MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting With Congress On Cuban Air Defense Requirements

1. A meeting was held in the Director's Conference Room on 11 January 1963 at 11:00 hours for the purpose of reviewing and updating congress requirements on reporting of the Cuban Air Defense posture. The meeting was attended by representatives from DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, State and CIA. NEA participants were

2. The following issues were discussed:

a. The NEA proposal to increase the frequency of reports through an overflight program in progress to report mobile radar and other information in Cuba.

b. The priority order in which new reports developments/events in the Air Defense posture would be issued:

1. Air movements to US reconnaissance flights, with real time reporting on overflights and 3 hour reports on personnel.

2. Cuban aircraft flying rules.

3. Location and operational status of all tactical aircraft in Cuba.

4. Civil/military transport, identified as Soviet or Cuban, arriving or departing Cuba.

5. ACE, proficiency of the air defense/early warning systems, degree of Soviet influence.

6. Six-hour reports on total air mission, with emphasis on Soviet participation and influence.

c. The proposal from COMAD to move its portion of the Joint Reconnaissance Control Center (JRCC) at Boca Chica to Montgomery Air Defense Sector (MEADS), including the AFOSO Key West and the KN-25 circuit.

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 F.G. 129695
by Director, DIA/Chief, CIA.

SECRET

HANDLE UNTIL CHECKED 30 June 1974
3. The following agreements were reached:

a. The SAM recommendation was bought by all consumers, subject to the stipulation that possible hostile intent/action toward peripheral flights be accorded the same high priority of overflights.

b. In reference to priorities, the present arrangement was agreed to except for the following changes:

(1) The requirement for reporting on peripheral reconnaissance flights is put on the same plane as reporting on overflights.

(2) The requirements agreed to be in lower priority for reporting were agreed to solely on the basis of the expediency with which they would be reported. This in no way negates or denigrates the necessity for reporting such items as USSR participation/ influence, indications of Russian departure, proficiency of Cuban/Russian Air Defense systems, transport activity in or out of Cuba, and the location and status of tactical aircraft in Cuba.

c. In reference to CONAD's proposal to move to MAIS, the Navy dis
centeed, pointing out the need to keep the KS-26 circuit into Cuba for CINCLANT aircraft. The Air Force explained that, by tying to MAIS, greater intercept capability would be brought to bear on any "bad dog" Cuban pilot who decides to attack the US or to facilitate any potential defector aircraft's safe arrival in the US. It was pointed out that providing the type of reporting desired by CONAD would have an adverse affect on its capability to perform its mission for other consumers. MAIS will advise EDA of the decision reached on the CONAD request. No further action is required by EDA at this time.

Chief, F05

cc: AIP
NOL
WOL