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DESERT CROSSING pre-Wargame Intelligence Conference

29-30 April 1999
MacDill AFB, Florida

Purpose and Objectives

DECLASSIFIED BY: NEIL DIAL, BG, USAR, UCJ2
DECLASSEFY ON: 29 NOV 2005
ACTION OFFICER: JAY W. KENT, GG12, USAF

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DESERT CROSSING

Pre-Wargame Intelligence Conference

29-30 April 1999
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Stability Indicators



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Timeline



Stability Indicators

- **Information Requirements-- not Collection requirements.**
- **Purpose: determine measures of Iraq's internal political and social stability.**
- **Use: to facilitate CINC through NCA deliberations for the DESERT CROSSING Go/No Go decision.**

Stability Indicators:

Instruments of Control

- RA or RGFC commanders attempts to contact the US or regional governments
- Unauthorized "removal" of SRG/SSO political officers at all levels of military field units
- *Unusual* increase in insurgent *urban unrest (north, south, central)*, *decreased government control*
- *Unusual* Increase in government *mount suppression operations (north, south and central)*
- *Unusual* increase in insurgent attacks (*north, south, central*), *decreased government control*
- *Unusual* Increase in government counterinsurgent attacks (*north, south and central*)
- *Desertion rates/unit desertions (Unit cohesion)*
- *Unusual* movements by RGFC forces
- RGFC units move toward Baghdad
- *WMD use against internal targets*
- *Change in status or content of regime's broadcast media*
- Reports of fighting between Iraqi security or military forces
- Baghdad Security Plan and regional city security plans activated
- SRG heightened activity or deployments
- Increased numbers/reinforcing of checkpoints on roads and bridges
- *Change in C3 patterns*
- Terrorist attacks in Baghdad
- *Casualties from Coalition action*

Stability Indicators:

Leadership Consolidation

- Iraqi Political leaders attempt to contact the US or regional governments
- Announcement of New Leadership
- Continuing purges of high-level military or civilian officials
- *Status of key members of new regime (die, disappear or depart Baghdad)*
- *Status of key members of old regime (die, disappear or depart Baghdad)*
- Rapid VIP movements around the country
- New regime's alternative leadership arrangements publicized (i.e. "Regional Commands")
- New regime's alternative leadership arrangements enacted
- VIP "loyalty" checks/morale visits to units
- Iraq's Foreign Diplomats unable to reach authorities in Iraq
- Reports of fighting between new regime's factions
- Public denouncement of new Regime by a regional authority (Tribal, religious leader, government official, etc)
- Attacks on government facilities; official's residences

Stability Indicators:

Leadership Confidence

- *Announcement of new public programs, etc*
- *Successful execution of military orders*
- *Deployment of military units from Baghdad*
- *Public appearances*
- *International support, recognition*
- *Support of populace*

Stability Indicators:

Military/Regular Army

- RA commanders attempts to contact the US or regional governments
- Unauthorized "removal" of SRG/SSO political officers at all levels of military field units
- *Unusual Increase in government MOUT suppression operations (north, south and central)*
- *Unusual Increase in government counterinsurgent attacks (north, south and central)*
- *Desertion rates/unit desertions (Unit cohesion)*
- *Unusual movements by RA forces*
- RA units move toward Baghdad
- *WMD use against internal targets*
- *Change in status or content of regime's broadcast media*
- Reports of fighting between Iraqi security or military forces
- Regional city security plans activated
- Increased numbers/reinforcing of checkpoints on roads and bridges
- *Change in C3 patterns*
- *Casualties from Coalition action*

Stability Indicators:

Political/Social

- Iraqi Political leaders attempt to contact the US or regional governments
- Announcement of New Leadership
- Continuing purges of high-level military or civilian officials
- Key member's of new regime death or disappearance
- Key members of new regime depart Baghdad
- Rapid VIP movements around the country
- New regime's alternative leadership arrangements publicized (i.e. "Regional Commands")
- New regime's alternative leadership arrangements enacted
- VIP "loyalty" checks/morale visits to units
- Iraq's Foreign Diplomats unable to reach authorities in Iraq
- Reports of fighting between new regime's factions
- Public denouncement of new Regime by a regional authority (Tribal, religious leader, government official, etc)
- Attacks on government facilities; official's residences
- Shia and/or Kurds seize control of major cities and/or strategic facilities
- Broad civil unrest
- Iraqi media campaign focuses criticism on key leaders, families, tribes, or ethnic groups.
- Increased crime/banditry.

Stability Indicators:


Tribes/Ethnic/Religious

- Public demonstration for/against new Regime by a regional authority (Tribal, religious leader, government official, etc)
- Attacks on government facilities; official residences
- Shia and/or Kurds seize control of major cities and/or strategic facilities
- Broad civil unrest
- Iraqi media campaign focuses criticism on key leaders, families, tribes, or ethnic groups
- Tribal cooperation with new regime
- Status of regime payments to tribes
- Ethnic/sectarian diversity in new regime
- Providing arms to selected tribes
- Regime concessions to tribal/ethnic/sectarian

Stability Indicators:

Economic/Humanitarian

- Iraq seeks the aid of regional countries
- *Major outbreaks of disease*
- Ethnic atrocities
- Status of oil exports
- Large scale internal population displacement
- External refugee flows
- Status of national infrastructure (economic, health, etc)
- Severe distribution problems for humanitarian goods, ration card restrictions/shortfalls
- Breakdown of basic public services in major cities
- Environmental/ecological problems that exacerbate humanitarian shortfalls
- *Legal/Illegal foreign trade disruption/expansion*
- *Changes in exchange rate, prices.*
- *Economic policy changes-- foreign investment, production sharing, etc.*
- *Defense Spending and arms imports status*
- *Spending/repairs to basic infrastructure-- health, power, oil production, C4I, Translog, military and strategic industries.*
- *Increased crime.*




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pre-Wargame Intelligence
Conference


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“Worst Case” and
“Most Likely”


"Worst Case"




"Most Likely"




"Most Likely"




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


"Most Likely"



“Most Likely”






Purpose

- To prepare for the 14-17 June wargame of Conplan DESERT CROSSING
- Deliverables:
 - 1 succession scenarios examined, “worst case” and “most likely” identified
 - 2 succession indicators for each scenario
 - 3 stability indicators, post-Saddam

(the goal is community consensus)

Scope



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Scenarios

“A Russian Roulette of Regime Change”

- Assassination
- Military Coup
- Military-Political Conspiracy
- Palace Coup
- Constitutional Succession
- Popular Revolt
- Exiled Opposition Takeover

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Order of fire, Th 29 Apr 99

0800-0815 Opening remarks (Alexander)

0815-0830 the Wargame (J5 rep)

→ 0830-0845 Purpose/objectives/schedule (Hooker)

0845-0915 DESERT CROSSING J5 rep

0915-0930 break

0930-1030 "Challenges in the Aftermath of Regime
Change" (McCormick)

1030-1130 Assassination Scenario discussion (Hooker)

1130-1300 Lunch

1300-1400 Military Coup Scenario discussion (Figueredo)

1400-1500 Military-Political Coup Discussion (Figueredo)

1500-1515 break

1515-1615 Palace Coup Discussion (Hooker)

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Order of fire, Fr 30 Apr 99

0800-0830 Opening remarks/review yesterday

0830-1030 Stability Indicator Lists (Hooker/Figuero)do)

1015-1030 break

1030-1100 Review of "worst case" scenario (Hooker)

1100-1230 Lunch

1230-1430 DESERT CROSSING intelligence issues
(Hooker/Figuero)do)


1430-1445 break

1445-1600 DESERT CROSSING intelligence issues
(Hooker/Figuero)do)

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Pre-DESERT CROSSING Scenario Discussion: Assassination

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Scenarios

“A Russian Roulette of Regime Change”

- ➔ • *Sudden Departure*
- **Military Coup**
- **Military-Political Conspiracy**
- **Palace Coup**
- **Constitutional Succession**
- **Popular Revolt**
- **Exiled Opposition Takeover**

Definition:

“Saddam’s elaborate personal protection measures and pervasive and overlapping security forces have not prevented occasional attempts on his life. Serious attempts on senior regime figures in the last several years--particularly Saddam’s son Uday and RCC Vice Chairman Izzat Ibrahim--suggest that a dedicated individual or cell could take advantage of flaws in the security net around Saddam.”


- “lone gunman”-- not part of a wider conspiracy
- *sudden departure?*
- *Desert Fox II?*
- *Visibility of the event is key to outcome?*
- *Plotter from inner circle would lead to greater strife in aftermath?*
- is not a conscious effort intended to replace Saddam--more likely an act of revenge/crime of passion
- the act of assassination does not therefore propel the perpetrator to power
- if Saddam were to die suddenly of natural causes, the dynamic would be similar to an assassination

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Branches

Sudden Departure



#1
Sunni conflict in central Iraq, no clear leadership emerges; regime unable to control north and/or south
Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

#2
Unified Sunnis who would oppose US forces hold in central Iraq but are unable to control other regions while sections break away. Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

#3
Unified Sunnis who would not oppose US forces hold in central Iraq but are unable to control other regions while sections break away. Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

#4
Non-Tikriti ascends after limited struggle/palace intrigue; receives support of military/security services

#5
Elites maintain hold and rally around new lesser known leader(s)

#6
Inner circle closes ranks, produces new leader(s)

Less stability



More stability

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Sudden Departure Scenario Indicators

- Specific information of an Assassination plot
- Increased disunity/upheaval within the inner circle
- *Spike in high level defections*
- Regime retribution/violence against prominent social/religious/tribal figures
- Increases or dramatic changes in regime VIP security procedures
- Emergency meetings of Baath Party officials/members
- *Unusual media behavior*
- Emergency/unusual VIP movements
- *Baghdad/Provincial Security plan activated*
- *Changes in military/internal security command and control, communications (C3)*
- *Restricted international communications*

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Pre-DESERT CROSSING

Scenario Discussion:

Military Coup

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Scenarios

“A Russian Roulette of Regime Change”

- Assassination
- ➔ • Military Coup
- Military-Political Conspiracy
- Palace Coup
- Constitutional Succession
- Popular Revolt
- Exiled Opposition Takeover

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Definition:

- **“All known plots against Saddam since the Iran-Iraq war have been spearheaded by active-duty or retired military or security officers. Access to well-armed units, communication and transportation links, and a cadre of like-minded career officers give a military-spawned plot--especially one involving Republican Guard or Special Republican Guard elements--a higher chance of success than most other scenarios. The change could occur suddenly or after a period of disintegration of civil order.”**

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Background:

- On the morning of 14 July 1958, army units ignored instructions to by-pass Baghdad on their way to Jordan and entered the Iraqi capital. The army seized the radio station and broadcasted a dramatic call to revolution. Soldiers attacked the royal palace, quickly overcame the royal bodyguards, and shot King Feisal dead. BGen Abd al-Karim Qassim emerged as prime minister and commander-in-chief of Iraq.

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Branches/Sequels

Military Coup

#1

Triggers regional ethnic uprisings and fighting between major military units; external meddling

#2

Coup not recognized by some cmdrs; regional military strongmen emerge. Strongmen may request US assistance; Ethnic uprisings may occur

#3

Shia see coup as opportunity to revolt

#4

Kurds see coup as opportunity to seize additional territory

#5

Repression of ethnic groups; martial law

#6

Coup accepted by all of Iraq; somewhat smooth transition

Less stability

More stability

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
Military Coup Scenario Indicators

- Specific information of an Assassination plot
- Increases or dramatic changes in regime VIP security procedures
- Movement of RG forces into Baghdad
- *Insert Sudden Departure Indicators here*
- *Media and opposition group reporting surge*
- *Temporary media silence*
- *Communication pattern changes*
- SRG heightened activity or deployment
- Emergency/unusual VIP movements
- Bagdad security plan activated
- Key regime members depart Baghdad
- Reports of fighting between IZ security forces and military forces

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**Pre-DESERT CROSSING
Scenario Discussion:
Military-Political Conspiracy**

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Scenarios

“A Russian Roulette of Regime Change”

- Assassination
- Military Coup
- • Military-Political Conspiracy
- Palace Coup
- Constitutional Succession
- Popular Revolt
- Exiled Opposition Takeover

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Definition:

- “A coalition of senior officials and officers could remove Saddam in a move similar to the Ba’th Party takeovers of 1963 and 1968. Saddam has fostered a culture of patronage, complicity, and mutual suspicion that inextricably links the fortune and future of Iraq’s ruling elite to his survival in power. If, however, Saddam’s followers decide that his actions imperil them, they might seek to remove him in hopes of preserving the Party’s and military’s hold on the country.”

Background:

- On 17 July 1968, the Ba'athists, with inevitable army support, made their successful coup. Four senior officers had been approached for help: the head of military intelligence, the commander of the RG, the commander of the RG Armored Bde, the commander of the Baghdad Garrison.

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Branches

#1

Military unit conflict no clear leadership emerges; regime unable to control north and/or south

Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

#2

Unified conspirators, who would challenge US force, hold central Iraq but are unable to control other regions.

Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

#3

Unified conspirators, who would not challenge US forces, hold central Iraq but are unable to control other regions.

Likelihood of foreign intervention increases


#4

Conspiracy/coup accepted by all of Iraq; somewhat smooth transition

Less stability

More stability

Military-Political Conspiracy




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Military--Political Conspiracy Scenario Indicators

- Specific information of an Assassination plot
- Increases or dramatic changes in regime VIP security procedures
- Movement of RG forces into Baghdad
- *Insert Sudden Departure Indicators here*
- *Media and opposition group reporting surge*
- *Temporary media silence*
- *Communication pattern changes*
- SRG heightened activity or deployment
- Emergency/unusual VIP movements
- Bagdad security plan activated
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Pre-DESERT CROSSING
Scenario Discussion:
Palace Coup

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Scenarios

“A Russian Roulette of Regime Change”

- Assassination
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- ➔ • Palace Coup
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- Exiled Opposition Takeover

Definition:

"Rivalries and rancor within the ruling family--attested in recent years by defections, woundings, and murders-- could erupt without warning in bloody infighting or coup plotting. Similarly, members of Saddam's inner circle or the Tikriti clan who fear that his continued rule endangers them might try to oust him in a way that leaves other elements of Tikriti control intact."

- perpetrators already have access due to position

Branches/Sequels

Palace Coup

Tikriti coup plot unseats Saddam but cannot replace him; other Sunnis take control (or not). Mass violence: Tikritis vs others, Arabs vs Kurds, Shiite vs Sunni.

Tikriti coup plot succeeds only after protracted intra-clan fighting, massive break-down of order; regime unable to control north and/or south

Tikriti coup plot succeeds only after intra-clan fighting, some break-down of order

Tikriti coup plot quickly succeeds, new leader(s) get broad support from mil/security

Less stability


More stability

Palace Coup Scenario Indicators

- Specific information of a Palace Coup plotting
- Increased disunity/upheaval within the inner circle
- Broad threats to the Tikriti status in Iraqi government
- Threat to inner circle financial status/black market access
- Purges of high level military or civilian leadership
- Regime retribution/violence against prominent social/ religious/tribal figures
- Increases or dramatic changes in regime VIP security procedures
- Emergency meetings of Baath Party officials/ members
- Emergency/unusual VIP movements
- Baghdad security plan activated
- Fighting within Tikrit

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"Worst Case"

Status quo

(SO)
Saddam gone

Sudden
Departure

Unified Sunnis who would oppose US forces hold in central Iraq but are unable to control other regions while sections break away. Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

Military Coup

Coup not recognized by some cmdrs; regional military strongmen emerge. Strongmen may request US assistance; ethnic uprisings may occur

Military-Political
Conspiracy

Unified conspirators, who would challenge US force, hold central Iraq but are unable to control other regions. Likelihood of foreign intervention increases

Palace Coup

Tikriti coup plot unseats Saddam but cannot replace him; other Sunnis take control (or not). Mass violence: Tikritis vs others, Arabs vs Kurds, Shiite vs Sunni.