

**Center for Army Lessons Learned  
(CALL)  
Initial Impressions Report  
Civilian Casualty (CIV/CAS)  
Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT)**

**15 April 2010**



**United States Army Combined Arms Center**

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## **Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) Initial Impressions Report (IIR)**

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This report is an executive summary of interviews conducted by CALL in support of the JCOA comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS. Topics included CIVCAS incidents, pre deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with recent operational experience in Afghanistan and Iraq.

### **Discussion**

#### **Pre Deployment Training**

Most leaders felt that they and their Soldiers were trained adequately for the upcoming deployment. However three areas of concern that were common among many of the interviews included SOF integration, EOF scenarios utilized at the CTCs and post CIVCAS mitigation and IO effects.

**EOF Scenarios:** Many leaders felt that the EOF scenarios conducted during training at the NTC while adequate could be made better by challenging Soldiers in situation that they have to balance ROE, force protection and avoidance of civilian casualties. The training of warning and disabling shots at the NTC by units was split between units. Many commanders discouraged the use of warning shots by their Soldiers (even before the in theatre prohibition against warning shots).

**Post Incident Mitigation:** While most units reported encountering a CIVCAS incident during their CTC rotation, many felt that when it came to the response it was more of a “check the block” scenario (KLE conducted, solatia payments made and then move on). When in reality the post CIVCAS response may be a long process, and the true effects may not be felt for a long time into the deployment. Also, the role players who participate in the rotation must be careful not to always play the “angry local” who wants compensation. They should vary their response and force leaders to adjust to every unique scenario appropriately.

**SOF Integration:** Many battle-space owning units reported conducting operations in conjunction with SOF units in Afghanistan but most have never trained with SOF units at any point during their CTC. Many leaders indicated an interest in incorporating SOF into their CTC rotations to give their junior leaders and Soldiers the exposure to how SOF may be operating within their AO. Understandably, most realize that training along with the actual SOF unit they will be operating along with may not be feasible due to differing deployment cycles within the units. But it would still be good to train on SOF integration during the rotation.

Additionally, outside of the CTCs many leaders provided feedback on the positive use of current AARs, and TTPs learned from the units currently operating within the AO that they will be assuming. Many younger leaders would have preferred more time and training in COIN and the Human Terrain and cultural awareness of the location that they would be deploying to. Incorporation of HTT teams into unit training could pay off during the pre-deployment training. COIN seminars and theatre specific OPDs conducted by the leadership as early as possible prior to deployment have also been indicated to be helpful to some leaders. This has given them more exposure and guidance on how they will be operating during the deployment.

### Pre Mission Planning & Mitigation

All units reported taking CIVCAS mitigation into account, there was mixed between those units with a formal SOP and those who applied the common sense standard to CIVCAS planning. All units had a standard for who conducted BDA and for most it was either the unit who caused the incident or the battle-space owning unit. Some units reported having the QRF with a dedicated mission to providing additional post CIVCAS response to any incident as required.

Many units found great benefit from inclusion of additional staff members (DOC, Physicians Assistant, SJA and Chaplain) into the planning process. Also, the incorporation of enablers (HTTs, CA, and PSYOPS) has also paid off during planning.

Some units found great benefit in conducting joint rehearsals and OPORDs along side with their ANSF counterparts. This not only helped in the training and mentoring of the ANSF, it also minimized the chances of an occurrence and helped clarify responsibilities and battle drill once an incident occurred. The rehearsals have shown to be more effective than the OPORDs because many times the ANSF may not grasp the full operation until they can walk through and deconflict along with the CF unit.

Another pre-operation method that has shown benefit has been to get a written "buy in" from the Provincial government or local village elders before an operation takes place. This shows them the respect that they as local leaders deserve and additionally provides credibility to the operation should a CIVCAS incident occur.

When it came to fires deconfliction, most all units had a plan for conduct of indirect fires. For counter battery units reported using either Falconview or PSSOF for CDE deconfliction. Units who reported firing counter IDF did conduct post fire BDA at the location.

## Operations

**Coalition Forces Risk Management:** Most leaders indicated that they understood that any increased risk to CF was worth the effort avoid CIVCAS. Many leaders also reported feeling safer due to CIVCAS mitigation measures. Most felt that the ISAF driving policy and allowing local traffic to blend in did not significantly increase risk to their convoys, and many felt that it actually made them safer understanding that the enemy has many of the same CIVCAS concerns as we do and will avoid targeting convoys where civilians may be injured.

**Enemy response:** Some units did report that they did observe the enemy adapt to their mitigation measures. Sometimes insurgents would fire on CF units from areas where civilians were at hoping for an “over-reaction” to the situation and for CF to cause casualties. Other times the enemy would flee into a village or qalat. Many units found the best way to deal with this situation was to establish a soft cordon to contain the area and allow the ANSF to enter and conduct the searches. Other enemy responses were focused on negative IO effects following a CIVCAS. Some reports indicated that the enemy would quickly remove weapons from fighters in order to give the appearance that they were nothing more than a civilian. Others would send in “agitators” to confront Coalition Forces and attempt to enflame the situation and the local population. Additionally, one unit reported that they enemy within their AO began to understand their pattern for conducting a BDA within two hours of conducting counter IDF fires and used this to establish ambushes for CF. This was compounded by the restrictive terrain often found in the areas. This was mitigated by allowing commanders flexibility on how and when to conduct the BDA.

**Local Impacts on CIVCAS:** While it is commonly understood that all CIVCAS has a negative impact on the local population, there did not seem to be a majority consensus of which type had the most negative impact. Many leaders felt that it included women and children casualties. Others indicated that night raids seemed to have more effect as the local population feels a sense of insecurity when they cannot feel safe in their own homes at night. Some believed that incidents involving holy sites or texts (mosques, Quran) had a larger than normal impact on the population. This indicated to them that the CF has no regard for their culture, religion or way of life. Many units indicated that external units (SOF, transient convoys) had a greater impact than battle-space owning units, because they did not have a complete understanding of the area and local population. This can lead to a sense of distrust among the locals who may wonder how they can trust the CF and ANSF if they cannot even control who operates within their areas.

**External Units:** A common theme among the conventional force battle space owners was they felt a lack of control in the conduct of SOF operations within their AO. Most believed that SOF units did not have a full appreciation of the local population and no

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vested interest in their well being. Some felt that personnel would be killed to often for “non compliance” and was not a credible threat. Often when a CIVCAS occurred they would not stay around long enough to conduct a battle handover with the battle space owner. Some units did indicate cooperation with SOF units and that they would always have a response force able to provide security, BDA, medical support in the event of a CIVCAS.

Post Incident Response: Units typically had a good post response plan to CIVCAS. Most units reported that they worked well with the ANSF and that they had no issue with them taking the lead. If the medical situation dictated they would evacuate the wounded to US facilities for treatment. But if not required some felt it better to keep them with the local facilities as it would be easier for their families to know where they are at and visit. Treatment of the dead was also an important issue with the units. If they are MEDEVAC'd out and die in US treatment it is essential to return them to their families in a prompt manner to facilitate burial. Many units reported the best way to accomplish this was through the ANSF or a local elder. Respect for the dead (civilian or insurgent) was an important theme through many of the units. Placing them into body bags and allowing their faces to be visible so that family may identify them was common.

When it came down to techniques of mitigation there was no one preferred method (KLE, solatia, etc...), but understanding that all are essential in conjunction with a timely and effective IO campaign. Most often a KLE or informal Shura would occur immediately following an incident with the local leaders. The preferred option was always a senior leader who has knowledge and respect for the local population. In many cases it was the battalion commander or other battalion senior leader, in other cases it was a company commander who had the respect of the locals. And the truth is always the best course of action (even if the incident was negligent). This shows them that CF and ANSF can be trusted. But it must always be someone with a level of authority over the situation. Additionally, another common theme was immediate notification and involvement of the provincial governor and other local leaders. They can often calm the situation and may be the best to counter any enemy propaganda. Timeliness was always an issue and sometimes with the distances and restrictive terrain getting senior leaders or government officials to the site was difficult to accomplish. And dynamically tasking rotary wing assets was always difficult to do with minimal lead time. When available, rotary wing assets can be of great assistance to mitigating CIVCAS incidents in a timely manner. Additionally, the timeliness of solatia payments was also a concern. Many leaders would have preferred to see additional pay agents available for rapid payments to the families of the victims. However, it is important to note that investigation must always be conducted in order to prevent false claims for future operations. Otherwise it can turn into a perception of “free money” anytime an operation occurs.

When it came to conducting the investigations units reported the benefit of always conducting a joint investigation along with the ANSF. The investigation should be detailed and complete. Units should always have cameras available for photographic evidence. Also, showing dead fighters with their weapons (especially if larger than an AK-47) is essential to prove that they were in fact a fighter and not an innocent civilian. Often, the local population will not believe that a dead fighter was in fact an insurgent unless shown proof. Other items that may need to be declassified and presented to the local leaders would be any gun camera footage and any ISR coverage that may show the incident.

Information Operations: Most units reported observing that the insurgents had a very rapid capability to influence the population negatively towards a suspected incident. Following an incident Coalition and ANSF forces need to begin an IO campaign immediately. This can range from KLEs, radio and television broadcasts, apologies (if warranted) and leader engagements. Most units reported that involving the Provincial Governor and local elders immediately was highly beneficial. If available, getting the Governor or radio or television (where available) was a very effective way to get the message out. Other methods included the use of the Radio In A Box (RIAB). But the IO campaign must be proactive and begin immediately. Many commanders felt that they were falling behind the insurgents in the battle of getting the truth out, and that it is always easier to inform and gain trust as opposed to having to counter lies and then get the truth out.

### ANSF/Provincial Support

Units felt very comfortable allowing their ANSF counterparts to take the lead on operations and during investigations. Few felt that there was anything that they did not trust them to handle. And often leaders felt that they were better at differentiating the fighters from the civilians. Involve the ANSF leaders in mission planning, orders and rehearsals.

When it came to CIVCAS mitigation, the involvement of Provincial government was clearly one of the most effective in countering enemy spin and gaining the trust of the people. This helps show the Coalition forces as true partners and establishes trust with the people. When appropriate, getting the provincial "buy in" prior to an operation can go a long way in establishing a trust and confidence between the local leaders, the Coalition and the ANSF.

## **DOTMLPF Implications**

### **Doctrine:**

- Establish an understanding between the battle space owners and the requirements of SOF units operating within their battle space. Provide the units with some visibility of any operation happening within their AO.
- SOF and conventional units must establish an understanding and plan for the event of CIVCAS (who is responsible for what).

### **Training:**

- CIVCAS does not need to be a standalone event and can be incorporated into many training events at home station and at the CTCs. It can vary from EOF procedures, leader engagement and cultural awareness training, COIN training, OPDs.
- Training should attempt to focus on the long term effects of CIVCAS on local populations and should not “check the block”.
- Training scenarios should be based on current events within the AO. Gather info from TTPs, SOPs, PDSS or any other method from the current unit as early as possible to help facilitate training and tailor training to meet those needs.
- Soldiers’ skills begin to atrophy once training is completed and the unit gets through RIP/TOA. Conduct EOF and ROE refresher training in country to keep Soldiers skills sharp.
- Incorporate training with enablers prior to deployment (ISR assets, CA, PSYOPS, and HTT).
- Incorporate SOF training for conventional units during their CTC rotations.
- Ensure that new systems (RIAB, PSSOF, etc...) are trained extensively prior to deployment, and give Soldiers time to work with them and get comfortable prior to deployment in order to make them more effective.
- Train Soldiers on the employment of less than lethal alternatives.

### **Material:**

- Additional UAS or redistribution of UAS assets to support ground force commanders prior to an operation. In addition to support during the operations, UAS assets can help separate civilian from insurgent personnel and aid in establishing patterns of life.
- Rotary wing assets, the more available (or flexible) they can be can help in the timely support for a CIVCAS incident. CIVCAS incident should be placed on a priority list for aviation commanders to support and give ground force commanders some ability to balance priority and make short notice requests.
- Incorporate rapid IO measures into more units. Identify areas without radio or television capabilities and employ RIAB in those areas. Ensure that Soldiers and leaders are trained in its use extensively prior to deployment.

- Maximize use of guided munitions such as Excalibur during the conduct of indirect fire missions.
- Additional less than lethal capabilities to conduct EOF measures and operations where certainty cannot be established.

**Leader Development and Education: COIN, OPDs**

- Begin COIN seminars early to let Soldiers and leaders begin to get the appropriate mindset for CIVCAS avoidance and cultural sensitivity.
- Theatre specific OPDs should be conducted as early as possible. Early command guidance will foster an area of understanding command guidance and will give junior leaders time to begin training and enforcing this among their subordinates.

**Personnel:**

- Establish and lock in personnel as early as possible prior to deployment. Key command and staff personnel who miss the pre-deployment train up and CTC rotation may not receive the full CIVCAS training that is required to accomplish the mission.
- Employ POLAD cells in mission planning and post CIVCAS mitigation. Allow subordinate units without POLADS to tap in those resources.
- Make pay agents more readily available to provide solatia payments. If not immediately available have a plan to rapidly move them throughout the battlespace.

**Comments/Notes**

Overall 19 interviews were conducted with 22 leaders and staff officers with recent experience in OEF and OIF. See Appendix A for interview observations and synopsis.



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## OBSERVATION

**Number** 01jmh16-03-10

**Name** LTC Benson, William interview

**Description** Comprehensive study plan covering CIVCAS with LTC William Benson (CAC COID) who served as the Squadron Commander of 1-10 CAV, 2BDE 4th IN DIV ISO OIF 08-10.

### **Discussion**

CALL conducted an interview with LTC William Benson on 16 1400-1500 MAR 10 to gather information for the JCOA CIVCAS study plan. The main areas of discussion were mission planning and mitigation, response, IO effect and redeployment training.

### **Mission Planning and Mitigation**

When asked about mission planning and mitigation measures, LTC Benson stated that CIVCAS was incorporated into every mission. Additionally, they would ensure that the squadron's medical team was also incorporated into the planning as well for potential medical response and coordination with the local hospitals if needed. The squadron regularly conducted H&I fires as well as counter-battery fires. While conducting H&I fires, the location would always have to be pre-approved and there would have to be continuous observation of fires to mitigate the potential of CIVCAS. During counter battery fires prior to firing, the location would be examined via imagery and a decision would be made to engage or not.

During missions, Soldiers would travel intermingled with local traffic and not create a protective zone around the convoy or patrol. While this created a greater potential for civilian casualties, there was not an increase in the amount of civilian casualties. The close proximity in many cases would make it more difficult for the enemy to engage coalition forces without themselves harming civilians.

### **Response**

The squadron took the mindset of always putting the host nation personnel (Iraqi Army, Police and provincial governmental services) in the lead and let them serve as the first responders when possible. They would always provide support or needed assistance as required or requested within limitations. The primary option for medical care was typically the local hospitals or clinics (unless the urgency of the injury dictated otherwise). This proved to be a benefit in several areas. It showed the people that their government was taking care of them. Additionally, the families were typically able to be better informed and visit the injured family member as opposed to being MEDEVAC'd to a US facility where the family would get no information on their injured family member or be able to visit easily. Several factors associated with the decision to provide US

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MEDEVAC or local medical care included severity of the injury, capability of local medical facilities, availability of Iraqi personnel to care for the wounded, the cause of the injury (US, IA, IP or enemy caused) and whether it was an accident or due to combat. Other challenges faced in response to treating medical injuries included how to treat for long term care (i.e. Burn Victims). US medical facilities are not equipped or prepared for long term care and treatment of patients and burn victims as most US personnel are evacuated to higher level care such as Landstuhl or Walter Reed. Often in the remote areas, the local hospitals are not well equipped and are often on the same level of long term care as that of the coalition medical facilities. In these cases, it was usually preferred that the patient be moved to an Iraqi medical facility so that his family would have better access to visitation and he could get care from his own country.

There was always a balance between coalition forces and host nation forces providing CIVCAS response. Typically the coalition has more capabilities when it comes to CIVCAS response, however, this could undermine the local security forces and government services and potentially lead to a loss of confidence in them. Also, there was expectation from the local population about the coalition forces providing medical care. This was balanced by maintaining a visible presence and providing support, but whenever possible allowing the Iraqis to take the lead and resolve the situation. Coalition involvement was also one of the best ways to gain support from the local population. Junior leaders were briefed about expectation management and their ability to support without making any commitments or promises.

During the deployment, the squadron did not encounter any CIVCAS that was directly related to their operations, but did have to provide support for several incidents involving either enemy attacks or Iraqi Security Forces. Additionally LTC Benson during previous deployments encountered CIVCAS caused by other non-battle space owning units (transportation convoys, SOF, etc ... ). Responding to CIVCAS incidents caused by other coalition units who operated within the squadron's AO was extremely difficult. It not only created the potential for a rift between the local population and coalition forces, but it also left the battle space owner with the requirement of explaining the actions that occurred to the local leaders and conducting an IO campaign to get the information out. The typical Iraqi civilian does not and cannot differentiate between conventional and SOF forces, regular patrols and transient convoys. All they see is an action leading to casualties and a US uniform. Developing a working relationship between non conventional units and the battle space owners is essential to CIVCAS mitigation. The better coordination between the various units, the less likely that unnecessary CIVCAS is to occur. Also, the better informed the ground owner is will impact the response to a CIVCAS incident and the ability to provide a proactive IO campaign versus a reactive IO campaign.

### IO Effect

A proactive IO campaign is essential in managing CIVCAS incidents. Too often our IO messages are reactive responding to insurgent claims of US responsibility or negligence. The longer that the local population waits on word about an incident the less effective that IO campaign will be.

When asked about the best way to deal with a CIVCAS response LTC Benson stated that "every situation is different" and that there is no one right way to follow up (KLE, reparations, solatia). In some cases, a key leader engagement is needed immediately. Other times it may be best to wait a few days. Some instances will call for direct contact with the family, other times may dictate using a third party, sometimes attendance at the funeral is appreciated and other times it can cause further damage.

When asked what type(s) of CIVCAS had the biggest effect on the local population, LTC Benson stated that it was "those caused by US forces". Additionally, he believed that not just who was involved was a large factor but the cause was also a major factor. For example, traffic accidents are common, clearly not intentional and easily understood by the people. EOF, while potentially damaging, can be explained. The most difficult to explain and justify was the precision targeting of houses or facilities (JDAM, GPS guided artillery, etc . . . ). This was complicated greatly if families were involved. To many Iraqis, it appeared to be a dishonorable way of waging warfare and justified the use of IEDs to attack coalition targets.

#### Pre-deployment training

Prior to the deployment, the Squadron incorporated CIVCAS mitigation measures into their home station training. At the individual level, training focused on ROE; clearing their gun lines and clearance of fires. Training started with situational engagements in the Engagement Skills Trainer. It was also incorporated into their ranges and squad live fire exercises (EOF measures, no shoot scenarios) and was also a part of their force-on-force exercises. COBs were also utilized during home station training prior to going to their CTC rotation. During the CTC rotation at the National Training Center, CIVCAS was incorporated into the rotation; however, it was limited primarily due to the time constraints of the typical CTC rotations. It was typically a scripted event that often led to a few requirements (15-6 investigation, KLE, solatia payment, etc .. ) and then move on to the next situation. In reality, the true effects of CIVCAS may not even be noticeable for several months following the incident and cannot be rushed. One area that he noted that has been historically missing from CTC rotations has been the integration of non-conventional units. Deployed units routinely work alongside nonconventional forces, and if they do train together at a CTC rotation, the likelihood is that they will not work with those units when they deploy. Relationships and TIPs must, therefore, be developed in country.

Additionally, one of the challenges in training was faced not during pre-deployment but rather several months into deployment. The Soldiers would come into country with the

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skills they have trained on fresh in their minds and over months those skills would often atrophy and diminish. Balancing continuation training with the OPTEMPO of the unit was always a challenge while in country.

### Summary

Overall, LTC Benson felt prepared for the deployment and believed that he had the proper equipment to accomplish the mission and still mitigate CIVCAS. This was his third deployment to OIF and believed that coalition forces have come a long way in the mitigation of CIVCAS as well as providing a response to CIVCAS that was in the best interest of the local population. He emphasized that when it comes to CIVCAS, the best method is to "learn to deal with it before it happens".

### Insights/Lessons

- Incorporate medical teams into mission planning.
- Current and accurate imagery is essential in the mitigation of CIVCAS during un-planned fires such as counter-battery.
- When possible, allow the host nation forces and essential services to serve as the lead for post-CIVCAS response, but always be available and capable to provide support as required.
- Integration with non-conventional forces operating within a unit's battle space is essential. The better coordinated the two organizations are, the less chance there is for an unnecessary CIVCAS and the better prepared the unit is to support with a response should one occur.
- CIVCAS training can be incorporated into many aspects of training and does not need to be a standalone training event.

### DOTMLPF Implications

Training: Training in CTC needs to emphasize the long term effects of CIVCAS. COB must be good role players and vary their responses to CIVCAS. Do not rush the post-incident response.

### Unit/POC/Contact Info

- MAJ Joel Helgerson (CALL OPSO)
- MAJ Eric Vetro (CALL OPSO)

If you need more information, contact CALL at DSN 552-9569; Commercial 913-684-9569 or 913-648-9533, go to our website <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/index.asp>, select 'RFI or CALL Product' or write to [call.rfimanager@conus.army.mil](mailto:call.rfimanager@conus.army.mil).

### Comments/Notes

- Although the goal of the Comprehensive Study Plan was to focus on CIVCAS in Afghanistan, LTC Benson had operational experience as a Squadron Comander recently in Iraq.
- Audio File is available

## OBSERVATION

**Number** 01epv17-03-10

**Name** LTC (P) Barren, James Interview

**Description** Comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS conducted with LTC(P) Barren (CAC G3) who served as Battalion Commander of 316th FA, 2nd BDE, 4th IN DIV in OIF 08 -10.

### **Discussion**

The goal of this interview was to decipher CIVCAS incidents, planning and mitigation efforts from key leaders with operational experience in Afghanistan and/or Iraq. Mitigation seems to have been a common theme during the interview since it was a condition on the battlefield that had to be addressed prior to any mission. Control measures had to be emplaced IOT mitigate CIVCAS. Often in many provinces, the Iraqi security forces have taken control and are responsible for the security within their own provinces. As part of that, many or almost all of the missions have become joint operations. Battle Damage Assessment was part of the planning process for US forces and discussed with Iraqi Army/Police security forces prior to any joint operation.

One aspect to further improve the mitigation of CIVCAS includes the train-up prior to a deployment. This starts at home station with focus on EOF procedures, weapon control status and orientation at the squad level during training on both STX lanes and LFXs. At the company level the focus is on troop leading procedures and at the BN level, on guidance IOT mitigate CIVCAS. At the CTCs, this includes ensuring that civilians on the battlefield are scripted into the rotation. With that, the scripts should include the procedures that should be followed if a CIVCAS incident occurs. While deployed, mitigation efforts included conducting missions when most of the local populace were not on the roads or using routes that didn't interfere with the local populace if the mission included large convoys. Another mitigation effort was to include some type of enabler into every mission. These include CAS and UAV coverage. The use of interpreters also was an essential mitigation tool.

Enemy tactics have changed in response to CIVCAS mitigation efforts. One case is that insurgents will attack civilians IOT attack the security forces that are responding to the first attack.

Since most provinces are now controlled by the Iraqi Army/Police security forces, giving them the lead when a CIVCAS has occurred has proved to be successful. A follow up to that is ensuring a positive IO campaign to distribute as to why the incident occurred. In some cases the Gol has demanded clarification as to why the CIVCAS incident has occurred. The most successful mitigation efforts following a CIVCAS incident has been

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KLEs. These have often been with the family, sometimes the sheiks, or in some cases mayors or provincial governors. These need to be conducted ASAP after a determination has been made as to why the CIVCAS incident occurred. This is followed up ASAP by a Solatia payment if it is justified.

When a CIVCAS incident has occurred, US forces are often responsible for conducting the BOA and follow on investigation. This is often done because the host nation cannot be relied upon to acknowledge that they were the cause of the incident. Keeping quiet will often lead to US forces being blamed for the incident. An effective IO campaign following an incident, either caused by US forces or host nation security forces, helps dispel US resentment.

CIVCAS considerations were incorporated into all CONUS training. The best practices for mitigating CIVCAS included rehearsals and crew drills in all training exercises. Conducting OPDs and revising and reviewing SOPs also attributes to the mitigation of CIVCAS, EOF was incorporated into training scenarios, MILES equipment was used at the CTC rotation but not a LFX. EOF procedures were integrated into all aspects of training, for example, static CPs. EOF training aids that proved extremely beneficial, but one that also had to be trained on was the use of warning signs and the use of pen flares. Multiple training aids were utilized during training and the LTC (P) Barren felt confident that the training was sufficient prior to deployment.

CIVCAS incidents that include women and children have the most impact on the local populace, When a CIVCAS incident happens at a school or a funeral, these have proved to be very detrimental to the US and host nation's IO campaign, and one that insurgents use readily for theirs.

In order to mitigate CIVCAS during joint operations, it is imperative to conduct joint rehearsals. Often, the Iraqi Army/Police were invited to the FOB IOT conduct a joint rehearsal. This included both mounted and dismounted rehearsals if space was available. Following the operation, a joint AAR was conducted where counterparts were given the chance to decipher what worked or did not.

LTC (P) Barren's battalion was not involved in any CIVCAS incidents during his deployment. There were incidents within the BOE, but he wasn't sure of the outcome of those incidents other than the fact that he knows that a formal investigation was completed.

### **Insights/Lessons**

- One way to mitigate CIVCAS when conducting joint operations with host nation security forces ... incorporate them into rehearsals and AARs.



- Incorporate some type of EOF STX lane at the CTCs for both mounted and dismounted operations.

### **DOTMLPF Implications**

None

### **Unit/POC/Contact Info**

- MAJ Joel Helgerson (CALL OPSO)
- MAJ Eric Vetro (CALL OPSO)

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### **Comments/Notes**

- Although the goal of the Comprehensive Study Plan was to focus on CIVCAS in Afghanistan, LTC(P) Barren had operational experience as a BN CDR recently in Iraq.
- Audio File is available

## OBSERVATION

**Number** 01 cb 09-04-10

**Name** LTC Baker

**Description** Comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS conducted with LTC Baker who served as the Battalion Commander for 1/501<sup>st</sup> PIR, 4<sup>th</sup> BDE, 25<sup>th</sup> ID during OEF.

### **Discussion**

The goal of this interview was to decipher CIVCAS incidents, pre deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with operational experience in Afghanistan.

#### **Pre Deployment Training**

The battalion trained on escalation of force in multiple different training venues (home station and NTC). Scenarios were based on realistic situation that the Soldiers would face in OEF. LTC Baker believed that the scenarios used at the NTC were quite effective, but did not carry the true weight that they needed to. CIVCAS incidents in Afghanistan carry such tremendous impacts on the local population that it is difficult to replicate with the limited constraints of the NTC. Afghans (Pashtuns in particular), are emotional and irrational about certain things and CIVCAS incidents are a big one of them. The Taliban have gotten very good at exploiting these types of incidents to their benefit because the population is so sensitive to it. As a result, civilian casualties have become “key terrain” so to speak in the fight to influence the population. If GIRoA loses this fight, then it may lose the population.

They talked to leaders and Soldiers at length on many different occasions and explained the detrimental impact of escalation of force incidents on the population in Afghanistan and linked it to Pashtunwali and the requirement for revenge to restore one’s honor. They also went to great lengths to ensure that the Soldiers understood the threat in the AO. SVBIEDs and VBIEDs were not a big threat in the AO, and it was extremely important that the Soldiers understood this (particularly during the first 60-90 days). The Battalion conducted a great deal of leader training on CIVCAS and incorporated CIVCAS scenarios into all of our collective training. Leader training consisted of vignettes of bad escalation of force incidents.

#### **Pre Mission Planning & Mitigation**

The Battalion always had contingency plans for CIVCAS which included taking money for solatia payments, body bags (it is very important to show respect for the dead—especially innocents), taking photos for proof of appropriate conduct, and an IO/engagement plan beginning at the scene. Most importantly, they always got buy-in from our Afghan partners prior to the operation and ensured that Afghans were in the

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lead whenever possible. Finally, all mitigation procedures had to be done very quickly; speed is important, and everyone (even external units and SOF) have to understand this at the outset. Civilian BDA was not a part of the planning. However, it was made clear that any possibility of a civilian casualty became the main effort unless you were still in contact. Everyone understood that nothing else is more important once a civilian casualty occurs.

LTC Baker considered it a given that Soldiers had to accept more risk in order to protect the population. This had to be communicated to the force during train-up prior to deployment, and consistently throughout the deployment. Oftentimes, he believed that the ANSF understood this better than we do. "You have to be realistic about the threat as well and understand your environment. Understanding your environment is the key to having a realistic perception of the threat. In their case, 99% of the civilian casualties were caused by outside units who do not understand the environment and are overly risk averse (overly focused on security)". LTC Baker believed that you cannot live on a FOB within a FOB and expect for your Soldiers to have a clear understanding of the threat; this only leads to mistakes.

#### Operations (CIVCAS Incident / Enemy Response / Local Impacts)

The Battalion had no CIVCAS incidents during its deployment. All CIVCAS incidents were a result of SOF or ANSF operations.

LTC Baker did not see any major change in enemy tactics during his deployment. But did note that the enemy was already very good at identifying the warning signs of an impending attack and were less likely to fight during night raids and act very passive (believing that if detained by ISAF they would be eventually be released shortly). The enemy did however choose to fight more often during daylight raids (which were not conducted often).

He indicated that there were a few instances during SOF raids where the insurgents would attempt to bait the assault force into overreacting during a firefight and inflicting civilian casualties. The insurgents also had an effective IO campaign and follow-on riots which were well executed. It was unclear if these were pre-planned or a target of opportunity.

When asked what type of CIVCAS had the most impact on the local population, LTC Baker stated that "the civilian casualties caused as a result of night raids on Pashtun qalats have the greatest impact. The homes of Pashtuns are forts. That is significant. The protection of one's family (and honor) is so important to Pashtuns that they would not even consider building a place to live that doesn't have a 20-foot wall and guard towers in the corners. Pashtuns are very emotional and even irrational about certain things—protection of their women and their homes. Violating these things by conducting a night raid will cause them to be humiliated and dishonored because they could not

protect their family/tribe. The only way for them to restore their honor when something like this happens is to fight and seek revenge.”

### Post Incident Response

The Battalion did have a checklist (original left in country). But he did indicate the importance of being on the ground at the site of the incident first to prevent the insurgent spin. When you have civilian casualties, the Battalion Commander (or other senior leader if he is not available) needs to get to that location as soon as possible. This must become the highest priority for the unit (no matter what else is happening). The first priority is to treat and evacuate the wounded (especially if the injury was caused injuries by coalition forces). LTC Baker thought it beneficial to place the dead and put dead fighters front and center so that everyone can see them and their weapons. They put the dead fighters in body bags out of respect for the dead and just left the faces exposed to show to the citizens along with all the weapons, gear, explosives, and other evidence. The reaction by locals to dead fighters was always genuinely very positive. Soldiers must still need to show respect for the dead fighters.

One area to consider is that often a man who is only armed with a bolt action rifle will probably not be seen as a fighter by the locals. Likewise, locals will not be convinced by a grenade or an AK-47 found in the home where someone was killed. Several SOF operations have been conducted where people were killed for “non-compliance” and the only thing found in the home was a grenade or bolt action rifle. You have to tidy up the dead civilians as best you can. Putting them in body bags is a good way to lessen the shock and show respect. You can unzip the bags to let the families ID the fallen as required. LTC Baker indicated that they left the bodies in the location where they were killed because it is easier to explain and comes off as more honest and genuine. You must to be brutally honest to the Afghan citizens who are at the site. He stated that “it is one of the hardest things I have ever done, but it certainly pays off”. He did this himself whenever possible, or I had one of his senior leaders on the ground do it. It is best to have a leader on the ground that really respects Afghans and has some compassion about innocent people being killed (not every leader fits that category unfortunately). All Soldiers must understand how Muslims and Pashtuns view handling the dead. It is very important to them that the bodies not be “spoiled” either through decomposition or through something that is viewed as desecration or defilement. To many Americans, Afghans seem irrational about this sort of thing and are very emotional about it. But, this is the sort of thing that will quickly anger a Pashtun to fight. They also have a standard means of preparing the dead for burial which all leaders and Soldiers need to be familiar with as well.

All the civilian casualties they dealt with were the result of SOF, ANSF, or other units external to the battalion. In these situations you may not know exactly what happened to cause the civilian casualties, but you will have to deal with the result the best you can. They had great success in dealing with accidental civilian casualties. In one case,

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SOF conducted a raid in which they killed six people. Only two of the KIAs were clearly fighters and they had fled over a kilometer from the target. The four that were killed on the target were unarmed and were killed for being “non-compliant”. The only weapon found in the target building was a hand grenade. Worse, one of the dead civilians was an unarmed man over 70 years of age. LTC Baker personally conducted the battle handover and dealt with the situation. By using the procedures described above, he was able to achieve a neutral outcome from the local community at least in the short term. He suspected that this operation created many more insurgents in the long run, but was able to minimize the damage to the district as a whole. Finally, civilian casualties often create a long-term requirement in terms of providing additional care and attention. In one case, a family was killed by an errant A-10 strike, and all of the adults in one family were killed leaving several orphans that the village then had to care for. From the Afghan perspective, CF now had a responsibility to help provide for those orphans. Right or wrong, that is the way they feel about it.

When asked about what was the most successful mitigation measure (solatia payments, KLE, etc...) LTC Baker indicated that “none of these efforts will be effective by themselves and they *all* have to be done right to achieve the desired effect.” He believed that when Afghans do the mitigation, it is always better than CF trying to do it. Solatia is very important in cases where innocents were killed; units conducting battle handover with SOF should always have solatia money with them. They wound up paying over \$31,000 in solatia payments for SOF raids in the province. The KLE at the site of the incident with the local elders is probably one of the most important mitigation procedures, and it must be done by trusted, local leaders—both Afghan and CF in most cases although there are times when Afghans are better able to do it without CF involvement. Media engagements are also very important, and the Afghan government and ANSF leaders should do this. In one case, the Governor was in Kabul when an incident happened, and LTC Baker was able to call him and have him influence the national ministry through a personal visit. The event in question was one in which a clinic was partially destroyed through a combined operation, and the Governor was able to mitigate any IO problems by personally visiting the Minister of Health and explaining the situation to him. This sort of cooperation cannot be overstated.

#### ANSF/Provincial Support

The Governor and ANSF helped tremendously in every case. He stated that “you cannot mitigate these sorts of incidents without the Afghans help and cooperation due to the xenophobia of Afghans in general”. In one example, they almost lost the support of the Afghans because we could not get someone to the scene of the incident (SOF operation) in time. As a result, the Taliban spin effort was very successful. It was so successful that the Governor and Chairman of the Provincial Council came to the FOB and accused the Soldiers of “handling the women’s breasts” and “poking the bodies with knives”. They were emotional, angry, and irrational at this point. Further, they were convinced that these allegations were true. Fortunately, they had pictures showing that

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the women were handled very respectfully, and we had pictures of the bodies that clearly showed that they were not mishandled or abused in any way. After they showed them the pictures, both of them got on board to help reverse the negative propaganda. Without these photos, I hate to think what the consequences would have been. The main reason this problem occurred was lack of battle handover from the SOF and failure to key trusted key leaders to the side of the incident before the Taliban could spin it.

LTC Baker always deferred to the Governor of the province with regard to the handling of civilian casualties, as he is the legitimate government leader in the province. Likewise, they would normally defer to the Police Chief or ANA BDE CDR at the tactical level. He felt that he had a very good relationship with all of them, and they all worked together to achieve the best results possible. There was no situation that he could think of that he wouldn't let the ANSF do with regard to a civilian casualty. LTC Baker stated that he "wouldn't presume to have the right to tell them to do or not to do anything". You have to work with them based on a relationship and trust. In one case, he let the Governor come in and view (and take pictures of) the body of a mullah from his home village who died while in SOF custody. This was a very controversial situation in which the public believed that the mullah was beaten to death by CF. The mullah had been very combative when he was detained, and his body showed the injuries caused during his detainment. Nevertheless, since the wounds were clearly not serious enough to cause death, showing the Governor the body and allowing him to take pictures, gave him the ammunition he needed to convince the Afghan public that the mullah was clearly not beaten to death but had died from a heart attack. Refusing to show the Governor the body would simply have convinced him that we were lying to him or covering up the truth and the results would have been detrimental and tragic.

Normally, the BDA would be conducted by whoever can get there the fastest. It should always be a combined effort (CF and ANSF). Whenever there were civilian casualties, he would try to get there as fast as possible with a trusted Afghan partner (either ANP or ANA). If he could not get there, then a company commander would do it with a trusted Afghan partner. SOF raids should include trusted Afghan leaders from the area in question with the assault force whenever possible. This worked extremely well on several occasions. Some SOF units are resistant to this TTP and will not allow local Afghan leaders or even CF from the BSO to go with the assault force. "This sort of lack of cooperation and understanding has to stop if we want to do better with regard to civilian casualties." Evidence is also very important during the investigation. Photos and video can help convince the local population that the casualty was in fact a fighter and not just an innocent civilian.

### Improvements

LTC Baker would have preferred more full motion video capable UASs. He believed that they were very low on the priority for UAVS coverage, and needed them more. "SOF

always have redundant UAS and FMV coverage (even if they are not conducting an operation); whereas, we were lucky to UAS coverage even for large operations in which we knew we were going to get into a fight.”

LTC Baker also stated that it would be smart to have some less than lethal alternatives for raids. It would give an assault force an alternative to killing someone in an unclear situation. Saving the lives of innocents in this way could be every bit as powerful in a positive sense as killing civilians inadvertently is negative. This would go a long way toward convincing the Afghan population that we are trying to prevent CIVCAS incidents. Examples would be bean bag guns, tasers, etc..., the sort of non-lethal alternatives that law enforcement organizations often use. Conventional forces should also be able to get flash bang grenades instead of fragmentary grenades to minimize collateral damage.

### **Insights/Lessons**

LTC Baker believed that they used our Afghan partners in nontraditional ways by giving them a say in whether or not we conducted certain operations or dropped ordinance. “When they have ownership and responsibility in an operation, they are much more likely to cooperate and help with mitigation should a CIVCAS accident occur.” He felt that “Afghans are better at differentiating between fighters and civilians than we are.” Finally, if there was any doubt in their minds with regard to PID, then they did not take the risk. He felt that it was much better to let a few insurgents get away rather than create many more insurgents by accidentally killing civilians. It is also worth mentioning that people who have to deal with the Afghan families after these accidents, are much less likely to cause them in the future than those forces who are never forced to see the result of their decisions or deal with the horrible results.

### **DOTMLPF Implications**

Materials:

- Increased UAS coverage would help in mitigating CIVCAS incidents during operations. They could help establish patterns of life and identify fighters from civilians prior to an operation. The video can also be used for investigations and as evidence to mitigate insurgent IO effects and show that CF did act appropriately during the incident.
- Incorporate more less than lethal alternatives (and training) into maneuver units.

### **Unit/POC/Contact Info**

Charles E. Bruce (L21 "HUB" Warfighter Cell, CALL)

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**Comments/Notes**

Interviews were conducted in a questionnaire format with key leaders from the 4<sup>th</sup> BCT, 25<sup>th</sup> ID. Original questionnaires are available at CALL.



## OBSERVATION

**Number** 02 cb 09-04-10

**Name** MAJ Laybourn

**Description** Comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS conducted with MAJ Laybourn who served as the S3 for 1/501<sup>st</sup> PIR, 4<sup>th</sup> BDE, 25<sup>th</sup> ID during OEF.

### **Discussion**

The goal of this interview was to decipher CIVCAS incidents, pre deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with operational experience in Afghanistan.

#### **Pre Deployment Training**

MAJ Laybourn was not with the Battalion during it's NTC rotation as he joined the Battalion downrange. But did indicate that CIVCAS incidents were part of the scenario and indicated that he felt whatever training did occur paid off well in theater.

#### **Pre Mission Planning & Mitigation**

For CIVCAS mitigation great effort was put in during planning. Some items were incorporated during every mission like bull horns and interpreters but this was standardized and required on every mission. The number of interpreters eventually increased to one per squad which proved to be very useful.

For direct fires mitigation planning they would incorporate control measures (phase lines, objectives and coordination points) and rehearse them. One very useful technique was the ROC drill (this was especially with the Afghan Security Forces). The ANSF would participate in the OPORD but until participating in the ROC Drill many of their leaders would not fully understand what was expected. They would see the RFLs or coordination points and talk them themselves during the brief. This was also the time when our and their leaders reminded all present that only accurate fires would be tolerated. We saw a dramatic increase in fires control after incorporating the ANSF into the ROC Drills.

Indirect fires, CAS and CCA were always planned for but the CDE for their employment had to be reviewed using FALCON VIEW prior and during missions before engaging. Often during a TIC or even when enemy had been observed emplacing IEDs they could not be engaged because of their proximity to other Qalats. "Though frustrating this method certainly reduced CIVCAS cause by CF." Great effort was taken to provide control measures for maneuvering units (especially when incorporating ANSF)

Because of the xenophobic nature of the Afghans every effort was made prior to a mission to mitigate any damage or perception of damage which might occur during a mission. The two most pressing were a pay agent with money (CERP) and cameras. Every mission had a camera of some sort. This enabled them to record what happened (or did not happen in some cases) on an objective. If anyone was harmed or any property damaged during the mission they would take photos or film of the site and the casualties and show them to the provincial governor ASAP. Typically they were able to get the pictures to the governor within 24 hours of the incident. This was easily the most valuable technique in assessing damage and mitigating any negative press because it got buy-in from GIRoA.

The pay agent along during a mission also helped for immediate reconciliation at a site, however, film proof of these transactions is also recommended.

#### Operations (CIVCAS Incident / Enemy Response / Local Impacts)

MAJ Laybourn was involved in mitigating every incident the battalion had as well as incidents that SOF units had within the AO. Primarily he would serve as the battalion mouthpiece to the GIROA and ANSF leadership IOT get their help in the mitigation effort. He met with the Governor weekly and the ANSF leaders daily which generated a very good relationship. When there were CIVCAS or rumors of them I would immediately call the governor and inform him. Because of his status in the battalion (S3) he had credibility with the governor.

MAJ Laybourn recalled two incidents which resulted in 15-6 investigations, one involved a child getting shot with a pen gun flare and the other involved SOF calling CAS on enemy and the rounds went long killing an old man and a boy. The process for informing the locals for each incident were essentially the same despite one being part of a belligerent action and the other an EOF. There was first an isolation of the area, attempt to render aid, collecting evidence and photos, contacting GIRoA and ANSF leaders (who were often on the mission already), arranging for KLE, paying a solatia if the situation warranted it.

BDA was conducted by the unit who inflicted the casualty (unless that unit leaves, which occurred with SOF units) then the BSO must pick up the slack. If ANSF inflict the casualty they were responsible but CF must be prepared to assist if the ANSF are late "perception in these events is everything."

If there was any sort of injury to an Afghan, enemy or civilian an assessment would be completed. The unit would also insist on holding a KLE to show elders what had happened on the ground. In some cases this helped mitigate already poisonous Taliban propaganda exaggerating or inventing CIVCAS where none existed. In one instance, two enemy were killed and the locals had been told by the Taliban that women and children were murdered. By showing the elders the enemy dead the Taliban message was discredited. This also helps with CIVCAS because Taliban messages will always be inflated (even if they are based on the truth).

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When it came to balancing the risk to CF, MAJ Laybourn considered it easy. "The more CIVCAS encourages the Afghans to support the Taliban so efforts which on the surface appear hyper cautious really protect our Soldiers. Furthermore, heavy-handed actions which destroy the innocent ultimately kill or harm the people we are seeking to protect. To protect one's garden you do not kill pests by burning everything there... though this does kill pests it kills all the veggies! Counterinsurgency takes a lot of effort and patience and a deliberate policy of protecting the civilian population."

When it came to enemy response and adapting to CF CIVCAS the insurgents would advertise actual or bogus CIVCAS causing the populous to get enflamed and riot. The insurgents would even be bold enough to have propaganda moles arrive at the scene to confront CF with words to get the locals angry.

When asked about what type of CIVCAS had the most impact on the local population MAJ Laybourn believed that Civilian casualties associated with a mosque or the Koran were the most detrimental. Most civilian casualties are received poorly but anything touching on Islam infuriates the Afghans terribly. He felt that "for the most part they are desensitized to death... civilian or otherwise. However, when that death can be associated with a perceived slight on the Muslim religion it goes over badly."

#### Post Incident Response

Following an incident the priorities would be to secure the site, treat casualties and MEDEVAC if possible, alert the Chain of Command and take pictorial evidence. Additionally holding a KLE with local elders and using a pay agent or food as a solatia payment in order to help the family or village. Informing the provincial governor was essential. Then they would compile evidence and make a story board for higher HQ and the show governor unclassified pictures of incident (including any enemy or weapons if the CIVCAS occurred during a fight where enemy were killed as well.) They asked the governor to publish a message via radio and print media explaining the incident (this last one was very important for mitigating enemy propaganda but must be somewhat subjective given the nature of individual governors' personalities).

A KLE is essential. If CIVCAS were involved then a solatia payment would be given. These techniques were very effective because it showed a willingness to help the locals. The learning process with this technique was learned from a couple incidents involving SOF teams who inadvertently killed civilians during missions in the AO. The governor had to be utilized to help subdue angry locals in these incidents and it developed from there... working with the elders, and explaining exactly what happened as well as paying the family and helping the village.

#### ANSF/Provincial Support

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Every mission was combined with ANSF. Because of this it was relatively easy to interact with them quickly. Normally if they or CF had a CIVCAS incident the Afghan Chain of Command is consulted immediately up through the BDE or Provincial Police level. Since the governor is also being informed this keeps parallel agencies involved and increases trust. ANSF habitually deal with locals better and would have a company commander (Coy) or battalion (Kandak) commander meet with village elders to hold a shura immediately. Most often a solatia payment for the family and some humanitarian aid for the village are offered which was very effective... it is more effective when ANSF participate or are taking the lead.

Though the national government had little interaction with our province concerning CIVCAS, the provincial governor was essential for mitigating local opinion and helping families. During one ANSF led operation the governor himself went to address the local elders after a civilian was killed in order to assuage their anger and help the next of kin. He provided his own money and personally published news stories and radio messages which was very effective in countering enemy propaganda and mitigating civilian emotions. Key to any CIVCAS incident is informing the governor immediately with some sort of pictorial evidence... it is also essential to tell him the truth. In an incident where a child was injured during an EOF with a flare, the Soldier had been reckless and the governor was told about this. This willingness to let him know what happened even if it was embarrassing improved his esteem about the unit even though a child had been hurt... subsequently the governor spoke to the locals and calmed them down. Incidentally, he was also made him aware of corrective actions for the Soldier and the unit.

The ANSF response process was the same as the CFs except the ANSF were much more timely in their response. In some cases an entire operation would halt to address CIVCAS (even if contact was still on-going).

### Improvements

The area the MAJ Laybourn considered most pressing was SOF working independently in the battle space owner's AOs. Because SOF Task Forces are not habitually interacting with the Afghan government in the provinces in which they operate. Though these teams do have Afghan partners who operate with them during missions they are not associated with the local government. This makes their missions very antiseptic for SOF but leaves the clean-up to conventional forces that may not be privy to all the information associated with the original mission.

Greater control over SOF elements operating in our battle space would eliminate a large amount of friction concerning CIVCAS. Because they are generally very transient and only generally have fleeting interaction with the local leadership, there are no relationships built between these agencies and provinces, districts and villages.

MAJ Laybourn also recommended that more wide spread pay agents would get the payments out faster. This capacity would give small unit leaders greater flexibility in the event that they encounter a CIVCAS situation.

### **Insights/Lessons**

**“ We simply made a great effort to engage the community and the Afghan leaders which showed our respect. We were very cautious in order to avoid CIVCAS in the first place which the locals know. This is not nontraditional as much as very respectful.”**

### **DOTMLPF Implications**

None

### **Unit/POC/Contact Info**

Charles E. Bruce (L2I "HUB" Warfighter Cell, CALL)

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### **Comments/Notes**

Interviews were conducted in a questionnaire format with key leaders from the 4<sup>th</sup> BCT, 25<sup>th</sup> ID. Original questionnaires are available at CALL.

## OBSERVATION

**Number** 03 cb 09-04-10

**Name** CPT Gelfgat

**Description** Comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS conducted with CPT Gelfgat who served as Battalion S2 for 1/501<sup>st</sup> PIR, 4<sup>th</sup> BDE, 25<sup>th</sup> ID during OEF.

### **Discussion**

The goal of this interview was to decipher CIVCAS incidents, pre deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with operational experience in Afghanistan.

#### **Pre Deployment Training**

During the Battalion's NTC rotation CIVCAS incidents were part of the scenario. Learning how to respond to the incident was useful and helped them understand what would happen in real life.

EOF was an integral portion of the in garrison training and incorporated firing warning shots.

Overall, he felt that they have been able to respond effectively and in a sensible manner to the CIVCAS that occurred during the deployment. However, he thought if given an opportunity to get familiarized with the local specificities and population's habitual reaction to CIVCAS during pre- deployment/PDSS/RIP-TOA they would have be able to minimize the "trial and error" period of the first two to three months.

#### **Pre Mission Planning & Mitigation**

At the Battalion level CIVCAS was routinely considered as an eventuality. Any mission that required entering private property/qalats of interest would entail a mandatory signing of a letter-type document initialed by the elders of the village and/or ANSF. Specifically, such a letter would stipulate that any casualties and/or damage occurred as a result of the mission is acceptable to the population, and that any actions taken by the ANSF/CF are in accordance with the local ways.

BDA was always taken into consideration. The most problems occurred when the unit was left to mitigate the consequences of the operations conducted by the Special Operations Task Forces. Lack of understanding of the local environment by the TFs would frequently create opportunities for severe backlashes and public outcry. It was through the local GIROA leadership and ANSF that they were able to restore the population's trust and not alienate a particular village.

CPT Gelgat believed that successful CIVCAS mitigation is only possible if our troops have a firm grasp on the tribal and geographical realities on the ground. A true partnership backed up by the CFs "willingness to take a back seat" and underline the primacy of the ANSF and GIROA goes a long way towards ensuring the safety of the CF. Getting local population and ANSF (especially ANP) interested in having a vested interest in the security of a village, and, in a way, "owning that specific village" is paramount to an overall success of the campaign and the subsequent safety of the ANSF/CF soldiers.

#### Operations (CIVCAS Incident / Enemy Response / Local Impacts)

Typically, any CIVCAS incident warranted notification of the provincial governor, key ANSF officials, as well as village elders. Concurrently, having ANSF leader(s) explain and present on the scene physical evidence tying that particular incident to insurgency would help alleviate any post-operational problems. Additionally, securing a letter from the village elders acknowledging the situation and agreeing with the ANSF/CF actions following an incident greatly improved post-incident mitigation efforts. Executing both of the above allowed them to successfully turn the situation towards the GIROAs advantage and avoid any potential public fallout.

The local insurgency has proven extremely adept at reacting to CF failures to mitigate in an expeditious manner. Every time ANSF/CF would fail to put its story forward under one or two hours, you would see an insurgent "spin doctor" talking to the locals and offering an alternate vision of what has transpired on the ground. Intercepting insurgent IO with timely and accurate reporting conveyed through the local villagers, GIROA reps and ANPs ensures the insurgents inability to react effectively to a situation.

CPT Erickson believed that the most detrimental CIVCAS incident would be a civilian death or violation of somebody's property/qalat would have the greatest impact if ANSF/CF failed to clearly show connection with the insurgency. ANSF/CF timely ability to produce evidence would be key to alleviating tensions. At the same time, complete admission of truth combined with other mitigation techniques (KLEs, notification of the GIROA officials as well as presence of the ANSF/GIROA officials on the scene) would frequently allow for an effective absolution of the CF of any blame associated with the incident.

#### Post Incident Response

BDA would be conducted by the CF and ANSF together every time. KLEs coupled with Solatia payments have consistently netted positive results.

We would make an effort to determine a real BDA following every Special Operations Task Force Operation through a battle hand over. We would also attempt to follow up any reporting pointing out suspicious activity entailing a possible CIVCAS. Any physical

evidence such as weapons beyond AKs or shotguns as well as Taliban propaganda would be used to irrefutably point out insurgency connections to the local population.

### ANSF/Provincial Support

ANSF leaders would always be involved in handling the situation and explaining details to the villagers. In the Battalion's province/AO (West Paktika) they were able to establish an effective working relationship with the local ANSF on every level (from district to the province).

National government has had little to no direct involvement in the provincial affairs during their deployment. But in contrast, the West Paktika Governor was very effective in responding to every CIVCAS incident. On multiple occasions, after a raid conducted by the Special Operations Task Force, if presented with pictures of the physical evidence indicating involvement of a particular group of individuals with local insurgency, the governor would be able to diffuse the tensions created by a rowdy lot of elders that would show up at his doorstep the next morning. He consistently shown willingness and prowess in handling post CIVCAS affairs. It has to be noted, however, that his ability to mitigate post-op consequences has always been directly related to how timely we have been able to share information and present evidence/pictures from the scene.

### Improvements

CPT Gelfgat indicated that if he could do anything differently he would "pay even more attention to the tribal and geographic break down of the area emphasizing deeply-rooted causes of the insurgency." Understanding the local "Human Terrain" is key to avoiding/mitigating civilian casualties. Specifically, population's reaction from the area with a stronger tribe, especially if the latter is perceived as more intricately connected to the local government, will likely result not only in a more significant public outcry but also trigger a keener response from the local insurgency. As such, ideally, the emphasis of the train up for leaders should be on the understanding of the local tribal and geographic intricacies even prior to coming to the respective AO. Understanding local people and the way of the land/Pashtunwali is key to mitigating CIVCAS.

Additionally, CPT Gelfgat believed that battle-space owning units should have a say in approving/disapproving Special Operations Task Force operations when it comes to the successful CIVCAS mitigation efforts. He felt that further emphasis on understanding the micro-dynamics of the situation on the ground was a necessity. Special Operations Task Forces should not be allowed to operate strictly based on Signal Intelligence indicators, they have to pay much closer attention to Human Intelligence and the complex local dynamic in the vicinity of each objective (usually, it is the combination of all "INTs" that nets the best results). Special Operations Task Forces have to work closely with the conventional units in order to avoid creating tactical blunders with strategic implications. A definite benefit would be derived from a longer tour duration of each Special Operations Task Force as well as better integration of with the



conventional battle-space owning units. CPT Gelfgat felt that a unit with a kill/capture only mission paying little to no attention to the post-battle handover fall out is becoming increasingly obsolete in today's COIN oriented Afghanistan due to its inability and lack of interest in mitigating CIVCAS.

### **Insights/Lessons**

Overall, he felt that they were adequately prepared to deal with CIVCAS eventualities. However, arranging visits from the HTT teams possessing intimate knowledge of the prospective AOs would have enhanced the BN's awareness of the local specificities.

### **DOTMLPF Implications**

#### **Training:**

- Incorporate HTT teams currently operating in the AO to assist in the training of key leaders and Soldiers to help them better understand the Human Terrain prior to deployment.

### **Unit/POC/Contact Info**

Charles E. Bruce (L21 "HUB" Warfighter Cell, CALL)

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### **Comments/Notes**

Interviews were conducted in a questionnaire format with key leaders from the 4<sup>th</sup> BCT, 25<sup>th</sup> ID. Original questionnaires are available at CALL.

## OBSERVATION

**Number** 04 cb 09-04-10

**Name** LTC Minalga & MAJ Altenburg

**Description** Comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS conducted with LTC Minalga (BN CDR) and MAJ Altenburg (BN S3) for 3/509<sup>th</sup> IN, 4<sup>th</sup> BDE, 25<sup>th</sup> ID during OEF.

### **Discussion**

The goal of this interview was to decipher CIVCAS incidents, pre deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with operational experience in Afghanistan.

#### **Pre Deployment Training**

Training at the NTC consisted of the usual incidents that were integrated into training. LTC Minalga and MAJ Altenburg stated that something they think that the CTCs should consider is to develop scenarios that give positive feedback to rapid BDA patrols. "Most units that fight in Afghanistan rarely see enemy bodies. Rapid BDA patrols turned up many. The BDA patrols definitely hurt enemy morale as we gathered up many of their bodies and turned them over to the local elders. This hurt the enemy and helped the ANSF as the locals respected their capability when they saw all the enemy dead." Additionally, more training should focus on preventing the casualties instead of addressing them. "You'll get plenty of guidance once you cause casualties. Our success can be attributed to working incredibly hard to prevent them in the first place."

The EOF training at the NTC was also the usual CTC EOF scenarios. They felt that some good scenarios to add would be those that make the soldier balance killing the enemy versus possibly hurting civilians with little danger to himself. Most situations, also valuable, focused on times in which the soldier is in danger and he balances danger to himself and killing a possible enemy/civilian. We did not initially allow warning shots in training. This changed in theater and then changed back with GEN McChrystal's guidance. The unit did not train in disabling shots.

The best training on CIVCAS came through constant BDE guidance and reiteration with OPDs and commander interaction. Company commanders had a good understanding of what was expected of them.

#### **Pre Mission Planning & Mitigation**

Protecting the population was the primary purpose of almost every mission conducted in theater. The East Paktika area of operations was conducive to killing the enemy away from civilians. The enemy in the Battalion's AO, in its effort to prevent civilian casualties, helped us in preventing them. Rarely if ever did the enemy engage our forces in the

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midst of civilians. The planned operations were likely to see enemy contact away from population centers. These missions usually involved securing terrain that could influence routes between villages. The enemy engaged frequently in these areas, but was easily defeated with CAS, indirect and direct fire with almost no CIVCAS concerns. ROE was the primary driver of mission planning for the frequent missions that occurred among the population.

All fire missions from 81mm through CAS were cleared by a field grade in the BN TOC and based on the latest available one meter imagery zoomed as close as possible. This process would add about 30 seconds to 1 minute to the process. During this time the S3,XO or BN CDR would help the CO CDR work through any ROE issues or help with other assets. We adjusted these missions to get the best effects for the commander and reduce collateral damage.

The guidance in the battalion was to conduct BDA within two hours. The terrain in the AO could add as much as 3-5 hours to this timeline. Every single IDF, CAS and OCF mission would have a BDA and site exploitation mission conducted immediately following. If there was a population center nearby the mission transitioned to an informal shura by the ANSF informing the locals of what had happened. This overrode almost every other mission in sector.

#### Operations (CIVCAS Incident / Enemy Response / Local Impacts)

The BSO always had the responsibility for conducting CIVCAS BDA within their AO. Even if another unit killed the civilians they still wanted the land-owning unit to do the BDA and mitigation. The area is treated like a TSE. If the situation was caused by insurgents, they would attempt to exploit them.

LTC Minalga and MAJ Altenburg stated that “almost every instance of CIVCAS mitigation that is brought up as an example of endangering forces is usually a misunderstanding or a lack of imagination.” One example of concern for them was in conducting BDA patrols within two hours of every IDF mission. In restrictive terrain this can cause a pattern that result in ambushes. Commanders must have the latitude to adjust to the situation. “If a commander thinks he’s setting a pattern, the BDA patrol may wait.”

The enemy set up ambushes for the Battalion’s BDA patrols in the Bermel valley once after they realized that they checked every engagement. They adapted by adjusting their time standards, conducted feints and using more prepositioned forces.

#### Post Incident Response

CIVCAS was CCIR, an immediate SIR and would constitute a 15-6 investigation. The Battalion had one CIVCAS incident during training when two rounds of artillery landed

1km east of its intended target. This caused two injuries, one minor and another requiring MEDEVAC.

Immediate coordination with the government (less than an hour) and telling the truth are the best methods. During the Battalion's incident, the Afghan leaders wanted us to tell the civilians that the explosions were from Taliban rockets. The Battalion leadership explained to them why they thought this was a bad idea.

All mitigations measures (KLE, solatia, media) must be conducted together and some would be more effective than others depending on the circumstances. CERP (no Solatia in their AO) would help the family, KLEs helped the community and Media is the best for countering Taliban propaganda in the larger AO.

### Improvements

ODA and OCF units did not clear their fires with the BSO in the battalion's AO. If they are given battle space and go through the usual routine of coordination beforehand, this works. ODAs, with their more liberal movement on the battlefield are more likely to have a CIVCAS or fratricide under the current guidance. They are usually unaware of the ANSF forces moving in the AO and if under fire, will engage. A BSO will be able to better determine civilians and ANSF in the area before clearing the mission.

Additionally, Excalibur rounds and M777s would help reduce the artillery CIVCAS concerns. ISAF has a high sensitivity to CAS as opposed to artillery. In the case of the 2/377<sup>th</sup> AO, CAS was a more effective platform at reducing CIVCAS but was highly scrutinized (120+ drops) even though artillery had more misadjusted rounds and close calls.

### Insights/Lessons

LTC Minalga and MAJ Altenburg would have preferred more gun training would help in the future.

### DOTMLPF Implications

#### Training:

- Incorporate more scenarios into CIVCAS training, include rapid BDA patrols.
- Incorporate additional challenges in risk mitigation for Soldiers during EOF lanes at CTC.
- Increased training in the employment of GPS guided munitions (i.e. Excalibur).

#### Materials:

- Incorporate GPS guided munitions into more munitions as needed to help mitigate CIVCAS concerns and collateral damage.

#### Leader Education:

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- Units need to begin AO focused OPDs on IO and CIVCAS early on so that junior leaders understand higher guidance early on and can enforce them among their subordinates.

**Unit/POC/Contact Info**

Charles E. Bruce (L21 "HUB" Warfighter Cell, CALL)

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**Comments/Notes**

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## OBSERVATION

**Number** 05 cb 09-04-10

**Name** CPT Davis

**Description** Comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS conducted with CPT Davis who served as the S2 for 3/509<sup>th</sup> IN, 4<sup>th</sup> BDE, 25<sup>th</sup> ID during OEF.

### **Discussion**

The goal of this interview was to decipher CIVCAS incidents, pre deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with operational experience in Afghanistan.

#### **Pre Mission Planning & Mitigation**

CPT Davis indicated that some of the mitigation measures that went into mission planning included having a representative with CERP/Solatia funds on all missions to provide compensation. PSSOF and CDE considerations were taken into account for all fires planning. During the targeting process the likely times for an increased presence of women and children were a consideration. Also, religious holidays and festivities were also a consideration (as celebratory fire could be mistaken as hostile fire).

#### **Operations (CIVCAS Incident / Enemy Response / Local Impacts)**

The Battalion had no CIVCAS incidents. However he did note some occurrences where the insurgents began removing weapons from the objective. This gave the impression that the fighters were unarmed civilians killed by Coalition Forces.

#### **ANSF/Provincial Support**

Whenever a CIVCAS incident occurred the injured would be brought to the US base for treatment. If LNs died during treatment they would be turned over to the ANSF or local elders for repatriation. The big issue with this is the timeliness of the handover to allow for a quick burial, often ISAF regulations and procedures slowed this process.

#### **Improvements**

CPT Davis indicated that he would have liked to see more ISR made available to help establish a pattern of life prior to fire missions and operations.

#### **Insights/Lessons**

Two capabilities that helped the unit mitigate CIVCAS during indirect fire missions was the use of the BETS-C and PSSOF. The BETS-C system was used at each FOB/COP to help clear the ground prior to indirect fire missions. Also the PSSOF software was used by the field grade officers when clearing CDE for indirect fires.

**DOTMLPF Implications****Material & Training:**

- Equip and train leaders who clear fires in the use of tools such as PSSOF in minimizing collateral damage.

**Unit/POC/Contact Info**

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**Comments/Notes**

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## OBSERVATION

**Number** 06 cb 09-04-10

**Name** MAJ Jasper

**Description** Comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS conducted with MAJ Jasper who served as the S3 for 1/40 CAV, 4<sup>th</sup> BDE, 25<sup>th</sup> ID during OEF.

### **Discussion**

The goal of this interview was to decipher CIVCAS incidents, pre deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with operational experience in Afghanistan.

#### **Pre Deployment Training**

The brigade conducted one internal COIN seminar prior to deployment. We focused on several COIN situations (not Afghanistan or Iraq specific), in order to collect ideas and practices that would be useful in OEF. The Squadron did conduct EOF training. They used the standard practices being taught back then, but quickly began to modify the procedures after arrival in theater. Over the course of the year the Squadron saw the reduction of some EOF measures such as no warning shots, restrictions on the use of pen flares, and the use of signs.

MAJ Jasper felt that so much training was crammed into the train-up that it would have been impossible to exploit the training opportunities necessary to understand CIVCAS mitigation. When it came to what the training lacked, MAJ Jasper stated that “the training needed to focus on the importance of putting ANSF/GIRoA in the front, it needed to be incorporated in all missions – not just lip service.”

#### **Pre Mission Planning & Mitigation**

Mitigation began long before mission planning with extensive training and leader development focused on the COIN environment – specifically focusing on the people as being the center of gravity. Ensuring that leaders and Troopers understand what constitutes Hostile Act, Hostile Intent, and Self Defense.

IPB was conducted as much as time permitted before entering any situation. Also, assessing Collateral Damage Assessment (CDE) in and around the objective area; all commanders on the ground, FOs, and TOC personnel must understand CDE. Civilian BDA was also considered and planned for prior to a mission. Prior to missions they ensured that all Troopers were trained on current EOF procedures and reviewed them prior to mission/patrol execution, that they had an understanding of local culture and customs and conducted a risk assessment for possible negative IO of the mission. All operations were combined with ANSF – “they lead, they plan, we train/coach them to consider CIVCAS.”



When it came to CIVCAS mitigation MAJ Jasper had a phrase: “sometimes it’s better not to shoot.” And would ask two questions:

- “Am I willing to devote huge amounts of resources, right now, to prevent the insurgents from turning this into a strategic IO victory?”
- “Is this essential to winning the COIN fight?” i.e. is this important to achieving effects along our 5 Lines of Effort?

#### Operations (CIVCAS Incident / Enemy Response / Local Impacts)

During the deployment MAJ Jasper served as the Brigade CHOPs and Squadron S3 and was involved in several CIVCAS incidents at the staff level. All of our CIVCAS incidents were documented using SIRs, ISAF CIVCAS reports, Storyboards, and EOF AARs (all stored on share-drives left with 3/101).

MAJ Jasper did not see or experience any changes in enemy tactics but did hear reports that the enemy was becoming more aware of negative effects of CIVCAS caused by them and that they may be changing tactics to mitigate these effects.

When it came to the impact of different types of CIVCAS he felt that the most detrimental was transient log forces moving through the AO who conduct an EOF but did not report it. Sometimes it would be days before they found out about it; by then, it’s a huge cluster and requires enormous effort to mitigate the effects. Additionally, CIVCAS from SOF units was difficult because often they refuse to remain in place long enough to conduct a battle hand over and it becomes an enormous effort to mitigate the effects.

#### Post Incident Response

The Squadron developed a “Deconfliction SOP”, “IO 9 Line” and “Integrated 60 minute battle drill.” They believed in the effectiveness of their battle drills so much that they trained our Afghan Brigade counterparts to the point that they saw the positive effects. They also disciplined themselves to conduct CIVCAS mitigation for all operations regardless if they had a CIVCAS or inflicted any collateral damage. In the long run, it was easier to control a situation early than to react to it several hours later and it provided additional opportunities to engage the populace.

When there was a suspected CIVCAS (actual or suspected) incident the BDA would initially be conducted by the unit on the ground; if necessary, additional Squadron support (IO, CA, etc) was provided ASAP. They collected photos and statements and would stay on the objective until the assessment was completed by both CF and ANSF.

MAJ Jasper felt that the most successful practice in CIVCAS mitigation was to accept blame early.

He mentioned an example where a father refused to even talk to CF for over a month after a CIVCAS incident with his family – “no amount of solatia would have made him

talk to us sooner”. Mitigation measures after CIVCAS should not be viewed as a “check the block” function. Units Be prepared for a long process, several weeks to several months if necessary “ keep in mind that we killed or wounded an innocent person – how would we feel in the States if the government killed an innocent person?”

### ANSF/Provincial Support

ANSF must always be in the lead during operations. They wanted their ANSF counterparts to do anything and everything that they did. They just were not in the physical or logistical position to sustain payments; however, they did put them in the lead to make payments – we also incorporated GIRoA officials in the process. “Putting ANSF/GIRoA, even if they do a marginal job, is better than CF doing a perfect job of CIVCAS battle drill.”

“ANSF can do a better job, over time, if we continue to provide them with maximum COIN training at all echelons. This seemed like a bridge too far, but we actually witnessed significant buy-in from our ANA counterparts after we began formal COIN training.”

Overall MAJ Jasper felt that most of their experiences with the GIRoA and CIVCAS responses were positive.

### Improvements

MAJ Jasper believed that the single most important thing that they needed for CIVCAS incidents was more rotary wing assets. “To do it right, you have to get resources on the ground, quick. Usually, the only way in is with R/W which inevitably take several hours to days to resource.”

### Insights/Lessons

- “We must continue to put ANSF in the lead, and they must become stakeholders in protecting Civilians.”
- “If the enemy takes cover in and around populated areas, even one qalat, then CF need to isolate, and allow ANSF enough time to conduct an Afghan entry.
- ANSF need to organize similar to CF (IO rep and/or cultural advisor, call out procedures, etc)”

### DOTMLPF Implications

#### Training and Leader Education:

- Soldiers and Leaders must understand COIN and the environment that they will be operating in as early out as possible and need to get current lessons learned from the AO that they will be operating in as early out as possible.

### Unit/POC/Contact Info

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**Comments/Notes**

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## OBSERVATION

**Number** 07 cb 09-04-10

**Name** CPT Meyer

**Description** Comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS conducted with CPT Meyer who served as the S2 for 1/40<sup>th</sup> CAV, 4<sup>th</sup> BDE, 25<sup>th</sup> ID during OEF.

### **Discussion**

The goal of this interview was to decipher CIVCAS incidents, pre deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with operational experience in Afghanistan.

#### **Pre Deployment Training**

The unit conducted a CIVCAS battle drill in the TOC during their NTC. Escalation of Force training was conducted during NTC. The most common scenario was a vehicle that would not stop while approaching a checkpoint. Warning shots were strictly forbidden in our unit due to the probability of someone getting hurt and due to the fact that a bullet is meant to kill not expend for a scare tactic.

#### **Pre Mission Planning & Mitigation**

As an Intelligence Officer CPT Meyer would attempt to recommend targets (personnel or area target) that are away from population centers.

#### **Operations (CIVCAS Incident / Enemy Response / Local Impacts)**

In some cases there have been reports of the enemy taking safe haven in a civilian home because they knew the likelihood ISAF forces would bomb it was low. A tactic to defeat this enemy TTP is to cordon off the structure until day break IOT prevent the enemy from leaving. At that point, an ANSF element would be instructed to remove the enemy elements from the compound for both cultural sensitivity reasons and prevent ISAF CIVCAS.

#### **Post Incident Response**

Within the unit, CIVCAS BDA was conducted by the Platoon or Company responsible for that particular area. CPT Meyer stated that the most successful mitigation technique he believed was when both ISAF and GIRoA officials taking responsibility for the event and providing a heartfelt apology to the local populace that it affected.

#### **ANSF/Provincial Support**

CPT Meyer did not personally witness such an actions on the part of the provincial government but felt that a recommendation would be for a Provincial or District

Governor to address the local population with ISAF counter-parts after the event to show the populace both us and the GIRoA can be truthful when mistakes are made.

#### Improvements

- Continued enforcement of ROE and risk mitigation prior to a mission.

#### Insights/Lessons

- Utilizing your ANSF and GIRoA officials during all CIVCAS exercises and prevention training is a must.

#### DOTMLPF Implications

None

#### Unit/POC/Contact Info

Charles E. Bruce (L21 "HUB" Warfighter Cell, CALL)

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#### Comments/Notes

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## OBSERVATION

**Number** 08 cb 09-04-10

**Name** MAJ Nall

**Description** Comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS conducted with MAJ Nall who served as the S3 for 2/377<sup>th</sup> PFAR, 4<sup>th</sup> BDE, 25<sup>th</sup> ID during OEF.

### **Discussion**

The goal of this interview was to decipher CIVCAS incidents, pre deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with operational experience in Afghanistan.

#### **Pre Mission Planning & Mitigation**

CIVCAS mitigation was incorporated at every level of operational planning. The ISAF ROE and COMISAF Guidance were always considered, from time of the operation, to infiltration, actions on the objective, IO mitigation and action upon withdrawal. CIVCAS BDA was also considered. It was called it their IO mitigation plan, but it incorporated an assessment and cataloging of any and all civilian damage.

To mitigate risk to CF forces the unit weighed the Pros/Cons of the operation against the likelihood of CIVCAS and risk and determined if the operation should be conducted at that time or not.

#### **Operations (CIVCAS Incident / Enemy Response / Local Impacts)**

The enemy knows CIVCAS mitigation is a priority for ISAF forces; because of this, they use civilian structures and population centers to their advantage, as much as possible. CIVCAS that caused the most disruption among the local population were incidents that happened in population centers. These incidents, if not acted on quickly by Coalition, ANSF forces and local GIRoA officials, could easily morph into mass demonstrations.

Before any operation, the Provincial Governor and local ANSF officials were informed. This was to get local GIRoA buy-in of the operation. This tactic and sharing of information, assisted greatly in reducing civilian blowback and bad local press in the event of civilian casualties. During and after operations significant IO mitigation operations were conducted. These activities were conducted whether or not there were civilian casualties. Another key part of our IO mitigation operations was to have key ANSF personnel (Co Cdr, Kdk Cdr, etc.) conduct KLEs with the village elder.

#### **Post Incident Response**

Coalition and ANSF would work together following any incident. CIVCAS BDA was conducted anytime shots were fired, IDF, CAS, or CCA assets were used. If there were

casualties found, BIOMETRICS data and other evidence was collected by the LEP and ANSF personnel.

Additionally, the Provincial Governor would appear on Khost TV, talking about what happened and what Coalition and ANSF forces were doing to compensate the family and village, as well as, prevent further CIVCAS incidents. This was their most successful mitigation measure.

### ANSF/Provincial Support

The ANSF and local GIRoA officials were a key part of the IO mitigation effort. Their presence on the scene, talking to local populace and their presence on the local TV station, talking about the incident, how it happened and what Coalition and ANSF Forces were doing was critical to gaining popular support. MAJ Nall thought the process that they used was pretty efficient; bringing in the local GIRoA officials and getting them in front of the population (TV, radio, etc....) works.

The Battalion was lucky enough to have a TV station in the Khost province. Keeping the provincial governor informed of and getting his buy-in on Coalition and ANSF operations was key to the IO campaign and IO mitigation efforts. They also saw that if the provincial governor was not aware of an operation and there was a CIVCAS, his ability to make things go from bad to worse, just by saying he had no idea of the operation, was huge.

### Improvements

- Continue combined action. It is painful to implement, but critical. The more we can bring the ANSF in on operations planning and IO mitigation efforts, the better.

### Insights/Lessons

- CA teams, IO officers, RIABs etc., all assisted with IO and CIVCAS mitigation.
- The use of the local TV and radio station was something that not many forces have at their disposal. But if available it's a critical component to success.

### DOTMLPF Implications

None.

### Unit/POC/Contact Info

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**Comments/Notes**

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## OBSERVATION

**Number** 09 cb 09-04-10

**Name** CPT Dickson

**Description** Comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS conducted with CPT Dickson who served as the A Co. Commander for 2-377<sup>th</sup> PFAR, 4<sup>th</sup> BDE, 25<sup>th</sup> ID during OEF.

### **Discussion**

The goal of this interview was to decipher CIVCAS incidents, pre deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with operational experience in Afghanistan.

### **Pre Deployment Training**

CIVCAS incident were scripted at NTC rotation and internal Squadron training done at Platoon level. Training scripts involved IDF by coalition and AAF, IED by AAF and direct fires by CF and AAF. Script involved response/redress by CF commanders of Solatia and KLE directly to family members and tribal leaders. EOF was always involved in training. Warning and disabling shots were always discouraged during training.

### **Pre Mission Planning & Mitigation**

Targeting guidance from Brigade and Squadron was always factored in. And no indirect fires within prescribed distances of civilian infrastructure were planned. There were also no fires on targets without PID of weapons and hostile intent, etc. This is always briefed as part of the mission OPOD process.

They used a Risk/Reward mindset for operations. No target was executed upon without regarding the impact upon civilian population; would destruction of target make a positive impact? If yes, then they would look at the risk to civilian population in executing the target and develop means to mitigate the risk.

Also, the KDK CDR was directly involved with mission planning, execution and CIVCAS risk mitigation. If CIVCAS did occur, the KDK CDR was directly involved with investigation and apology process.

### **Operations (CIVCAS Incident / Enemy Response / Local Impacts)**

The company had no direct involvement with CIVCAS incidents.

When it came to the enemy adapting to CF CIVCAS mitigation CPT Davis noted that he saw a change in IED emplacement schemes. Insurgents began emplacing IED's in vicinity of civilian infrastructure.

### Improvements

CPT Dickson stated that “constructing a truly unified CoC where all players in a battle-space were under the direct command of the battle-space owner when conducting operations in that area.”

CPT Dickson also indicated that he would like to make PSS-OFF mandatory for all IDF targeting and better training on its use to junior Fires personnel. Before he considered utilizing IDF he would always consult with his ANSF counterparts to get their take on the targeted area and target.

### DOTMLPF Implications

#### Training:

- Increased PSSOFF training for all leaders and fires personnel (to include junior fires personnel).

### Unit/POC/Contact Info

Charles E. Bruce (L2I "HUB" Warfighter Cell, CALL)

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### Comments/Notes

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## OBSERVATION

**Number** 10 cb 09-04-10

**Name** CPT McDonald

**Description** Comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS conducted with CPT McDonald who served as the B Co. Commander, 2/377<sup>th</sup> PFAR, 4<sup>th</sup> BDE, 25<sup>th</sup> ID during OEF.

### **Discussion**

The goal of this interview was to decipher CIVCAS incidents, pre deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with operational experience in Afghanistan.

### **Pre Deployment Training**

The unit conducted Platoon EXEVALs. During this FTX, several lanes consisted of similar scenarios where a CIVCAS incident occurred and the platoon was forced to react to the situation by conducting KLE and utilizing the one-hour IO battle drill.

At NTC, the unit conducted several lanes that involved Escalation of Force. The scenarios frequently consisted of a car trying to blow through a TCP. TTP's encouraged proper standoff, use of lasers or pen flares, use of blocking material such as concertina wire and cones. Soldiers were never authorized to use warning shots. Disabling shots were never part of training.

Prior to deployment the unit conducted an immense amount of training regarding COIN knowledge and practice. Involved in this training were many tactical situations presenting a dilemma between tactical success and strategic failure. They learned the nature of the COIN fight and how CIVCAS should always be at the forefront of the ground commander's mind when engaging the enemy. Killing a few enemy is not worth the cost if it means alienating an entire village.

### **Pre Mission Planning & Mitigation**

Each mission was closely analyzed according to the possible CIVCAS that could occur. After left and right limits were established, the scheme of maneuver was planned. Civilian battle damage assessment was also central to the mission planning process.

Because of the nature of the COIN fight, avoidance of CIVCAS was always the primary concern and took priority over increased risk to ISAF soldiers.

### **Operations (CIVCAS Incident / Enemy Response / Local Impacts)**

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CPT McDonald indicated that he did observe that the enemy would “frequently abuse and take advantage of ISAF CIVCAS mitigation efforts.” An example of this would be shooting at US forces from the center of villages or shooting at US forces then ditching their weapons in houses and moving away to different houses. Also, the enemy frequently took advantage of the fact that US forces are not allowed to physically search random homes or cars without just cause. This makes it very difficult to clear villages. The unit was not able to come up with notable effective solutions to these problems during their deployment.

When it came to types of CIVCAS, CPT McDonald believed that CIVCAS involving young children seemed to have the greatest impact on the local population because many villages feel they have a group ownership over children.

#### Post Incident Response

When CIVCAS occurred, the Squadron would send out a platoon to do consequence management. In the consequence management, the platoon would get the facts of the incident from multiple parties. During this time, the unit would also inform and get the SubGov involved along with the ANSF. Once the facts were gathered and analyzed regarding the incident, monetary compensation would be given to the families involved. When a CIVCAS incident occurred the Squadron would send the QRF out to gather facts and conduct consequence management. Additionally the QRF platoon would collect evidence, and look for collaborating evidence.

CPT McDonald believed that KLE was the most successful mitigation measure. It was successful because it showed the local nationals that US forces and ANSF forces legitimately cared about the incident. By conducting the KLE, US forces were able to get information out quickly explaining why the incident occurred before the enemy could take advantage of the situation. Media engagement was also very effective; the RIAB system was used extensively and it was a very effective tool when conducting the one hour IO battle drill.

#### ANSF/Provincial Support

The unit used ANSF leaders to assist in KLE’s following CIVCAS incidents, but did not let the ANA become too involved because a large majority of them are not competent enough to understand the situation and get the facts of the incident. Moreover, many ANA have skewed opinions and cannot be relied on to objectively get the facts of the incident. Additionally, the ANA have no ability to actually hand out monetary compensation.

Additionally, the provincial sub-governor would often send a representative to the sight of the incident to gather facts and make a show of support. This often helped legitimize the ANSF in front of the local nationals.

**Improvements**

None.

**Insights/Lessons**

- The focus on COIN is imperative to success. "Junior leaders must understand the nature of the fight over in Afghanistan right now. They must understand that it is not about how many enemy you kill, but about how many village you can win over."
- ISR was very helpful in some circumstances.

**DOTMLPF Implications****Training & Leader Education:**

- Continue to stress COIN education at the Soldier and leader level.

**Unit/POC/Contact Info**

Charles E. Bruce (L21 "HUB" Warfighter Cell, CALL)

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**Comments/Notes**

Interviews were conducted in a questionnaire format with key leaders from the 4<sup>th</sup> BCT, 25<sup>th</sup> ID. Original questionnaires are available at CALL.

## OBSERVATION

**Number** 11 cb 09-04-10

**Name** CPT Erickson

**Description** Comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS conducted with CPT Erickson who served as the for C Co. Commander 2-377<sup>th</sup> PFAR, 4<sup>th</sup> BDE, 25<sup>th</sup> ID during OEF.

### **Discussion**

The goal of this interview was to decipher CIVCAS incidents, pre deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with operational experience in Afghanistan.

### **Pre Deployment Training**

They conducted a CIVCAS event during NTC for civilians injured during an engagement between coalition and enemy forces. Civilians were treated and BDA was conducted, but a thorough investigation was not completed. They did conduct a KLE following the event and the event did have an impact on subsequent KLE's over the following days of the MRE. No redress was initiated. EOF training was included at Ft. Richardson and during NTC. Soldiers were briefed often about the importance of PID and not using warning shots. All shots fired are meant to kill or disable.

CPT Erickson stated that "understanding COIN was critical to our success in avoiding CIVCAS. Every Soldier knew the possible repercussions prior to deploying. Responding to it, especially when it wasn't our fault was a new experience and caught us off guard." He believed that training exercises should include situations where the population doesn't believe the facts and place the blame on the ISAF force.

### **Pre Mission Planning & Mitigation**

Civilian BDA was part of unit SOP and was a part of mission planning.

### **Operations (CIVCAS Incident / Enemy Response / Local Impacts)**

The company was involved in a few CIVCAS incidents that were not due to their actions. CPT Erickson felt that the first incident was the most difficult as "the people didn't trust us because we were new". One child was killed and one injured by a UXO and the unit was blamed for firing a MK-19 round into their village. An informal investigation was conducted and the evidence was presented to the people showing that it was an old Russian grenade. The elders accepted the evidence as truth, but many of the people still blamed the unit up until they redeployed. Solatia was paid to both parents for both the death and the injury.

When it came to risk management, CPT Erickson felt no increased risk based on the CIVCAS mitigation measures. On the contrary he stated “repercussions from a CIVCAS event had the greatest potential to raise the risk to ISAF forces. Focusing on protecting the population and letting the people know how important that goal is, led to lower risk for the Soldiers as the people wouldn’t allow AAF to conduct attacks against ISAF patrols in many areas. Following the ISAF Tactical Driving Directive made Soldiers safer in the long run.” CPT Erickson felt that enemy tactics changed in their favor. With CF support of the population, insurgents were restricted in where they could conduct attacks and that allowed us to focus security efforts on those areas. They did see an increase in IED’s along with a relative drop in complex attacks involving IDF and SAF.

### Post Incident Response

Every incident was dealt with immediately with the people involved and with the local elders. RIAB was utilized during more serious events to inform the people of the facts. They dealt immediately with helping the families concerned. Apologies were given regardless of if it was our fault or not. Once complete on scene or if another element was available, a patrol would go to the village/ tribe associated with those involved and give the facts and apologies to the village elders. The RIAB would broadcast a message relating the same things. Regardless of fault, if warranted, solatia payments were provided in 24-72 hours from the time of incident. Some people wouldn’t accept the apologies, but in the long run our response built trust with the people and our word was taken as fact as opposed to AAF propaganda.

CPT Erickson felt that the best response to CIVCAS was a KLE with local leaders and the families to apologize and explain what occurred. This was not a one-time thing. Multiple events over time were required to build a level of trust that will make things said legitimate. He felt that solatia was a good thing, but the people always wanted more money. It also needs to be done as quickly as possible or the people will start changing the story so that more people can get a cut of the money. Media is a great opportunity for higher level government to use when they conduct their government outreach missions. It is difficult for legitimate media to be used for local events. RIAB can be used where the Sub-Gov, local elders, and ANSF leaders can explain what occurred and the response. That proved to be extremely successful.

Civilian BDA was assessed for any civilian casualty regardless of severity and if any civilian property was damaged or destroyed. In addition to talking to witnesses, photos of the site are taken from multiple angles. Every platoon carried an SSE kit to collect evidence which could be analyzed later by CIED or other agencies if necessary. To determine fault, they compared accounts of the event and position of affected personnel or property to determine who most likely caused the casualty or damage, AAF or ISAF/ANSF.

-The best thing was a KLE with local leaders and the families to apologize and explain what occurred. This is not a one time thing. Multiple events over time are required to build a level of trust that will make things said legitimate.

-Solatia is a good thing, but the people always want more money. It also needs to be done as quickly as possible or the people will start changing the story so that more people can get a cut of the money.

-Media is a great thing for higher level government to use when they conduct their government outreach missions. It is difficult for legitimate media to be used for local events. RIAB can be used where the Sub-Gov, local elders, and ANSF leaders can explain what occurred and the response. That was hugely successful.

### ANSF/Provincial Support

The Company worked closely with ANSF and everything said was done on a united front (ISAF would take the lead while training the ANSF on how to do the process). Concurrently the local elders would conduct their own assessment of what occurred and would mediate between the family and Afghan Gov't/ ANSF/ ISAF leaders. Messages were agreed upon prior to talking to the people. They can do everything more effectively. It is easier for them to build the trust and the people believe them more easily than ISAF forces. By the end of the deployment, he felt the ANA in particular were an integral part of everything they did and they placed no restrictions on them. It did take an education program for the ANA leadership to understand how to deal with CIVCAS or other events. The ANA and local government is the only way ahead in the long term.

Unfortunately in their district the Provincial government was rarely involved with anything that occurred. The District Sub-Governors were however critical to the process though the people didn't always trust what they said. CPT Erickson felt that if the Provincial Governor had shown interest that it would have been received positively by the people.

### Improvements

One area that CPT Erickson felt could be improved was in enforcing standards with all units across the country and utilizing an Afghan run information campaign that focuses on Afghan rights on the road and what they can expect from ISAF and ANSF patrols. Additionally, CPT Erickson would have liked to see solatia funds more readily available.

### Insights/Lessons

The unit would integrate RIAB into messaging early on in order to help establish trust with the people, and feels that they dealt with every event in the right way. They were trained on the RIAB prior to the deployment, but felt that they lacked proficiency as it was new to everyone when they deployed.

### DOTMLPF Implications

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**Training & Material:**

- Increase fielding and training on the Radio In A Box (RIAB) to units. Allow them to work with it during their CTC rotations prior to deployment to gain familiarity with it and build it into their mission planning.

**Unit/POC/Contact Info**

Charles E. Bruce (L21 "HUB" Warfighter Cell, CALL)

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**Comments/Notes**

Interviews were conducted in a questionnaire format with key leaders from the 4<sup>th</sup> BCT, 25<sup>th</sup> ID. Original questionnaires are available at CALL.

## OBSERVATION

**Number** 12 cb 09-04-10

**Name** CPT Osgood

**Description** Comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS conducted with CPT Osgood who served as the S2 for 2/377<sup>th</sup> PFAR, 4<sup>th</sup> BDE, 25<sup>th</sup> ID during OEF.

### **Discussion**

The goal of this interview was to decipher CIVCAS incidents, pre deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with operational experience in Afghanistan.

#### **Pre Mission Planning & Mitigation**

As the Battalion S2 CPT Osgood provided intelligence that limited civilians and civilian structures to hostile activity on objectives. Civilian BDA was also part of the intelligence that was provided. Additionally, target information was provided that would limited risk to both civilians and US forces.

#### **Operations (Enemy Response)**

The enemy knows that they are being observed with ISR and that CF will not attack civilian buildings, so they run to or amongst them after an attack or after they have been discovered at IDF or IED sites.

#### **Post Incident Response**

The company assigned to the AO was responsible for conducting BDA. Reporting timeliness was critical for IO mitigation. Beating the enemy to the media was essential to winning the civilian minds. Additionally, pictures are the most useful to the Intelligence community. They tell the story. All action large and small helped, but most important was getting the information out as fast as possible.

#### **Improvements**

- More time prior to deployment to understand the local culture and how certain actions were perceived by the locals.

#### **Insights/Lessons**

None.

#### **DOTMLPF Implications**

##### **Training & Leader Education:**

- Begin COIN training and AO specific OPDs with current information about the area that the unit will be operating in early in the pre-deployment process.

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**Unit/POC/Contact Info**

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**Comments/Notes**

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## OBSERVATION

**Number** 13 cb 09-04-10

**Name** LTC Martin, MAJ Berk, SGT Wombles

**Description** Comprehensive Study Plan covering CIVCAS conducted with LTC Martin (BN CDR), MAJ Berk (BN S3) and SGT Wombles (Bn S2) of the BSTB, 4<sup>th</sup> BDE, 25<sup>th</sup> ID during OEF.

### **Discussion**

The goal of this interview was to decipher CIVCAS incidents, pre deployment training, planning, mitigation efforts and best practices from key leaders with operational experience in Afghanistan.

### **Pre Deployment Training**

Escalation of force kits training was conducted at the National Training Center and fielded to units, though rarely used.

### **Pre Mission Planning & Mitigation**

As a sustainment unit and non-battle space owner, the primary concern was avoiding vehicle accidents. International Security Assistance Forces driving standards were reinforced during mission briefs and rehearsals and situational awareness of civilian vehicles during operations is stressed.

### **Operations (CIVCAS Incident / Enemy Response / Local Impacts)**

The avoidance of CIVCAS was so important to overall mission success that some increased risk to the unit was acceptable. The Soldiers must therefore be even more alert, well trained, and able to discern a threat from a non-threat while conducting operations.

### **Post Incident Response**

There were no CIVCAS incidents during their deployment, however the unit did conduct an AR 15-6 investigation in July 2009, for A Company, 725 Brigade Support Battalion which was involved in a vehicle accident while traveling through Kabul which resulted in one civilian death. The AR 15-6 investigation after the event determined that the convoy commander did not follow ISAF driving directives and was moving in the center of a congested road. This led directly to the vehicle accident.

### **Improvements**

With vehicle accidents as the primary concern for CIVCAS in sustainment units, better situational awareness and real time information on route status and current level of traffic would reduce the hazard but not completely remove it.

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Also, stressing the importance of driving through major population areas during hours of darkness or, at a minimum, during non-peak driving hours so as to minimize the potential hazard to civilian vehicles.

### **Insights/Lessons**

- Enforcement of ISAF driving standards.
- Mitigating risk to Soldiers and locals through proper planning and avoiding peak driving times.

### **DOTMLPF Implications**

None

### **Unit/POC/Contact Info**

Charles E. Bruce (L21 "HUB" Warfighter Cell, CALL)

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### **Comments/Notes**

Interviews were conducted in a questionnaire format with key leaders from the 4<sup>th</sup> BCT, 25<sup>th</sup> ID. Original questionnaires are available at CALL.

## **OBSERVATION**

### **Observation Name**

TRADOC Support to U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Study.

### **Observation Description / Issue**

- On 6 April 2010, conducted CIVCAS interview with the 45<sup>th</sup> SuS BDE Commander, COL Clay Hatcher.

### **Discussion**

- In response to continued civilian casualties in Afghanistan and in support of the Commander, International Security Forces-Afghanistan (COMISAF), a DOTMLPF CIVCAS prevention mitigation study has been commissioned. Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) is leading the study.
- The CIVCAS Collection Plan contained 23 questions in the following categories:
  - Training Venues (Administrative and Operational)
  - Identifying CIVCAS Best Practices and Lessons from Operations
- There were many challenges when conducting distribution of sustainment operations through three battle space owners. In regards to CIVCAS; ISAF published guidance shortly before they left. Before that the C-JTF had guidance and mitigation for RC (E), NATO published guidance for RC (S) elements and as the MEB built capability they relied heavily on their POLAD cell for mitigation strategies. There were two CIVCAS incidents during the execution of convoy operations. In both incidents, procedures were followed and investigations were initiated.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned**

- The inclusion of joint logistical convoy operations would enhance the training protocol for the ANSF by incorporating the joint execution of the CIVCAS process.
- BDE HQs deployed and fell in on and built capability while deployed (doubling in size). Therefore, the Pre-Deployment Training was focused at the MRX at the HQs level.
- Internally, the legal team provided CJTF-crafted ROE and EOF training in large-group settings prior to deployment. As units became part of our Task Force downrange, the legal personnel traveled throughout the CJOA to provide intensive, in-person ROE and EOF training down to the company-level at least once per quarter. As ISAF and CJTF revised their guidance on EOF and other

tactical procedures, they immediately published the new policies, revised our training modules, and conducted small-group training sessions to ensure universal comprehension and compliance.

### **DOTMLPF Implications**

Training, Material & Leadership and Education

**Unit/POC/contact** info Mr. Brian Espenshade

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## OBSERVATION

**Observation Name:** TRADOC Support to U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Study.

### **Observation Description / Issue**

- On 6 April 2010, conducted CIVCAS interview with the 45<sup>th</sup> SuS BDE S2, MAJ LaShaunda Jackson.

### **Discussion**

- In response to continued civilian casualties in Afghanistan and in support of the Commander, International Security Forces-Afghanistan (COMISAF), a DOTMLPF CIVCAS prevention mitigation study has been commissioned. Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) is leading the study.
- The CIVCAS Collection Plan contained 23 questions in the following categories:
  - Training Venues (Administrative and Operational)
  - Identifying CIVCAS Best Practices/Lessons from Operations
- The Brigade S2 arrived the week of deploying to theater and was not involved in any pre-deployment training. In addition, the S2 did not have an active role with ISAF CIVCAS migration measures or efforts. The role of the S2 was dual-hatted at BDE and BN level and provided mainly intelligence reports to the units or convoy commanders during mission planning. The unit basically operated in a very large footprint that included three Regional Command's, RC-E/S/W. Most battle space owners SOPs, other than COMISAF Directives, dominated tactics, techniques and procedures for CIVCAS, ROE, and escalation of forces in contact.

### **Insights/Lessons Learned**

- ARFORGEN process needs to ensure HR has key personnel in place 6 months before unit deploys to OE.
- We maximized the use of HNT (AFGHAN 1<sup>st</sup>); this also reduced the need for green convoys on the road.
- Swift and thorough investigations are key to compliance.
- Our TTPs must evolve faster than the enemies.
- MSR's were the real battleground.
- Most insurgent attacks are videotaped for propaganda and recruiting.



**DOTMLPF Implications**

Training, Material & Leadership and Education

**Unit/POC/contact** info Mr. Brian Espenshade

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## OBSERVATION

### Observation Name

TRADOC Support to U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Study.

### Observation Description / Issue

- On 7 April 2010, conducted CIVCAS interview with the 45<sup>th</sup> SuS BDE S3, MAJ Ray Ferguson.

### Discussion

- In response to continued civilian casualties in Afghanistan and in support of the Commander, International Security Forces-Afghanistan (COMISAF), a DOTMLPF CIVCAS prevention mitigation study has been commissioned. Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) is leading the study.
- The CIVCAS Collection Plan contained 23 questions in the following categories:
  - Training Venues (Administrative and Operational)
  - Identifying CIVCAS Best Practices/Lessons from Operations
- There were many challenges when conducting distribution of sustainment operations through three battle space owners. During Distribution Operations, in RC-E, they conducted over 184 Escort Missions, 85 PLS Truck Missions, 48 High Visibility Moves, and traveled over 443,674 miles. In RC-S/W, 98 Escort Missions, 131 PLS Truck Missions, 34 High Visibility Moves, and traveled over 409,867 miles. There were only two CIVCAS incidents

### Insights/Lessons Learned

- Add some more consequence management training---the population relationships are key to success and any training supporting this is warranted.
- Additional medical assets with the ability to speak Dari and Pashtu would have been extremely beneficial to the response process.
- We maximized the use of HNT over 88% of the time (AFGHAN 1<sup>st</sup>); this also reduced the need for green convoys on the road.
- The Afghan transportation system works better than US.ISAF transportation systems in AFGHANISTAN. (AFGHAN 1<sup>ST</sup>)
- Immediately take photos of BD and obtain statements from local police and witnesses.
- Inquire about ISR data from battle space owners IOT assist in determining BD.

All convoys were equipped with “claims cards” packages to ensure any incidents were documented appropriately and, as applicable, proper measures were subsequently employed to compensate civilian entities for any resulting damage.

#### DOTMLPF Implications

Training, Material & Leadership and Education