It is partnered with 10 Division, 1st Corps Iraqi Army (IA). To meet its capability and personnel shortfalls, it requested and received an MP Company, a Civil Affairs Detachment, seven Military Transition teams (MiTT), two Police Transitions teams (PTT), one National Police Transition Team (NPPT), and six Border Transition teams (BTT). Furthermore, the BCT received OPCON of a UN SF battalion. An explanation of the Task Organization from left to right follows:

1-14. The SF battalion is partnered with the FSF SF BN that is attached to the division. However, the BCT commander has provided one of its MiTT teams to directly assist with the SFA mission. The BSB is partnered with the 10th Support Regiment and has received one MiTT. The Engineer Battalion is partnered with the 10th Forward Engineer Regiment and has one MiTT. The STB is un-partnered and provides the BCT's QRF and meets Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) security requirements. All these battalions play a general support role across the BCT AO; they do not own ground.

1-15. The 1st Battalion owns battle space in a fairly permissive part of the BCT AO. As such, it has been partnered with a broad array of IA units: two police brigades and two Army brigades. It has received four training teams (TT) from the BCT to train each brigade. A Coalition Provincial Reconstruction team (PRT) has been formed in the AO as well. The battalion works hand in hand with the ePRT and has provided a company minus for its security.

1-16. The 4th Battalion (Fires) has received an equally permissive environment with a relatively low population density. Therefore, the BCT commander partnered the battalion with the one IA brigade operating in the AO. He also assigned the BN commander an MP company to partner with the police battalion in the AO. The battalion received one MiTT.

1-17. The 2nd Battalion has the most hostile AO in the BCT. It has been partnered with one Army brigade. This allows it to maintain a more robust full spectrum capability while still conducting SFA. It also has a National Police Brigade in its AO and a separate police brigade. The police brigade is partnered with the MP company (-). The National Police have the TT to help it get established in the hostile AO. The PRT activities are also in full force in this AO, and the battalion commander has assigned his scout platoon exclusively for PRT security operations.

1-18. Finally the recon squadron has been exclusively partnered with the Border Enforcement Brigade in the AO. All six of the BTTs were used to augment the recon squadron based on its lower personnel than a traditional battalion. This mission suits the recon squadron well as border enforcement most closely resembles the recon squadron's typical security operations.

1-19. Many Army publications provide additional example task organizations for how partnering and advising might take place. The best examples include the following:

- FM 3-07.1, pages 3-8 and 3-9, discusses task organization considerations and techniques in detail.
- FM 3-07.1, pages 4-9 and 4-10, highlights example task organizations for battalion and below.
- FM 3-24, pages 6-4 to 6-6, includes an excellent discussion on how U.S. forces organize to train FSF in counterinsurgency environments.
- FM 3-24.2, pages 8-6 and 8-7, discusses the considerations for organizing Advisor Teams.

1-20. For an explanation of Command Relationships and Task Organization above the BCT level see pages 1-8 and 1-9 of FM 3-07.1.

AUGMENTATION

1-21. BCTs will still need augmentation to correctly accomplish their SFA mission similar to the example Task Organization above. The BCTs must demonstrate the additional capabilities they require, but cannot resource internally. This drives and legitimizes their request for forces. The chart below shows a baseline augmentation for a BCT conducting SFA. The chart is divided into the three phases across which SFA is conducted IAW FM 3-07.1 The BCT is partnered either with one, two, or three Host Nation (HN) divisions, and it is augmented based on the phase. As the security situation and the FSF capability improve, the BCT is able to cover a larger area of operations and partner with additional FSFs.

Figure 1-2: Sample Augmentation by Phase

CAPABILITY	INITIAL PHASE (1 HN DIV)	TRANSFORMATION PHASE (2 HN DIV)	TRANSFORMATION PHASE (3 HN DIV)
Police Provincial District	171 - MP Company 2 - MP Team (LTC/SGM) 3 - MP MAJ	171 - MP Company 4 - 2 x MP Team (LTC/SGM) 6 - MP MAJ	171 - MP Company 6 - 3 x MP Team (LTC/SGM) 9 - MP MAJ
Legal HN BDE HN DIV	2 - JAG Team (MAJ/SFC) 2 - JAG Team (CPT/SSG)	4 - 2 x JAG Team (MAJ/SFC) 4 - 2 x JAG Team (CPT/SSG)	6 - 3 x JAG Team (MAJ/SFC) 6 - 3 x JAG Team (CPT/SSG)
Public Affairs	2 - PA (Officer/NCO)	2 - PA (Officer/NCO)	2 - PA (Officer/NCO)
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations	32 - CA Company = 5 CA Teams 70 - Tactical PSYOP Company = 9 TPTs	32 - CA Company = 5 CA Teams 70 - Tactical PSYOP Company = 9 TPTs	197 - CA Battalion (4 CA Companies) = 20 CA Teams 70 - Tactical PSYOP Company = 9 TPTs
Engineer	8 - FEST-A Team 2 - EOD (CPT/SFC)	8 - FEST-A Team 2 - EOD (CPT/SFC)	8 - FEST-A Team 2 - EOD (CPT/SFC)
Sociocultural Experts	8	8	8
Military Transition Team	56 - MTT Augment	4 - MTT Augment	8 - MTT Augment
TOTAL	358	315	493
ePRT	~15-20	~15-20	~15-20
Sustainment Truck Squad Supply Platoon CCT FMST	21 personnel 32 personnel 4 personnel 4 personnel	4 personnel 4 personnel	4 personnel 4 personnel
CA	civil affairs	LTC	lieutenant colonel
CPT	captain	MAJ	major
CCT	contingency contracting team	MP	military police
DIV	division	MTT	military transition team
JAG	Judge Advocate General	NCO	noncommissioned officer
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal	PA	public affairs
EPRT	embedded provincial reconstruction team	SFC	sergeant first class
FEST-A	forward engineering support team – augmenting	PSYOP	psychological operations team
FMST	financial management support team	SGM	sergeant major
HN	host-nation	SSG	staff sergeant
HTT	human terrain team	TPT	tactical psychological operations team

1-22. Of particular interest in the chart are the following:

- The MP Company and Advisors play the role of partnering with FSF police and advising them. JAG teams help the FSF establish rule of law and judicial procedures. Notice this requirement increases as the FSF nears sovereignty and its legal system improves.
- The Civil Affairs company allows the BCT commander to improve essential services and foster economic development until the Operating Environment is secure enough for an NGO or Department of State element to take the lead. In the final phase, the need for CA units will grow to a battalion.
- Sociocultural experts will often be defense contractor teams or DA civilians. They will offer expertise and insight for the commanders and MTT chiefs.
- The ePRT is the Department of State element that works embedded with the BCT commander to ensure unity of purpose and effort.
- The 56 members of the Military Transition Team (MTT) are designed to be two lieutenant colonels, 31 majors, and 23 master sergeants. These ranks are intended to meet the needs of additional senior advisors for FSF units.


1-23. Other assets that the BCT commander may request to augment the unit are below:

- Contingency contracting team. These teams will liaison with host nation contractors to build facilities and provide services that the FSF and BCT require to begin functioning.
- Financial management support team. A challenge of SFA is paying the FSF. These teams help to pay FSF while the government and institutional army are still establishing its pay procedures. Confirmation of this process is an indicator of success.

- Special Operations forces. Traditionally, Special Operations forces are the experts and training and employing FSFs. Their expertise can often fill gaps in the BCT's Security Force Assistance capability.
- Interpreters and Army linguists with appropriate security clearance (O9L). The nature of working closely with foreign security forces is that a large number of interpreters and linguists are required. Often, interpreters may be contracted from the local populace, and Army linguists for signal intercept and intelligence collection require higher level security clearances and training and must be resourced in advance.
- Contracted Law Enforcement teams. In addition to MPs, BCT commanders will also consider requesting expert U.S. police advisors from agencies such as the FBI, NYPD, and LAPD. These experts may have insight into police functions and civil law that military police lack.
- Contracted Border / Customs Training teams. Requesting a team of individuals from U.S. Customs or Border Patrol may provide the BCT a very specific skill set that it cannot get anywhere else. Often, national borders are one of the greatest problems to security during SFA missions. The requisite skill set in these teams may greatly enhance the effectiveness of the BCT's SFA efforts.
- Robust logistics assets and personnel to assist and augment. As the security situation improves, BCTs must partner with FSFs over an increasing area of operations. To cover the ground, commanders will require a more robust logistics and mobility platform. Often, this comes in the form of additional rotary wing assets.

1-24. The key advantage of having a BCT lead the SFA mission is that advisor teams and partnered units rest under a singular BCT commander. This ensures unity of effort and purpose at the lowest possible levels. When augmenters join the BCT, the recommended best practice is to have them PCS to the BCT's home station as early in the BCT lifecycle as possible. This provides maximum stability for families during the lifecycle, and highest possible morale for leaders and Soldiers. Then, the BCT commander has the flexibility to build a cohesive and trusting team of partnering units and advisor teams. OPTEMPO and availability of augmenting forces may not allow for early optimal integration. In such circumstances, the BCT should request like units to train with to develop lessons learned and to exercise command and control prior to deploying. Figure 1-3 shows recommended additional events on the ARFORGEN training model that are unique to SFA missions.

TRAINING THE ORGANIZED FORCE



1-25. Once the task organization is established for the SFA mission, BCT commanders formulate training plans to develop skill sets. Soldiers and leaders who are to serve as advisors require significantly different skill sets than Soldiers who partner with FSF units. Prior to individual training, commanders must identify two different elements. First, units that will partner with FSFs and will generally stay organized as traditional units. Second, training teams that will be formed and will proceed on a significantly different training plan than units identified for partnering.

1-26. Partnering units train along typical training lines for full spectrum operations (FM 7-0). After brigade commanders train their partnering units on the General Mission Essential Tasks (GMETs) and the Common Collective Mission Essential Tasks (CCMETs), they begin to focus on a DMETL designed to develop of the FSF with whom they will partner. Below is a sample DMETL for a brigade assigned a SFA mission. Note the tasks below are similar to standard Army tasks, but have been slightly altered to constitute an SFA mission. Commanders may have to develop their own Training and Evaluation Outlines to determine whether their partnering/advising units are T, P, or U at each of the DMETL tasks:

- Conduct cordon and search with a coalition force in the lead
- Conduct ISR with coalition partners
- Train an Initial Entry Training Cadre in support of a FSF
- Employ Fire Support and Effects in support of a FSF
- Conduct Sustainment activities in support of a FSF

1-27. Advising units begin a significantly different training cycle from the beginning of ARFORGEN. First, they must be formed as a small and effective team, much like a Special Forces team. Advisor teams training that must be emphasized:

- Baseline language, cultural, and translator training.
- Foreign weapons and equipment training.
- Train-the-trainer on the specific military tasks they will likely instruct for the FSF.
- Cross training among all members of the advisory team to increase survivability and compensate for reduced combat power, such as: advanced communications skills, close air support skills, qualification on multiple U.S. weapons, demolitions skills, and beyond combat life saver medical skills.
- Finally, special training for the type of unit they will be advising. For example, police trainers may embed with a U.S. police force to learn essential law-enforcement tasks.

1-28. After they are trained as a team, Advisor Teams train to advise FSF. Usually these tasks are best mastered at CTC's where there are enough role players to approximate a real FSF. A generic advisor team DMETL based on the fundamental SFA tasks: Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/Build, and Assist (OTERA) is listed: (See chapter 4, FM 3-24.2 chapter 8, and FM 3-07.1 for additional information on OTERA tasks)

- Organize FSF sustainment units
- Train the FSF to implement an individual and collective training plan within the context of full spectrum operations
- Train the FSF to conduct ISR operations
- Equip the FSF with modern FM communications
- Rebuild an initial entry training facility in support of the FSF

1-29. Commanders may also consider augmenting their US units with FSF. This technique is particularly useful when the FSF is increasing in capability. *FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, page 8-12, has a useful company level augmentation example.

1-30. The DMETL associated with the SFA mission must help the partnered brigade to proficiency.

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Chapter 2

Assessing FSF Capabilities

2-1. Identifying success and mission accomplishment during SFA is particularly vague and difficult. Objective and thorough assessments are vital in SFA to determining whether FSFs are progressing toward the desired endstate. This chapter briefly discusses the nature and importance of accurately assessing FSF capabilities. It then outlines some basic assessment categories, tools, and periods by which SFA commanders can measurably define their victories.

ENDSTATES

2-2. An assessment is valuable to a commander only if it has a clearly defined and measurable endstate. Not all FSFs have to be able to conduct the same operations to adequately secure their country. Therefore, BCTs define the FSF endstate by first understanding the operational endstates from their higher headquarters. These endstates may come from a JTF, USAID, or the Department of State (DOS) Forward Area Country Team (FACT). For more on how the BCT bridges the operational and tactical gap, see chapter 4. When defined endstates are not clear from a higher operational headquarters, BCT commanders conduct mission analyses and define their own.

2-3. The BCT functions as the bridge and implementing arm of policy and strategy at the tactical level. Accurately assessing FSF capabilities provides strategic and policy leaders the feedback they require to help the HN government focus energy on key security issues. This ensures strategic leaders provide the enabling resources their FSFs need to become independent and capable. BCT commanders need an operational endstate to serve as their azimuth, and operational headquarters require on the ground assessments from the BCT to measure progress.

2-4. After BCT commanders understand the FSF endstate, they begin to partner with FSFs to ensure there is a shared desired endstate. Commanders conducting SFA insist that their FSF counterparts share the responsibility in getting to the endstate. Without the shared responsibility FSF commanders cannot be held accountable. This accountability must be nested through every echelon.

MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE (MOP) AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE)

2-5. *Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*, defines measures of performance as, “Criteria used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measurement of task accomplishment.” For SFA, MOP are measurable friendly actions that are indicative of an improving FSF. Examples of MOP in SFA are as follows:

- Numbers of personnel recruited.
- Numbers of personnel trained.
- Numbers of HN security units formed.
- Combined U.S. and HN security operations.
- Numbers of provinces where HN security force leads.
- Autonomous HN security operations.

2-6. JP 3-0 defines MOE as, “Criteria used to assess changes in system behavior or capability tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.” SFA MOE represent methods of measuring progress and effectiveness of campaign programs in both quantitative and qualitative terms. MOE create a system to gauge whether or not SFA actions are producing the desired results within the OE. In SFA, MOP answer the question, “Is the FSF getting better?” MOE answer the question, “Is the FSF making the Operational Environment better?” Some example MOEs for a SFA operation follow:

- Numbers of human rights violations.

- Absenteeism in security force units and organizations.
- Instances of insurgent attacks and/or border clashes.
- Public perception of security, rule of law, and corruption.

2-7. Developing MOP and MOE is complex in the SFA environment as a planner must apply criteria for U.S. and multinational forces as well as for the FSF. Those developing MOP/OE for FSF must recognize and apply cultural norms to fairly measure performance. All MOEs and MOPs must be understood by the FSF leadership and they must share in command responsibility for them. They must be relevant to the success of the FSF leadership.

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA AND TOOLS

2-8. As indicated above, the FSF activities (MOP) and their effectiveness (MOE) may be articulated in multiple ways at each echelon of command. The Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) is a common tool that commanders and advisors leverage to determine an FSF unit's overall ability to conduct independent operations at the operational and tactical levels. As of April 2009, advisors in Iraq are using it.

Figure 2-1. Operational Readiness Assessment

1. Personnel		OVERALL ASSESSMENT			
	< 50% of auth manning	50-69% of auth manning	70-84% of auth manning	≥ 85% of auth manning	
Officer Manning	< 50% of auth manning	50-69% of auth manning	70-84% of auth manning	≥ 85% of auth manning	
NCO Manning	< 50% of auth manning	50-69% of auth manning	70-84% of auth manning	≥ 85% of auth manning	
Admin	Unable to pay troops	Pay System Established	>80% Personnel paid	S1/G1 maintains current UMR ≥ 90% Personnel Paid ≥ 80% Personnel paid IAW pay grade	
2. Command & Control		OVERALL ASSESSMENT			
Intelligence	No Intelligence capability	Able to process, analyze disseminate info	Participates in decision making; develops enemy COA	Able to conduct Intel based ops	
Operations	No operational capability	Able to establish TOC Maintains situational awareness	Able to send and receive reports/orders from higher/lower echelons	Able to conduct Staff planning and execution	
Communications	No ability to communicate	Able to establish/maintain internal communications	Able to maintain external communications with higher	•HSC Signal Platoon/CO formed •>70% personnel MOS qualified	
3. Sustainment/Logistics		OVERALL ASSESSMENT			
Supply (I, III, V, IX)	Secure/Store supplies	Account/Issue Items	Forecast/Requisition supplies	Maintain mission requirement storage	
Maintenance	No Maintenance conducted	Conducts PMCS and reports equipment status	Conducts 1 st line repair Request repair parts 30% Personnel qualified	≥70% personnel qualified utilizes 2 nd line or above Maintenance	
Transportation	No Organic transport capability	Capable of executing limited transport requirements	Capable of executing essential transport requirements	≥ 70% transport personnel driver qualified Able to conduct independent transport operations	
Infrastructure	Temporary Billeting	Statement Work/Construction has begun	Minimal billeting, administrative and perimeter security infrastructure	Adequate billeting administrative, mess, motor pool and perimeter security infrastructure	
Medical	No treatment capability No evacuation capability	Limited treatment capability Limited evacuation capability	Able to conduct treatment and evac operations with ISF or CF support	Able to conduct treatment and evacuation operations	
4. Training		OVERALL ASSESSMENT			
METL	Achieve 'P' or 'T' in ≤26% of all METL tasks	Achieve 'P' or 'T' in 26% to 99% of all METL tasks	Achieves 'P' or 'T' in ALL METL tasks	Capable of planning and executing training to sustain 'P' or 'T' in METL tasks	
5. Equipment		OVERALL ASSESSMENT			
EQUIPMENT ON HAND	< 50% of auth	50 - 69% of auth	70 - 84% of auth	≥ 85% of auth	
Weapons	< 50% of auth	50 - 69% of auth	70 - 84% of auth	≥ 85% of auth	
Vehicles	< 50% of auth	50 - 69% of auth	70 - 84% of auth	≥ 85% of auth	
Commo	< 50% of auth	50 - 69% of auth	70 - 84% of auth	≥ 85% of auth	
6. Leadership		OVERALL ASSESSMENT			
Leaders and staff primaries are capable	< 50% of leaders and staff primaries	50-69% of leaders and staff primaries	70-84% of leaders and staff primaries	≥84% of leaders and staff primaries	
7. Operational Effectiveness & Reliability		OVERALL ASSESSMENT			
Ability to effectively plan, execute, and sustain operations	Ineffective or incapable	Requires extensive CF Assistance	Requires minimal CF Assistance	Capable of independent operations	
Reliability and willingness to execute missions to standard	Unreliable and unwilling <50% of missions	Semi-reliable 51-70% of missions	Consistently reliable 71-90% of missions	Totally dependable 91-100%	
8. Subjective Performance Assessment:					
Annotate total number of pages attached to this report. See supplemental instructions for required categories					
<p> A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations.</p> <p> A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with ISF or coalition support.</p> <p> A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units.</p> <p> A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations</p>					
<p>This unit is currently assessed at Level and has already assumed IAL.</p> <p>HSC is assessed at level 1 overall.</p>					

2-9. The assessment categories in the ORA are intended to encompass the operational, leadership, and sustainment MOP criteria that are most useful for tracking the development of an FSF unit. While being far from perfect, the ORA combines subjective criteria and objective measures into one efficient reference tool for BCT commanders and staffs to use throughout an SFA mission. This tool is the articulation of MOP which

BCT commanders use to succinctly communicate their assessments to a higher headquarters as well as refine their SFA campaign guidance to subordinate units. Figure 2-1 is an ORA used for assessing an FSF unit conducting counterinsurgency.

2-10. Commanders and staffs may need a more refined FSF capabilities assessment tool at the tactical level. The criteria for assessing these smaller units, such as companies and platoons, should obviously be nested in the ORA and, therefore, connected to the strategic and policy objectives for the HN. Again, the assessment categories listed in the Tactical Capabilities Evaluation (TCE), Figure 2-2 are not intended to be prescriptive, but can provide a starting point for units developing MOP for FSF at the company and below.

Figure 2-2: Tactical Capabilities Evaluation (TCE)

	Company 1	Company 2	Company 3	Company 4	HSC Company	Recon Platoon
SHOOT						
MOVE						
COMMUNICATE						
PLAN						
TRAIN						
TREAT						
SUSTAIN						
LEARN						

2-11. In this example, a 12-man TT has been assembled from an infantry company and augmented with a Major. The TT evaluates the FSF battalion using the TCE. Different members of the team are responsible for assessing each of the criteria on the left for each battalion subordinate element. For example, the communications NCO on the team evaluates each company on their ability to communicate, and the senior infantry NCO on the team evaluates companies on their ability to shoot and move.

2-12. Team members make these assessments using green, amber, and red ratings. However, each of these colors are tied to measurable and relevant MOP. For example, an FSF company’s amber rating in the ‘shoot’ category could mean that 60% of soldiers in an FSF company have qualified to an established basic rifle marksmanship standard with their personal weapon in the last six months. Notice, this category supports the assessment of a FSF BN’s rating in the ‘Training’ and ‘Operational Effectiveness and Reliability’ categories. The standards by which the FSF Company is being evaluated should be based on those sets and understood by both the SFA unit *and* FSF unit command.

2-13. The example criteria discussed above are intended to illustrate a generic assessment methodology for a BCT conducting an SFA mission and how those criteria can be refined and used at the lowest level of advising and partnership. The evaluation criteria within these categories can be developed at the lowest levels necessary as long as they are nested in the ORA criteria. This method satisfies the need of many units to develop criteria particular to their SFA mission and help FSF units with METL development and refinement.

2-14. The level of proficiency of the FSF will determine future training requirements. The SFA training teams must remain open minded about how the FSF unit trains its personnel. Often, FSFs have very different but equally effective techniques as the U.S. military. It is important to remember that ‘good enough’ is usually an acceptable result for FSF units in the context of an SFA mission, but whatever the training methodology it should result in individual and collective Soldier confidence. Here, the ORA and TCE are merely tools which give FSFs ideas how to make their unit a better security force.

2-15. Success indicators for training a unit staff are similar to MOP used by the U.S. military. The MOP center on the FSF’s understanding of the critical tasks necessary to function as a security organization. If a FSF staff has a process to solve tactical problems—even if it is different from US methods—it has the core skill set to function. It is the SFA unit’s job to help its counterparts identify and develop these critical skills as a staff, not simply tell them what to do or to do it for them.

2-16. Another essential MOP for a unit staff is the ability to produce, resource, and implement a training schedule for its subordinate units, concurrent with combat operations. One of the most useful skill sets U.S. military training teams have to offer is the know how to conduct tough, realistic, and productive training. Once FSF units understand how to train well, they can prepare themselves for any task or threat. Usually, this skill

must be mastered while rotating in and out of combat operations. The most successful SFA missions coach FSFs to rotate their units through a refit, train, fight cycle similar to a simplified U.S. ARFORGEN model. Failing to establish an ARFORGEN-like cycle model will result in FSFs that fight a lot, but never get better or even deteriorate.

ASSESSMENT PERIODS

2-17. Assessing Host Nation security forces can be done for three distinct periods of time—short, mid, and long (*FM 3-24.2 p.8-9*). Considerations for each include—

Short

2-18. The SFA unit is involved in the training of the FSF unit.

2-19. An example of a short term goal for an advisor unit is ensuring the FSF operations officer tracks all assigned units conducting missions. An example of a short term assessment for a partnering unit is training HN Soldiers on marksmanship and room clearing.

Mid

2-20. The FSF unit is more self-sufficient, but still not fully capable, and the SFA unit acts in a supervisory role.

2-21. An example of a mid-range goal for an advisor unit would be ensuring the HN staff plans for logistical support during missions. An example of a mid range goal for a partnering unit is training platoon-sized units to move tactically during patrols.

Long

2-22. The FSF unit can conduct training, planning, sustainment, and operations with little guidance and the SFA unit provides oversight and mentorship.

2-23. An example of advisor unit long-range goal would be to ensure that the FSF intelligence officer gathers, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence and is fully integrated into the planning process. An example of a partnering unit's long-range goal is to provide only the additional forces and quick-reaction force (QRF) capabilities to the FSF unit.

2-24. Like the ORA and the TCE, these assessment periods are intended to provide a generic shell from which BCT commanders and staffs can build their own assessment periods. These periods, like phases, can be driven by key changes in FSF capabilities and can be effective means of providing reference points for BCT commanders and staffs when executing an SFA campaign plan. This chapter is far from being a comprehensive illustration of FSF assessment methodology, but it does contain the basic components used by units currently conducting the SFA mission and the most recent supporting SFA doctrine.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

2-25. For more thorough discussions of assessing FSF see *The Security Force Assistance Planner's Guide*, February, 2008. It contains excellent tools and frameworks for assessing FSF:

- Chapter 2 has an excellent list of Measures of Effectiveness and Performance for use in assessing FSF.
- Annex A has a generic, but extremely thorough, assessment checklist for conducting assessments of FSF.
- Annex C gives an excellent outline of how to conduct metric based assessments, tailored to an SFA.
- The DOS document, "Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks," provides an illustrative sample of short, near and long-term actions should be considered when developing measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE).
- Finally, FM 3-24.2, pages 8-7 to 8-10, provides concise and relevant discussions on assessing FSF.

Chapter 3

Partnering, Augmenting, and Advising

3-1. The BCT Commander must ensure unity of effort for partners, augmenters, advising units and individuals in his area of operation. All participants must understand and work towards the BCT commander's end state. Partnering and advising FSF as part of a SFA mission are closely related tasks. In reality, partnering U.S. Forces will perform advisory tasks throughout the phases of their SFA missions and advisors are positioned to facilitate the enabling lethal and nonlethal effects from a partnering force.

PARTNERING, AUGMENTING , AND ADVISING AS TASKS

PARTNERING

3-2. Partnering attaches U.S. units at various levels with foreign units to leverage the strengths of both U.S. and foreign security forces. A partnering unit will share responsibility for an FSF's area of operations and support its partner FSF's operations in numerous ways. Partnering takes many forms but in its simplest, a BCT (or RCT) partners with either a brigade or division, depending upon the AOR. Effective partnering activities include combined planning, training, and operations. As part of a well-rounded strategy, a partnering U.S. force will have to advise its FSF colleagues at varying levels depending on the phase of the SFA mission and the FSF's capabilities. This means partnering U.S. units may have to provide robust advisor teams as well as support maneuver units and effects which are delivered through a combination of the warfighting functions to their FSF counterparts. For further details on this topic, see FM 3-24.2, Chapter 8; FM 3-07.1, Chapter 2; *Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance Handbook*, Chapter 3.

AUGMENTING

3-3. Augmenting is an arrangement where FSF provide individuals or elements to combine with U.S. units, or U.S. individuals or elements combine with FSF. Augmentation improves the interdependence and interoperability of U.S. and foreign security forces. Augmentation can occur at many levels and in many different forms. For example, a U.S. squad can be augmented with host-nation individuals, a U.S. company can be augmented with a host-nation platoon, or a U.S. battalion can be augmented with a company from an FSF. Similarly, augmentation can be of short duration for a specific operation or of a longer duration for an enduring mission. Augmenting immerses FSF in a U.S. environment to provide language and cultural awareness to the U.S. unit. U.S. forces can also augment FSF. Augmenting can be seen as the middle ground between partnering and embedding advisors with an FSF unit. For further details on this topic, see Reference: FM 3-07.1, Chapter 2

ADVISING

3-4. Advising is the use of influence to teach, coach, and advise while working by, with, and through FSF. Advising is the primary type of security force assistance and is the most efficient means of helping an FSF to become an effective and legitimate branch of a developing foreign state. Advisors are not partners; U.S. forces act as partners. Advising and partnering are complementary but inherently different activities. Advising requires relationship building and candid discourse to influence development of a professional security force. Partnering incorporates training with combined operations to achieve the same SFA goals. Advisors conduct partnership shaping functions, shape discussions with their counterparts, and create opportunities for the partner units. Advisors support U.S., coalition and partner unit objectives, but, depending on the operational phase, the partner unit may support advisors or advisors may support the partner unit. For further details on this topic, see same references as above.

COMMONALITIES OF PARTNERING AND ADVISING

3-5. Partnering and advising share the core principles of empowering as well as working by, with, and through a FSF. The majority of FSA missions for BCTs will require combinations of partnering and advising with augmentation of FSF units or U.S. forces based on the situation. Unit partnerships do not replace advisor roles or functions. However, if partnering and advising are used in combination, it forms a three-part relationship among FSF, advisors, and the partner units. Partner units should look to the advisor to identify, shape, and facilitate operational partnering opportunities and training events. Both partner and advisor units must build rapport with, demonstrate their value to and have credibility with FSF leaders to varying degrees so that they can influence their counterparts to accomplish SFA missions. In short, units must be prepared to execute both tasks during an SFA mission because each task mutually supports the other and are often combined in multiple areas at the operational and tactical levels.

COMMON MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS OF PARTNERING AND ADVISING UNITS WHEN WORKING WITH FSF:

Plan

- Clearly define the mission and METL of the FSF.
- Define the end state for the period of partnering/advising.
- Define the advising concept. What are the advisor teams' operational focuses in our AOR? Do they have an advising plan or a Campaign Plan they are helping the FSF employ based on the lines of effort?
- Define the partnering concept. How do we plan to partner with HNF? What does it mean to partner with a HNF?
- Determine if we require augmentation for our force. Do we plan to augment an FSF at some level?
- Define corruption. What are we prepared and capable of doing about it?
- Determine the key points of leverage that we can use to influence the FSF.
- Understand and define the security problem.
- Task-organize the force to secure advisors and maximize their operational capabilities with suitable enablers.
- Create, as needed, special elements in each force such as SWAT, waterway, border, or SOF.
- Establish mobile training teams.

Execute

- Ensure security forces understand they support the host nation (HN) government *and* the people.
- Maintain relevancy of security forces for their culture, their population, and their laws.
- Ensure credibility and legitimacy to all counterinsurgency operations.
- Provide a model for society by using military units of mixed ethnicity, religion, political affiliation. For example, who can work together to secure and protect all the people?
- Conduct combined operations with each newly trained security force; include them in the planning process.
- Promote mutual respect between U.S. and HN forces and between the military, police, and paramilitary.
- Train the trainers first, and then train the HN cadre.
- Support the HN cadre in training the whole force.
- Separate HN military and police forces, especially during their training.
- Place the HN cadre in charge as soon as possible.
- Recognize achievement, especially excellence.
- Train all security forces to not tolerate abuses or illegal activity outside of culturally acceptable levels.
- Develop procedures to report violations.

- Enable HN to assume the lead in counterinsurgency operations to alleviate effects of a large US presence.
- Ensure infrastructure and pay is appropriate and managed by the Host Nation government.
- Promote professionalism that does not tolerate internal incompetence. Develop methods to redress.

3-6. For further details on this topic, see FM 3-24.2, Chapter 8; FM 3-07.1, Chapter 2; Commanders Handbook for Security Force Assistance, Chapter 3.

THE ADVISOR

3-7. Military advisors will have to perform a myriad of tasks that will often force them to work out of their military occupational comfort zones in an environment of ambiguity, austerity, and cultural differences. To be successful, advisors will have to live, work, and fight alongside their counterparts. As an overarching principle, everything advisors do should be centered on execution by, with, and through the FSF. For more detailed explanations considerations, tasks, and characteristics of advising see FM 3-07.1, chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10 and FM 3-24.2, Chapter 8.

Teaching, Coaching, Mentoring, and Assisting

3-8. The core tasks of advisors with respect to a FSF can be divided into the categories of Teach, Coach, Mentor, and Assist. Advisors may have to do more than these four tasks during their tours of duty, but teaching, coaching, mentoring, and assisting encompass the bulk of our advisors responsibilities when working a FSF.

Teaching

3-9. Teaching includes training and education. Methods of teaching can include classroom lectures, seminars, hands-on training, training exercises, and simulations. Without exception, hands-on training is the most effective teaching method when working with a FSF. Advisors must tailor their teaching methods to the culture, educational levels, and expectations of their FSF unit. For example, the literacy rate in an FSF unit among lower enlisted soldiers is often very low in host nations. Developing teaching methods and classes that feature pictures and other visual aids will mitigate the disadvantages of illiterate students. Advisors should not think of this as a ‘dumbing down’ of classes because the information being taught is still communicated, and illiteracy may not be an indication of intelligence in the FSF ranks in their particular unit.

Coaching

3-10. Coaching relies on guiding to bring out and enhance capabilities already present. Coaching refers to the function of helping someone through a set of tasks. Those being coached may or may not have appreciated their potential. The coach helps them understand their current level of performance and instructs them how to reach the next level of knowledge and skill. Coaching requires identifying short- and long-term goals and devising a plan to achieve those goals. The coach and the person being coached discuss strengths, weaknesses, and courses of action to sustain or improve. When developing a coaching strategy, advisors must consider the cultural dynamics of their partner FSF unit to find the proper motivational techniques. For example, trying to motivate a FSF soldier by illustrating his weaknesses so he knows what to improve may be seen as insult by the soldier. Often, a more effective means is accentuating the positive aspects of his performance and presenting the improvements needed individually without assigning a value judgment to them.

Mentoring

3-11. This literally means to act as a trusted friend, counselor, or teacher. In the context of an advisory mission, an advisor will provide his counterpart with an honest and candid perspective on numerous issues ranging from internal unit developments to dealings with U.S. partner units. An advisor’s ‘mentoring’ is a function of his relationship with his counterpart and the environment. Often times, an advisor’s counterpart outranks him and is older with potentially more combat experience. Mentoring for an advisor is, therefore, also a function of knowing how and when to respectfully interject honest opinions when asked. Mentoring is a task that is rooted in an advisor’s rapport, credibility, and value to his counterpart. The advisor must be culturally aware that mentoring is often best done in private. The central principle is that mentoring can only truly occur when an advisor has a good relationship built on rapport, credibility, and value with his counterpart.

Assisting

3-12. Assisting is providing the required supporting or sustaining capabilities so FSF can meet objectives and an end state across the warfighting functions. Assisting a FSF unit can range from providing them with basic resources to helping an FSF unit design and produce psychological operations products. As an advisor, this assistance is provided with the intent of helping the FSF develop the capacity to be self-sufficient enough sustain whatever action or idea facilitated by an advisor independently. Assistance includes providing enablers such as intelligence, topographic products, QRF, aviation, logistics and medical evacuation.

3-13. For further details on teaching, coaching, mentoring, and assisting, see FM 3-07.1, Chapter 2, as well as The Combat Advisor Handbook (Feb, 2008)

Necessary Qualities of an Advisor

3-14. Because advisors operate in very subjective environments, it is difficult to establish objective criteria by which to assess potential advisors. However, research and experience indicate that several personality traits greatly enhance the advisor's ability to adapt and thrive in a foreign culture. These traits include—

- Tolerance for ambiguity
- Realistic goal and task setting
- Open-mindedness
- Ability to withhold judgment
- Empathy
- Communicativeness
- Flexibility
- Curiosity
- Warmth in human relations
- Motivation of self and others
- Self-reliance
- Strong sense of self
- Tolerance for differences
- Perceptiveness
- Ability to accept and learn from failure
- Sense of humor

3-15. Having these personality traits does not guarantee an individual will become a trusted and effective counterpart to an FSF leader. However, without these an individual may become overwhelmed by the variations from his knowledge base and not be able to focus on the mission which can result in a very unproductive relationship with his counterpart and a lack of progress in helping the FSF to develop. For further details see FM 3-07.1, Chapter 7; FM 3-24, Chapter 8.

BUILDING AN EFFECTIVE ADVISOR TEAM

3-16. Building an advisor team should start from the moment the team members make contact and continue until the team returns from its deployment. Even if future team members are serving in different positions at different posts prior to being assigned to an advisor team, they should all focus on building their team even if it is only through email communications. Time is crucial for the advisor team members because they not only have to learn about their area of assignment and the FSF unit they will advise, they also have to come together as a team prior to deployment. The team leader and team NCOIC should constantly evaluate their team and determine what unconventional talents each team member has. An example of how responsibilities on an advisor team are divided is located in annex B of the Commanders Handbook for Security Force Assistance produced by the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. Building an effective advisor team is also based on four fundamentals:

Education

3-17. Team members must know as much about the area, culture, and unit they will be advising as possible prior to deployment. The team must also understand the fundamentals of counterinsurgency to grasp some of the additional duties they may have to perform that are out of their military occupational comfort zones. This education will provide a necessary foundation for team members as they prepare for and execute their advisor mission. A team leader will be able to gain the fidelity he needs to give his team the initial and particular knowledge base they must have by going on a pre-deployment site survey and requesting classes from subject matter experts in area studies and counterinsurgency as well as referring to recommended reading lists and professional forums. Professional on-line forums located on the Army's Battle Command Knowledge System, such

as The Transition Team Forum at <https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=62133&lang=en-US>, are excellent and centralized locations for professional advisor materials of all varieties.

Planning

3-18. Based on their initial education discussed above, teams will and should begin to develop an advisor plan prior to deployment into theater. This plan should focus on how to assess the current operational capabilities of their FSF, how they plan to divide their responsibilities, and what areas they will focus on initially when working with the FSF. This plan can and will change when the team begins advising in theater. However, if the advisor team members apply good thought, analysis, and focus based on an education in the areas discussed above, they should be more effective advisors sooner than if they wait until in theater to start analysis and planning.

Training

3-19. Advisor teams must train in individual soldier skills, collective tasks, and unconventional tasks associated with advising. The individual soldier skills and collective tasks associated with traditional combat skills are crucial, and the whole team must be proficient in them. Working with interpreters and conducting leader engagements are two examples of the unconventional tasks in which all advisors should have training. A leader engagement often includes multiple members of an advisor team besides a team leader. Therefore, all team members should be trained in and comfortable with engaging counterparts and senior FSF personnel in group and individual settings.

Discipline

3-20. Discipline among team members equates to safety and mission accomplishment. A frequent misconception is that advisor teams manned with more senior “mature” personnel require less supervision. Although small teams do require more individual responsibility and initiative (than in larger more structured organizations), personnel must be held accountable for their actions and contributions from the training phase until the mission is complete. This can be accomplished by conducting frequent inspections, team training events, physical training events and drills. Time dedicated to team discipline is never wasted. Soldiers, NCOs, and officers who take advantage of the decentralized nature of the advisor role and do not maintain standards of conduct must be disciplined immediately using the UCMJ and removed with a relief-for-cause performance report.

ADVISING

3-21. As mentioned in Chapter 1, understanding the operational environment is a primary SFA mission imperative. An advisor can only understand the operational environment if he understands the host nation culture as well as the military culture of the FSF he is advising.

Culture

3-22. A culture is the set of opinions, beliefs, values, customs, and mores that defines the identity of a society. It includes social behavior, language, and religion. Culture is a learned behavior. For example, food is a basic need that is not based on culture; however, how a person cooks and what, when, and how they eat are all products of their cultural environment. Culture evolves and changes based internal and external influences. In other words, culture is not static. If an advisor fails to understand the culture in which he operates, he will quickly become ineffective.

The Importance of Understanding Culture

3-23. Advisors derive their effectiveness from their ability to understand and work with foreign counterparts from another culture. They must understand enough of their own culture and their counterpart’s culture to accurately convey ideas, concepts, and purpose without causing counterproductive consequences. Advisors must be aware of aspects of the local culture and history which influence behavior in their operational environment. Advisor team members must understand the reasons and motivations underlying personal

interaction and must practice great patience with their counterparts. Group norms guide individual behavior, and advisors must understand how individuals in a society tend to interact as members of a group, whether a race, ethnic, or kinship group (family, clan, tribe, village, or neighborhood). Cultural understanding is not derived from demographic information provided to the military through country briefs prior to deployment. It is gained from studying, interacting with, and understanding the people, religion, history, customs, and social and political structures within an area. For true understanding, it is necessary to live among the people, gradually understanding the subtleties and nuances of their culture.

3-24. For further readings on culture, cultural understanding and the impact of culture on the advising mission see FM 3-07.1, Chapter 8; TC 31-37, Chapter 2.

Influence

3-25. Influence is one's power or capacity to be a compelling force on or affect the actions, behavior, opinions, etc., of others. The better an advisor is able to influence his counterpart, the more effective he will be. Influence can be considered the components of rapport, credibility, and the perceived value that an advisor brings to his counterpart. Rapport is a relationship between people based on mutual understanding, respect, and trust. Credibility is gained over time by following through on promises, conducting missions with counterparts, and adhering to standards. Value is equal to all assets that an advisor can bring to bear. It includes his personal and team knowledge and capabilities, access to resources, and his ability to provide lethal and non-lethal coalition effects. The level of influence an advisor has with his counterpart may vary over time, and maintaining influence requires advisors to constantly assess the operational environment using their cultural understanding. For more thorough explanations of culture understanding and influence development in the advising context, see FM 3-07.1, Chapter 8, 9, 10; TC 31-37, Chapter 2, 3, 4; Commanders Handbook for Security Force Assistance, Chapter 3.

Chapter 4

Strategic framework

4-1. This chapter places Security Force Assistance (SFA) in strategic context by explaining SFA and how it applies across the spectrum of conflict (see FM 3-0). The chapter nests SFA with strategic and operational level programs. The remainder of this chapter covers SFA phases and the fundamental and developmental tasks of security force assistance. This chapter summarizes key points of discussion from FM 3-07.1 (May, 2009) and JCISFA's *Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance* (July, 2008)

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE AND THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

4-2. Security Force Assistance (SFA) is the unified action to *generate, employ, and sustain* local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of legitimate authority (FM 3-07). Collectively, these host nation forces are referred to as Foreign Security Forces (FSF). Foreign security forces are forces—including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel—who provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization's mission (3-07.1).

4-3. The SFA occurs within the framework of full spectrum operations (see FM 3.0). The SFA aligns primarily under stability operations because it is a key contributor to the vital stability tasks of establish civil security and establish civil control. The SFA, however, is not solely a stability operation as SFA also occurs within the context of offensive and defensive operations when U.S. forces accompany FSF in combat. The SFA can be conducted across the spectrum of conflict from stable peace to general war. Likewise, SFA can occur as part of any operational themes—peacetime limited engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare, and major combat operations. Figure 4-1 shows the SFA relationship inside of each.

4-4. The SFA is part of a comprehensive approach and includes close collaboration with military and civilian, joint and multinational forces. The host nation or regional security organization is the key actor within the comprehensive approach. Units conducting SFA must objectively and continuously assess FSF's Organization, Training, Equipment, Rebuilding, and Advising (OTERA) (See FM 3-07.1, pg 2-3, 2-11). Law enforcement, military, intelligence, and border forces operate and cooperate within the security sector. U.S. forces understand how these units are intended to operate in the host-nation scheme, and although not necessarily using a U.S. model, they should plan to help develop the respective capabilities so these units can carry out their security functions IAW the host nation security structure.

4-5. Security force assistance requires unified action through a whole government approach in which joint and interagency departments unify efforts in task and purpose across the diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) construct. Depending on the operational environment, the Department of State (DoS) may have the lead and oversight of certain aspects of security force assistance and other times the military will have broad latitude when conducting security force assistance. Regardless of which agency has the lead, unity of purpose to achieve a clear end state is essential.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TACTICAL

Strategic

4-6. At the strategic level, U.S. national security strategies and law provide the foundation for security cooperation initiatives that drive requirements for security force assistance. Through strategic guidance and authorities, embassies and Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) develop country plans and theater campaign plans to carry out these strategies. Joint interagency coordination groups (JIACG) facilitate unity of effort and action in GCC and embassy planning and execution activities.

Operational

4-7. At the operational level, advanced civilian teams (ACT) and joint task forces (JTF) design operational frameworks and activities to achieve objectives and conditions within theater campaign plans and country team action plans.

Tactical


4-8. Brigades, in concert with forward advanced civilian teams (FACT), implement security force assistance to assist in the development of foreign security force capabilities and capacities as they relate to the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) & policy. This includes military, police, and border security forces.

Brigade as Operational and Tactical Bridge

4-9. Inherently, the brigade has the skills and robust command and control capacity to coordinate and synchronize a broad range of tasks associated with stability operations where security force assistance occurs. These capabilities allow the brigade to serve as a bridge between the operational and tactical levels to request, coordinate, and synchronize a broad range of joint enablers to support tactical requirements within security force assistance.

4-10. Figure 4-2 explains the relationship of SFA from the strategic level, through operational, down to tactical level of application. As noted, the BCT serves as the pivotal piece in the process to leverage strategic activities and programs to enable success at the tactical level.

Figure 4-2 The Brigade in SFA: Strategic to Operational to Tactical



SFA PHASES FOR THE BCT

4-11. FM 3-0 outlines the definition and use of doctrinal phases through completion of an operation. The phases of SFA outlined by FM 3-07.1 (Chapter 4) are as follows:

- Phase I: Initial Phase
- Phase II: Transformation Phase
- Phase III: Fostering Sustainability Phase

4-12. Understanding these phases and developing measurable triggers to determine when it is appropriate to transition to the next phase is critical to conducting successful SFA.

4-13. Figure 4-3 illustrates an SFA operation that includes all three SFA phases. The horizontal axis depicts an improving security situation, and the vertical axis depicts security capability. The example depicts an ideal situation, although this may not be the case in actual execution. Issues that arise require proper assessment and potentially the use of branches or sequels.


4-14. In figure 4-3, the combined security capability represents the overall security capacity of all security forces involved; it is the sum of U.S. conventional security, host-nation security, and the U.S. Special Operations forces security capabilities.

4-15. The U.S. conventional security capability refers to tactical U.S. elements, such as the BCT. As the FSF capability improves, the need for conventional forces declines. Overall, the combined security capability remains above the required capability to maintain security.

4-16. The need for Special Operations forces remains constant throughout all phases because these small teams will sustain and gradually improve the FSF capability after conventional forces depart. The host-nation or regional security organization and U.S. policy determine the end state for special operations.


4-17. For the situation depicted in figure 4-3, a major change in the operational environment may require more FSF or additional SFA assets to ensure the available security capability stays above the requirement. Drastic changes to the situation may even require a new operational plan. The figure focuses on capability, not forces, so host-nation security capability may increase without increasing the number or size of host-nation forces. (FM 3-07.1, Chapter 4).

Figure 4-3. SFA phases



4-18. Figure 4-4 illustrates how the area of operations for a modular brigade augmented for SFA may change throughout the SFA phases. The differences between the initial response phase and the transformation phase may not change on the surface, but the BCT's relationship with FSF changes drastically. For example, FSF in the north met required conditions so one of the U.S. brigades conducting SFA was no longer required or in limited fashion. The responsibility of the other U.S. brigade expanded from providing assistance to one division to two divisions. This brigade's span of control and area of operations similarly expanded. The latter stage of the transformation phase can differ greatly. Areas of operation generally increase in size as they provide SFA to more FSF.

Figure 4-4. Changing SFA phases



SFA ACTIVITIES AND TASKS

4-19. The essence of security force assistance for a US brigade is the linking of *capability* and *capacity* development in the foreign security force with those development activities of the brigade in support of the host nation. Specifically this means linking the fundamental security force assistance activities: *generate*, *employ*, and *sustain* to security force developmental tasks: *organize*, *train*, *equip*, *rebuild / build*, and *advise* (OTERA). The brigade conducts these tasks in support of the host nation's requirement to generate, employ, and sustain their security forces and enabling institutions.

4-20. The brigade must conduct thorough and continuous *assessments* to determine foreign security force progress in support of the activities: *generate*, *employ*, and *sustain*. Based on the assessments of progress, the brigade determines its relative priority of effort related to its developmental tasks and activities. Both the SFA activities and developmental tasks of security force assistance may occur simultaneously and to varying degrees throughout the foreign security force. However, within a given foreign security force unit, these tasks must occur in a deliberate and sequential manner.

ACTIVITIES OF SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

4-21. The objective of security force assistance is for the host nation to be able to generate, employ, and sustain its security forces and enabling institutions. The descriptions of the fundamental tasks are the following:

Generate

4-22. Primarily, the task "*generate*" includes organize, recruit / man, train, equip, mobilize, service and supply security forces. Fundamentally, this task requires identification, resourcing, and resolution of capability gaps in the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) and policy of the security forces – at every level.

Employ

4-23. Primarily, the task "*employ*" as it applies to military security forces, includes collective training and carrying out the missions assigned to the unit. This includes the integration of *maneuver*, *intelligence*, *fires*, *force protection*, *sustainment* and *command and control* functions during actual operations. The task "*employ*,"

as it applies to police security forces, includes training and actual operations with the integration of *patrolling, forensics, apprehension, intelligence, investigations, incarceration, communications, and sustainment.*

Sustain

4-24. This task is the DOTMLPF & policy engine that drives the process of requirements determination, capability and capacity generation, and force employment. When a security force requires new or additional capabilities and capacities, security force assistance may be required.

DEVELOPMENTAL TASKS OF SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

4-25. The brigade conducts the following developmental tasks in support of the fundamental tasks listed below, to develop capability and capacity of foreign security forces.

Organize

4-26. All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit / organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting / manning.

Train

4-27. All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels. This may include the development and execution of programs of instruction, training events, and leader development activities.

Equip

4-28. All activities to create, improve, and integrate materiel and equipment, procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life cycle management. This may include new equipment fielding, operational readiness processes, repair, and recapitalization.

Rebuild/Build

4-29. All activities to create, improve, and integrate facilities. This may include physical infrastructures such as bases and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures.

Advise and Assist

4-30. All activities to provide subject matter expertise (SME), guidance, advice, and counsel to foreign security forces while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit / organization. Advising will occur under combat or administrative conditions, at tactical or operational levels, and in support of individuals or groups.

4-31. Assist consists of all activities to provide the foreign security force temporary access to brigade capabilities and capacities they otherwise do not have. In reference to security force assistance, the brigade conducts "assist" to support the execution of the developmental tasks. "Assist" should not create a dependency on the provider or create an undesired effect in force development.

FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

4-32. FM 3-07.1 describes the three functions of the SFA mission at the BCT level as the following: The Brigade Combat Team, the partnering or augmenting unit, and the military advising team. The table below describes basic duties and responsibilities for each function.

Table 4-1. SFA duties and responsibilities

	<i>Duties</i>	<i>Responsibilities</i>
BCT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Carrying out SFA tasks and assisting FSF in support of objectives and the end state. • Facilitating partnerships between U.S. and foreign security forces. • Requesting, coordinating, and synchronizing resources. • Providing command and control of subordinate units and assigned advisory teams. • Coordinating with other commands and adjacent units. • Coordinating with other participants integrated within the comprehensive approach. • Developing, implementing, and synchronizing information engagement in assigned areas. • Developing relationships and an understanding with appropriate actors involved in SFA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enough staff to handle the communications traffic generated by conditions. • Able to analyze information to aid commander and subordinate elements. • Able to articulate resource requirements in support of subordinate elements and efforts to conduct SFA tasks. • Organized and equipped to conduct operations and support and sustain FSF. • Regionally oriented host-nation officers to provide regional expertise.
Partnering Unit or Augmenting Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partnering with foreign security under the BCT level. • Increasing capability, capacity, competency, confidence, and commitment of FSF by conducting combined tactical operations. • Providing feedback on performance of FSF and certain shortfalls to embedded advisors and BCT headquarters. • Conducting sustainment and medical training with FSF at their home station or on operations. • Reporting conditions in the operational environment. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S. forces that are capable, competent, committed, and confident. • Interoperable with FSF. • Available for an appropriate period
Military Advising Team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Under the BCT headquarters, advising, training, and assisting FSF to which it is assigned. • Increasing capability, capacity, competency, confidence, and commitment of foreign security forces by providing advice and support during battalion level and higher operations. • Assessing partner leaders, staff, and certain shortfalls to BCT headquarters. • Conducting sustainment training with FSF at their home or on operations. • Reporting on conditions in the operational environment. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manned with trained personnel who are properly equipped so as to be capable of executing their mission in current conditions. • Personnel with rank, education, and experience corresponding to the echelon and type of unit being advised.

BATTLE COMMAND


4-33. When conducting major combat operations, the focus is on the enemy; in COIN operations, the focus is securing the population. In security force assistance, the focus is on the foreign security force. The brigade's perspective must be to execute all activities and operations with the objective of the development of the foreign security force. This concept is not commonly understood, and to many leaders foreign security force development is an unfamiliar mission. Brigade commanders still use the concept of battle command; however, security force assistance requires a unique perspective that incorporates the security force assistance fundamentals.

4-34. This requires the commander to *understand*, through assessments, the foreign security force, the total operational environment and its effects on the foreign security force, and the established objectives. This understanding enables the commander to *visualize* a security force assistance end state. Based on this visualization, the commander is able to *describe* a concept of operations that aligns the developmental tasks of OTERA with the fundamental tasks generate, employ, and sustain. This description enables the commander to effectively *direct* his subordinates through task and purpose. The most challenging aspect of battle command in security force assistance is developing the battle command of the FSF commander.

4-35. Figure 4-6 illustrates the operations process (Plan, Prep, Execute, Assess) and Battle Command in an operational environment encompassing the fundamentals of security force assistance. FM 3-07.1 (Chapter 3) details the operations process specific to the SFA mission for the BCT.

BATTLE COMMAND AND SFA TASKS

Figure 4-6: Battle Command and SFA



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Some of the documents listed in these References may be downloaded from Army websites:

- The Transition Team Professional Forum.....
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